
VIII Seminario Internacional sobre Seguridad y Defensa en el Mediterráneo

Nuevos escenarios de cooperación
Nouveaux scénarios pour la coopération
New scenarios for cooperation

Eduard Soler i Lecha e Irene García (eds.)



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PRESENTACIÓN

Narcís Serra

Presidente de CIDOB

Santos Castro

*Director General de Relaciones Institucionales.
Ministerio de Defensa, España*

La monografía que el lector tiene en sus manos recoge las ponencias, intervenciones e informes presentados en el octavo seminario internacional de seguridad y defensa en el Mediterráneo, celebrado en Barcelona el 26 de octubre de 2009. Estos seminarios, organizados conjuntamente por CIDOB y el Ministerio de Defensa, se han convertido en un punto de referencia para los especialistas en cuestiones mediterráneas y de seguridad.

Esta cita anual pretende consolidarse como punto de encuentro entre representantes gubernamentales de los países de la Unión Europea, de los socios de la OTAN y de los países del sur y el este del Mediterráneo. Asimismo, propicia un foro de diálogo entre académicos de prestigio y actores que están sobre el terreno, contribuye a profundizar en la comprensión de los distintos retos existentes en materia de seguridad en el Mediterráneo y explora nuevas vías para avanzar en la cooperación, tanto en el ámbito militar como civil.

El seminario de 2009 se celebró en un momento decisivo para el Mediterráneo y en concreto para las relaciones euro-mediterráneas. Tras meses de bloqueo a raíz de la crisis de Gaza del invierno anterior, la Unión por el Mediterráneo retomaba sus trabajos. Quedaba pendiente la puesta en marcha del Secretariado y, sobre todo, se estaba lejos de un clima político en Oriente Próximo proclive al diálogo y la cooperación. Con todo, los primeros pasos de la administración Obama en política exterior o el inminente inicio de la Presidencia española del Consejo de la UE aumentaban las expectativas sobre cambios positivos en la región.

A la vista de los retos y desafíos que afloran en el Mediterráneo, este octavo seminario apostó por analizar nuevos escenarios de cooperación en materia de seguridad y defensa. En primer lugar, se planteó una apertura conceptual analizando los nexos entre seguridad convencional y seguridad humana y su correspondiente desafío en el mundo árabe. En segundo lugar, el debate se centró en evaluar el diálogo trasatlántico y su reper-

cusión en el Mediterráneo, especialmente relevante ante el nuevo enfoque adoptado por la nueva Administración Obama. En último lugar, en el marco de grupos de trabajo, se abordó cómo mejorar la cooperación en seguridad marítima, protección civil y gestión de crisis, para los cuales se precisa de una solución conjunta si queremos conseguir convertir el Mediterráneo en el área de paz, estabilidad y prosperidad al que ha aspirado desde sus inicios el Proceso de Barcelona.

Desde CIDOB y el Ministerio de Defensa invitamos a la lectura de las contribuciones recogidas en esta monografía. Los distintos recorridos profesionales y académicos de los ponentes, las distintas percepciones, opiniones y vivencias enriquecen un diálogo y una reflexión que pretende exportar confianza y transparencia entre los socios del Mediterráneo, reforzar la cooperación, lograr un multilateralismo efectivo y abogar por soluciones regionales, que debería ser un objetivo compartido por todos los gobiernos y sociedades de la cuenca mediterránea.

Narcís Serra

Président de CIDOB

Santos Castro

*Directeur général des Relations institutionnelles.
Ministère de la défense, Espagne*

La monographie que vous avez dans les mains reprend les exposés, les interventions et les rapports présentés au cours du huitième séminaire international sur la sécurité et la défense en Méditerranée, qui a eu lieu à Barcelone le 26 octobre 2009. Ces séminaires, organisés par la Fondation CIDOB et le Ministère de la défense d'Espagne, sont devenus un rendez-vous de référence pour les spécialistes en matière de Méditerranée et sécurité.

Ce rendez-vous annuel cherche à se consolider comme un point de rencontre entre des représentants des gouvernements des pays de l'Union européenne, des membres de l'OTAN et des pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée. Il ouvre également un forum de dialogue entre des académiciens de prestige et des acteurs qui travaillent sur le terrain, tout en contribuant à approfondir dans la compréhension des différents défis qui se posent en matière de sécurité en Méditerranée et en explorant de nouvelles voies pour avancer dans la coopération, aussi bien dans le domaine militaire que civil.

Le séminaire de 2009 a eu lieu à un moment décisif pour la Méditerranée et, notamment, pour les relations euro-méditerranéennes. Après des mois de blocage en raison de la crise de Gaza de l'hiver précédent, l'Union pour la Méditerranée renouait son travail. Or, le Secrétariat n'était pas encore en marche et, surtout, nous étions loin d'un climat politique au Proche-Orient enclin au dialogue et à la coopération. Néanmoins, les premiers pas de l'Administration Obama en matière de politique étrangère ou le début imminent de la Présidence espagnole du Conseil de l'UE multipliaient les attentes de changements positifs dans la région.

À la lumière des défis qui se présentent en Méditerranée, ce huitième séminaire a voulu analyser de nouveaux cadres de coopération en matière de sécurité et de défense. Pour commencer, le séminaire a adressé une ouverture conceptuelle en analysant les liens entre sécurité conventionnelle et sécurité humaine avec leur défi correspondant dans le monde

arabe. Deuxièmement, le débat a été axé autour de l'évaluation du dialogue transatlantique et sa répercussion en Méditerranée, spécialement pertinente en raison de la nouvelle approche adoptée par la nouvelle Administration Obama. Pour terminer, dans le contexte de groupes de travail, les participants ont adressé la façon d'améliorer la coopération en matière de sécurité maritime, de protection civile et de gestion de crise, sujets pour lesquels une solution d'ensemble est nécessaire si nous voulons réussir à faire de la Méditerranée la zone de paix, de stabilité et de prospérité à laquelle le Processus de Barcelone aspire depuis ses débuts.

CIDOB et le Ministère de la défense vous invitent à lire les contributions reprises dans cette monographie. Les différents parcours professionnels et académiques des rapporteurs, les différentes perceptions, points de vue et expériences enrichissent un dialogue et une réflexion visant à exporter la confiance et la transparence parmi les partenaires de la Méditerranée, à renforcer la coopération, à aboutir à un multilatéralisme effectif et à plaider pour des solutions régionales, un objectif que tous les gouvernements et les sociétés du bassin méditerranéen devraient partager.

Narcís Serra

Président of CIDOB

Santos Castro

*Director General for Institutional Relations.
Ministry of Defence, Spain*

This monographic work contains the speeches, comments and reports presented at the 8th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean held in Barcelona on 26 October, 2009. These annual seminars, jointly organised by CIDOB and the Spanish Ministry of Defence, have become a vital point of reference for specialists in security and Mediterranean issues.

The aim of the event is to become a regular gathering of governmental representatives of the European Union countries, NATO members and the countries of the south and east of the Mediterranean. It aims to provide a forum for dialogue between these actors and the leading academics and practitioners working on the ground in the region in order to build shared understandings of the different security challenges in and around the Mediterranean. It also aims to explore new means of enhancing cooperation in military and civilian spheres.

The 2009 seminar took place at a decisive moment for the Mediterranean, and specifically for Euro-Mediterranean relations. After months of blockage caused by the crisis in Gaza, the Union for the Mediterranean had finally recommenced its work. Pending tasks included setting up the Secretariat and, most notably, confronting a political climate in the Near East especially averse to dialogue and cooperation. Yet, the early signs of a more cooperative foreign policy approach by the Obama Administration in the United States, together with the imminent launch of Spain's EU Council presidency served, however, to boost expectations for some positive changes.

In view of the challenges that abound in the Mediterranean, this eighth seminar analysed new scenarios for cooperation in security and defence issues. The event opened by analysing the conceptual link between conventional security and human security and the respective challenges both concepts pose in the Arab world. Secondly, and in view of the change of direction represented by the Obama Administration, the debate focused

on the transatlantic dialogue and its impact on the ground. Finally, participants were divided into working groups and invited to examine the possibilities for boosting cooperation in maritime security, civil protection and crisis management. Areas that require a joint effort to turn the Mediterranean into an area of peace, stability and prosperity, as aspired to since the earliest days of the Barcelona Process.

We at CIDOB and the Ministry of Defence hope that you, the reader, will enjoy the different views compiled in this monographic work. The professional and academic backgrounds of the contributors - their different perspectives, opinions and experiences - all serve to enrich a dialogue that aims to encourage trust and transparency among the Mediterranean partners; to strengthen cooperation; achieve effective multilateralism and champion regional solutions, all of which should become central to the shared objectives of the governments and societies of the Mediterranean basin.

INTRODUCCIÓN

- ESPAÑA Y LA SEGURIDAD EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO

Luis Cuesta Civís

- SWEDISH PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
EU'S SECURITY POLICY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Hakan Jevrell

Luis Cuesta Civís

*Secretario General de Política de Defensa
Ministerio de Defensa, España*

Barcelona se ha convertido, sin duda alguna, en un punto de encuentro único para seguir profundizando en una Asociación Euro-Mediterránea, que nació en 1995 y fue relanzada en 2008 mediante la nueva Unión por el Mediterráneo (UpM).

A lo largo de estos años, hemos visto cómo los grandes objetivos de la Declaración de Barcelona, aprobados en su programa de Trabajo del X Aniversario (2005) siguen plenamente vigentes y se proyectan y complementan con las nuevas prioridades de la UpM a fin de construir un diálogo constructivo y de cooperación entre nuestras naciones y sus pueblos.

En efecto, nuestro objetivo común es seguir trabajando por lograr esa área de paz, de estabilidad y de prosperidad compartida, desarrollando nuestras relaciones sobre la base de unos principios fundamentales, como son el respeto mutuo, la promoción de los derechos humanos, la tolerancia y la democracia.

Por ello, consideramos fundamental seguir avanzando en la comprensión mutua de los problemas y necesidades, especialmente en el campo de la seguridad y la defensa, para tratar de alcanzar respuestas comunes a desafíos comunes. De ahí la importancia de la celebración de este seminario.

Permítanme que resalte brevemente la evolución que hemos experimentado, a nivel nacional e internacional, desde que se celebró la VII edición del Seminario de Seguridad y Defensa en Barcelona el año pasado.

Por un lado, la nueva Directiva de Defensa Nacional 1/2008, sancionada por el Presidente del Gobierno, recoge un mandato muy claro para desarrollar en esta Legislatura: apoyar todas las iniciativas de seguridad que se desarrollan en este ámbito geográfico, como son la Iniciativa subregional 5+5 y el Diálogo Mediterráneo de la OTAN, así como las que se puedan desarrollar en el ámbito de la Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa (directriz u).

Los grandes objetivos de la Declaración de Barcelona siguen plenamente vigentes y se proyectan y complementan con las nuevas prioridades de la UpM

El Mediterráneo es una región de "importancia y oportunidad" para Europa hacia donde debe ir dirigida nuestra mayor atención

También estamos desarrollando nuestras relaciones con los países del Magreb y de Oriente Medio en el marco bilateral a través del intercambio de visitas y la realización de numerosas actividades de interés común para nuestra Defensa y sus Fuerzas Armadas, que incluye aspectos relativos a la formación, el mantenimiento de la paz, etc.

Ejemplo claro de este diálogo entre nuestros pueblos ha sido la reciente visita realizada por el Presidente del Gobierno a Siria, Israel, los territorios Palestinos, Jordania y Líbano. En este último país, ha estado también acompañado por la Ministra Carme Chacón, quien desea enviar a todos ustedes su más cordial saludo y su agradecimiento por haber atendido esta convocatoria.

Juntos han visitado de nuevo a las tropas españolas en el Líbano (la primera fue en enero de 2008), lanzando un mensaje de apoyo y reconocimiento a la labor que realizan nuestras tropas en la misión de Naciones Unidas (junto con las de otras muchas naciones) y de compromiso con la seguridad y la estabilidad de la región en su conjunto.

Recíprocamente, el Presidente de esta República, Michel Suleimán, y el Ministro de Defensa, Elías El Murr, visitaron el pasado día 20 de octubre al Presidente, José Luís Rodríguez Zapatero, y a la Ministra de Defensa, Carme Chacón. De esta manera, nos estamos preparando para trabajar más estrechamente cuando España asuma el mando de UNIFIL y la Presidencia de la Unión Europea en el primer Semestre de 2010 y Líbano participe como miembro no permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU en el bienio 2010-2011.

La próxima visita del Ministro de Defensa de Israel, Ehud Barack, permitirá reforzar las estrechas relaciones bilaterales que mantenemos entre nuestros países (desde hace 23 años), así como dar más profundidad al diálogo sobre cuestiones de seguridad que afectan a la región.

Por otro lado, nuestra Presidencia de la Unión Europea tendrá también como referente el Informe sobre la Implementación de la Estrategia de Seguridad Europea "*Providing Security in a Changing World*", acordado en diciembre de 2008 y el nuevo Tratado de Lisboa, en vigor desde el 1 de diciembre de 2009.

Será entonces cuando defendamos, una vez más, que el Mediterráneo, como dice el informe, es una región de "importancia y oportunidad" para Europa, hacia donde debe ir dirigida nuestra mayor atención. Al fin y al cabo, la asociación euromediterránea está integrada por 43 naciones y representada por más de 700 millones de personas. Deseamos asociar más la Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa (PESD) a los países de las riberas Sur y Oriental del Mediterráneo.

Este enorme potencial nos anima a trabajar ya en la amplia agenda de temas a tratar durante los dos eventos que están previstos durante nuestra Presidencia de la UE. Por un lado, la reunión ministerial de defensa, a nivel 27 + 5, con los países del Magreb, que tendrá lugar en Palma de Mallorca el 24 y 25 de febrero DE 2010, en la que deseamos lanzar una reflexión sobre nuestra cooperación para hacer frente a desafíos comunes a nuestra seguridad y, por otro lado, la celebración de la II Cumbre de la Unión por el Mediterráneo (UpM) en Barcelona, prevista el 7 de junio de 2010.

No me gustaría terminar mis palabras sin resaltar, asimismo, la importante contribución que realiza la OTAN a la seguridad en el Mediterráneo, a través del Diálogo que mantiene con siete países de la región desde el año 1994.

A lo largo de estos años, esta relación se ha hecho más sólida y así lo reconoce la declaración de los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno acordada el pasado mes de abril 2009 en la Cumbre de Estrasburgo-Kehl.

En este contexto, compartimos con nuestros aliados y socios mediterráneos que la paz y la estabilidad en el Mediterráneo son esenciales para la seguridad euro-atlántica. Por ello, consideramos que el principio de la co-propiedad (*joint ownership*) debe seguir reforzándose para garantizar el éxito de esta relación.

En definitiva, desde distintas esferas compartimos la necesidad de seguir incrementando el diálogo político y la cooperación práctica con los países de la ribera sur en una amplia gama de materias. En realidad, cada vez son más los temas que ocupan nuestra agenda, como la energía, las migraciones, el terrorismo, la formación, etc.

El Seminario que hoy inauguramos aporta el valor añadido de ampliar nuestro debate a tres temas que consideramos muy relevantes: la seguridad marítima, la protección civil y las misiones de gestión de crisis.

Estoy convencido de que, tras el intenso día de trabajo que hoy nos reúne a todos, podremos extraer conclusiones que nos permitan seguir avanzando en nuestro deseo común de forjar un espacio de seguridad euromediterráneo, sustentado en el diálogo, la tolerancia y el respeto, porque nuestras naciones y nuestros pueblos tienen el derecho a convivir en paz y en estabilidad. Y ello requiere el esfuerzo y empeño de todos.

Compartimos la necesidad de seguir incrementando el diálogo político y la cooperación práctica con los países de la ribera sur en una amplia gama de materias

Hakan Jevrell

*State Secretary
Secretariat General for Defence Policy, Sweden*

The issues addressed at this seminar – Maritime security, civil protection and crisis management – are all very important issues and of high priority, also to the Swedish Presidency. The focus today is the Mediterranean area, but the challenges are common everywhere.

Let me start with Maritime Security. One of our priorities during the Swedish Presidency is to move forward on maritime surveillance, being one important aspect of maritime security.

Maritime surveillance is an area where an increased cooperation, both between agencies and between Member States really can make a difference and make the most of already existing resources. This is relevant for many areas: trade, law enforcement, border control, disaster response, the protection of the maritime environment and fisheries control. It also has a role to play in security in international crisis management operations.

Before I do that, I would also like to touch upon the two other topics of this seminar, civil protection and crisis management, which are both of high relevance for all of us.

The EU civil protection cooperation has developed over the past years, in many regards as a reaction to several natural disasters both inside and outside the Union. We remember the Tsunami in South-East Asia and the hurricane Katrina, but also the forest fires in the Mediterranean, earthquakes in Italy, storm disasters in Sweden, and flooding in central Europe.

The climate change has given us several new and complex challenges and therefore we need to make the best possible use of the available resources. But we also need to look at ourselves in order to meet the demands of our citizens to respond to the specific needs that we are facing.

Prevention in civil protection is also high on the agenda. We find that the focus for a long time has been on response and preparedness on an EU level. But for responding ably, we also need to develop our national competences. We all know that the support that is closest at hand is the most efficient.

Maritime surveillance is an area where an increased cooperation, both between agencies and between Member States really can make a difference and make the most of already existing resources

The EU identifies and develops capabilities for international crisis management separate for civilian and military needs. To make the most efficient use of Member States' resources, more coordination and cooperation is needed in order to find and promote civil-military synergies

That is also why regional cooperation in civil protection is becoming increasingly important. Recently the EU has agreed on several regional actions where civil protection is highlighted as one of the priority areas. I look for example at the Eastern partnership cooperation, and at the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean. One important aspect of this is to find synergies and to avoid duplication.

Now let me move on to crisis management, and more specifically the EU Battlegroups. The establishment of the Battlegroups provides the Union with a capability to act swiftly and globally. It gives the ESDP credibility.

The Battlegroup concept also serves as a tool for transformation of our national defences into more mobile and rapidly deployable forces. This is certainly true for my country, where our new Defence Reform to a large extent builds on experiences from the Nordic Battlegroup. However the fact that no Battlegroup has been deployed, despite calls for its use, might put the credibility of this instrument at risk.

We believe that the Battlegroup concept as such is still relevant. The problem does not lie within the concept. The instrument is ready, but are we ready to use it? We have invested resources and tax payers' money to make Battlegroups a reality. This is why The Swedish Presidency has launched a discussion on the usability and flexibility of the EU Battlegroups. The discussions so far have been fruitful and are proceeding well in Brussels.

In crisis management, the EU has a well developed conceptual framework for civil-military coordination. However, there is a general understanding among the EU Member States that more can be done.

The EU identifies and develops capabilities for international crisis management separate for civilian and military needs. To make the most efficient use of Member States' resources, more coordination and cooperation is needed in order to find and promote civil-military synergies.

An important starting point for further analysis is experience from missions and operation where we know that there are practical issues where shared civil-military benefits are found. These include training, risk assessment/intelligence/information sharing, evacuation/MEDEVAC, logistics/support and lessons learned.

Returning to the issue of Maritime Surveillance, I would like to point out that in the Baltic Sea region, lessons learned have shown that maritime security and safety in its broadest sense, benefits from cooperation across borders and sectors.

Learning from one another is of course not limited to countries bordering each other, or countries bordering the same area. Sharing experiences between regions are also that important. During our Presidency we use the SUCBAS cooperation in the Baltic Sea as an example, hoping that parts can be relevant for other cooperation in other regions.

SEGURIDAD HUMANA Y DESARROLLO: LA SEGURIDAD HUMANA EN EL MUNDO ÁRABE

- HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ARAB WORLD
AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid

Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid

*Professor of Political Science,
Cairo University*

Human security in any part of the world should not be seen as a matter of exclusive concern to citizens of this part. Human security, when undermined, would have serious implications for other countries as well. Certain dimensions of human security are closely related to national security as conventionally defined. Other dimensions of human security, though are usually far removed from concerns of national security experts and officials, are bound also to threaten national security. This understanding of the links between human security and national security is also true in the case of human security in the Arab world. One can easily state that human security in the Arab world must be a concern for Europe, a Northern neighbour of the Arab world.

To illustrate these points, this short paper would examine first the concept of human security as understood in the Arab world, moves to explain the different threats to human security in Arab countries and it concludes by suggesting some ways through which human security could be enhanced in this region, and how Europe could contribute to it.

HUMAN SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Human security scholars tend to emphasize the differences between human security and conventional understanding of security. The object of human security is the individual human being, whereas conventional security studies focus more on state security. The former suggest that threats to human security are multi-dimensional, economic, social, political, cultural as well as military, with no particular dimension being necessarily more important than others, unlike the latter who privilege the military dimension, being in their view the most important threat to national security. Threats to human security (HS) come very often from within the society itself, while threats to national security come mostly from external forces, usually other states or terrorist groups located abroad or inspired by leaders in other countries.

An examination of sources of threat to HS would indicate that despite these differences, there are strong links between the two concepts.

Human security in any part of the world should not be seen as a matter of exclusive concern to citizens of this part. Human security, when undermined, would have serious implications for other countries as well

In countries or regions where life itself is not under threat, the appropriate question is: what enhances human security? In other countries or regions, where life itself is under threat, the appropriate question would be: how to confront threats to human security? The Arab world belongs to the second category

Threats to HS, as will be argued later, could be divided into hard and soft security threats. The former entail the danger of loss of life, whereas the latter could impair the quality of life. Foreign military intervention and identity conflicts that escalate into civil wars as well as repressive measures by the state could lead to murder of large numbers of people. Unemployment, poverty, famines, lack of health care and ineffective protection of personal security, is all soft security threats, which undermine the quality of life.

But it is easy to see that hard security threats are also threats to national security. The foreign military intervention is a violation of the sovereignty of the state, the theatre of this intervention. This intervention would lead to an increase in regional and perhaps also international tension. Identity conflicts in one country could impact the security of other neighbouring countries, either because supporters of one party in this conflict could seek refuge in that state, or because neighbouring states may find themselves drawn, voluntarily or involuntarily into that conflict, for ideological or ethnic solidarity considerations.

Soft security threats also could affect other states' security in many ways: poverty, unemployment and famine may drive large numbers of people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, thus exerting strong pressures on the host countries' economic resources and could be met by hostile reactions from their citizens. Deterioration of health and personal security in one country, under conditions of globalization, could entail serious implications for the health and personal security in neighbouring countries and beyond.

THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ARAB WORLD

There are two ways of considering the human security situation in any country or region. In countries or regions where life itself is not under threat, the appropriate question is: what enhances human security? In other countries or regions, where life itself is under threat, the appropriate question would be: how to confront threats to human security? The Arab world belongs to the second category, the right question is therefore: what are the threats to human security in Arab countries?

The final version of the Arab Human Development Report of 2009 which was submitted to the UNDP by this author in his capacity as the lead author of the Report¹ divided human security threats in the Arab world into two categories: hard security threats and soft security threats. The first included threats emanating from vulnerable environmental conditions, foreign intervention, identity conflicts and absence of the state of law. The second category comprises unemployment and poverty, famines and malnutrition, lack of health care and criminality.

The elevation of vulnerable environmental conditions to the status of the most serious threat to human existence in Arab countries should occasion no surprise. Arab African countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti suffered frequently severe droughts that caused death of hundreds of thousands of their inhabitants. Water scarcity is at its lowest in most Arab countries, compared to other regions in the world. Some scenarios of climate change foresee the rise of sea levels to such an extent as to flood large areas in Tunisia, Delta in Northern Egypt and the United

1. Following disagreements with the administration of the UNDP which heavily edited the printed version of the Report, my name was mentioned as Lead Consultant of the Report.

Arab Emirates driving millions of people away from their homes and sources of living. Foreign military occupation has wrought havoc recently in Iraq, Palestinian Territories and Somalia. The occupied Golan Heights are a potential cause of war between Syria and Israel. The United Arab Emirates complains of Iran's occupation of three of its islands. Moroccan-Spanish relations are marred by dispute over the right status of Ceuta and Melilla. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the recent siege of and war on Gaza inflicted much suffering on the Palestinian people, the details of which are amply described in reports of regional and international Human rights organizations including Israeli organizations. Identity conflicts, in Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq, inflicted a heavy human toll manifested in the killing of hundreds of thousands of people in the civil wars that these countries had experienced in recent decades. Disputes framed in identity terms are a source of inter-group tensions in several other Arab countries. Nor are threats to human existence limited to actions of foreign powers or intransigent leaders of ethnic groups. The absence of the state of law is definitely at the origin of several violations of the right to life when people are condemned to death in the wake of unfair trials, executed summarily without trial or left to die in prisons as a punishment for their exercise of legitimate right to freedom of expression or association.

A common Arab stand could perhaps persuade foreign powers to limit their intervention in internal affairs of countries of the region

These hard security threats exert a multiplier effect over other threats to human security. These conditions affect the soft security situation. Environmental disasters, foreign military occupation, identity conflicts and absence of the state of law would disrupt the economy, cause food shortages, constitute a burden over health facilities, and oblige people to resort to criminal activities to survive. But soft security threats have also causes of their own. Despite much progress registered by most Arab countries in their attempts to stimulate growth of their economies, provide cheap food for the needy through government subsidies, improve health standards of their population and fight crimes, important sections of their population were not affected by this progress, or suffered reversal of their situation either because they live in conflict zones in Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Palestine and recently in Yemen or because neo-Liberal economic policies lifted the umbrella of social protection that had shielded them against economic hazards. This progress slowed down in many Arab countries in recent years and was reversed in others.

DEALING WITH HUMAN SECURITY THREATS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

The intensity of human security threats is not the same in all Arab countries, notwithstanding the commonality of some of these threats in most of them. The causes of threats also vary. The major responsibility for some threats lie with foreign countries, others are the responsibility of the state, while societal actors could be the source of a third category of threats. Thus, some actors could be quite influential in alleviating some threats, but they have no power over other threats.

Soft security threats are largely the responsibility of the government of these countries. Deterioration of economic, health, food and personal security situations is largely a function of the quality of governance in the country. It is likely that good governance is a major guarantee for

improvement in these situations. It should be also recognized that soft security threats are a byproduct of hard security threats in countries in conflict zones. In other Arab countries which are not under foreign military occupation, facing civil wars or protracted civil strife, governments assume the major part of the responsibility for dealing with soft security threats, even though movements of prices of petroleum and agricultural goods did complicate their performance in this respect, as demonstrated by the fall of prices of crude oil and the rise of prices of food imports in recent years.

Hard security threats remain the major concern for many Arab countries as resolving crises caused by these threats is largely beyond their power. Arab countries had no hand in the military occupation of Iraq by the US, UK and allied governments in 2003. Foreign powers, including Arab and non-Arab countries, were involved in civil wars in Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon. Israel has maintained a policy of consolidating its occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territories and has rejected calls by Arab governments to accept an Arab Peace Plan based on the principle of exchange of territory for peace and was largely supported by the US. The absence of the state of law is due to the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, but these regimes are supported by Western governments, who claim nevertheless their sympathy for the transition to democracy.

Arab cooperation could enable Arab governments to stimulate further growth of their economies and reduce their dependence on international markets for their food imports. A common Arab stand could perhaps persuade foreign powers to limit their intervention in internal affairs of countries of the region. Effective action by civil society movements could push the process of transition to democracy in Arab countries. However past experience suggests that prospects of success of Arab economic and political cooperation or success of civil society movements in the struggle for democracy are very limited, at least in the near future.

In the recent past, some European countries had their hands implicated in the aggravation of the human security situation in some Arab countries, particularly Palestine and Iraq. They had also made a positive contribution to alleviation of some soft security threats in Arab countries. Could they play a more constructive role in alleviating both hard and soft security threats in the Arab world as has been demanded in different terms by important sections of their public opinion who protested in the last few years against war on Iraq and the siege of Gaza? The answer to this question is the responsibility of European peoples and governments. Enhancement of human security in the Arab world would be also a positive contribution to further improvement of the security situation in Europe itself.

EL MEDITERRÁNEO Y ORIENTE MEDIO EN EL DIÁLOGO TRANSATLÁNTICO

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THE OBAMA MOMENT AND THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

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I would like to start my contribution by introducing what the change in American foreign policy is. When looking for cooperation with the United States within the Mediterranean area, we should take this into consideration.

I would say that it is a radical change, and that we need to understand the nature of it well if we want to be able to take advantage of it. Some, who I would call the “realistic pessimists” or “American pessimists” or “European, American pessimists”, would say that there is no change, just words, which is no change at all. There are a lot of people who are very cautious about the nature of change, because they come from a school where foreign policy is conceived as something unchangeable, something that always represents the best interests of a given country (geography, power, etc.); people we can call geopoliticians.

Nevertheless, I am sure that we all agree that George W. Bush’s policy was a real change from Clinton’s policy. With Obama it is the same, as it is more difficult to find continuity than change. There is something absolutely fundamental in that change: President Obama clearly said at the United Nations (but also before and after being President) that something like a common humanity exists. It may seem rhetorical or idealistic but I think it is a deep belief in itself. There is common humanity, common challenge and common regional challenge, and we need a common answer from the international community. In his speech at the United Nations, he spoke of interdependence security. This is quite interesting, as when we look to the globalised world, we have always placed the accent on interdependent economics. However, the financial economic crisis has shown how interdependent the world is, and how globalisation brought countries together in terms of economic interest in the financial sector.

Is this the same with security? The answer is yes. There is interdependent security. No borders exist for a number of security problems, for example proliferation. There are also global challenges and not necessarily ones regarding security, such as climate change. This idea of a common humanity, a shared humanity and an interdependent world, where security is also part of interdependence, is the basis of President

President Obama clearly said at the United Nations that something like a common humanity exists. There is common humanity, common challenge and common regional challenge, and we need a common answer from the international community

What Obama is proposing is close to what the European Union proposes: effective multilateralism

Obama's approach toward international politics, which is, of course, far from a traditional, realistic approach. It is much within the liberal tradition of United States foreign policy, that of Presidents Wilson, Webber, Roosevelt and other important American leaders during the history of the United States.

This concept is not so far from the European concept. Edgar Morin, a great French philosopher and thinker, speaks of global patriotism. The idea that challenges bring together people, not only states, and that we possess a shared humanity.

Let us consider, for example, NGOs. Greenpeace and Amnesty International, for example, understand that they do not just operate at the national level, but that there is something like an international common space; they are trying to build an international public opinion. This international public opinion is the basis of what they call global patriotism. They understand that they have a common Earth to protect, a common interest at the global level.

Thus, from this ideological, political or doctrinal concept of President Obama's, I would like to point out what his proposal is about. In fact, he is proposing what the European Union has been proposing for years:

First, he is proposing effective multilateralism. But he is not just proposing effective multilateralism in the traditional sense of the word. Multilateralism in the traditional sense, as it is in the basis of the United Nations Charter, is a way of protecting states and creating a system where the most powerful are controlled by the others. What Obama is proposing is close to what the European Union proposes: effective multilateralism.

President Obama is proposing a multilateralism that is not just a balancing of the powers in the system, nor the containment of the most powerful (in this case the United States), but a multilateralism to solve problems, to find solutions through this multilateralism.

This concept was created in the Balkans because of the inability to respond to wars, to respond to challenges in Bosnia, as well as in Rwanda. The idea exists that you can do it through multilateralism. That is the opposite idea to that of the Bush Administration, of the Neocons. The idea that you can act through a multilateral framework, backed by multilateral legitimacy - and effective at the same time - focusing on solving problems and not just on the containment of power. Moreover, the State is not the ultimate goal of this protection, the ultimate goal are the citizens, closely linked to the concept of human security. As Kofi Annan said in his very famous address during the Millennium Speech at the UN, "borders cannot be walls that protect for doing what they want to do against their citizens".

In order to apply this effective multilateralism concept, President Obama (and the same within the EU) realised that the world is changing dramatically. We are no longer in a Western world, a world as it was during the 1990s, in which a strong alliance between the EU and the US was sufficient to solve most problems. Thus, during the 1990s we were asking the question of how to connect with the United States, as this deep connection would enable us to solve the problems.

Now there is an awareness in the United States, as well as in Europe, that the West cannot do without the rest. It sounds almost like a slogan, but it is the reality. The West needs China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, just as it needs local and regional players. We are in a world that Pierre Hassner calls a world of relative power. No power has enough power to operate alone, and not even a combination of two powers is enough, be it US-EU, or US-China - as it is today *à la mode* - or perhaps Egypt, in the future global governance. We need to work with the others. This is the basis of President Obama's external policy. We need to place the accent not on essential military components, because this will not allow us to engage with the others; instead we need to do it through diplomacy, engagement and long-term strategies that take time, and are more difficult.

How does this apply to the Mediterranean region? I would say that in this vision of the world that President Obama has, the region we are discussing is at the very heart of it. It is a region that is a little bit larger or much larger than the Mediterranean, as we, the Europeans, define it. This larger region certainly includes Iran and, of course, shows enormous concern toward Afghanistan. This region is at the core of President Obama's policy.

We need to remember that the first phone call Obama made as a president was not to a European leader, nor to a Chinese leader but to President Abbas and, since then, he has placed this region at the heart of his priorities. This becomes very clear if we analyse the speech he made in Turkey and, in particular, if we read his extraordinary and historical speech, in Cairo, about the Middle East and the world.

This implies a number of shifts in American foreign policy, which are very important for this region. I will merely concentrate on the shifts that concern the Mediterranean region in the larger sense.

The first is to end the war on terror. We need to interiorise this: to put an end to the war on terror. It should be pointed out that President Obama wants to fight a war on terror, but he does not conceive to speak about a war on terror in the sense it was referred to during the Cold War against the Soviet Union, something globalised and that becomes the paradigm of the entire security and international policy. Ending the war on terror means linking terror, the fight against terrorism, not to the military sphere, but to justice, police and intelligence service. This is the tradition of the fight against terrorism.

The second aspect that is very important for us is the fact that he has placed the Palestinian question in the centre of the Middle East equation. If you read Obama's speech in Cairo, he says very clearly that it is a central question. Beforehand, it was said to be an Israeli-Palestinian question, but this is the first time that an American president has claimed that a Palestinian question existed, and this is of central importance. Furthermore, in his speech he defines what the Palestinian question by pointing out that occupation in Palestine creates suffering, creates humiliation, and that there will be no solution until the end of the occupation. Of course this does not deny Israel's right to its security, just like any other state.

I would also like to talk about the role of Turkey. For President Obama, Turkey plays a very important role. Relations between Turkey and the United States were very difficult during the Bush years. Turkish public

Now there is an awareness in the United States, as well as in Europe, that the West cannot do without the rest. No power has enough power to operate alone, and not even a combination of two powers is enough. We need to place the accent not on essential military components, we need to do it through diplomacy, engagement and long-term strategies

Obama has placed the Palestinian question in the centre of the Middle East equation. Beforehand, it was said that there was an Israeli-Palestinian question, but this is the first time that an American President has claimed that a Palestinian question existed, and this is of central importance

opinion, not to mention all the difficulties between Turkey and the United States in relation to the Iraq war. President Obama went to Turkey and he attached great importance to the role Turkey can play in this area.

Last but not least is the priority in changing perceptions of the USA in the Arab world. He knows that he cannot change such perceptions through speeches; he needs to change them by actions. This is an absolute priority in order to change the Arab world's attitude towards the USA. As far as the agenda of the US is concerned, they share the same concerns, but with different priorities and approaches. For the Americans, Europeans are essential for Afghanistan, for Iran, for disarmament and, in a certain way, for development. For the Europeans, Americans are essential for the Middle East, for climate change and for coexistence between nations, including in Asia.

To conclude, I would like to call on Europeans to change our attitude. We need to grasp this opportunity. We need to understand that with President Obama there is a window of opportunity that will not be there forever.

As the former Prime Minister of Egypt, Ahmed Maher, said recently in Paris, "We need to be aware that Obama cannot do it alone, he needs the support of others and he is not getting the support that he would like to have".

He is not getting the support from Israel, from the Palestinians, from the Arabs or from the Europeans that he needs to have. For the Middle East, if Europe is to help President Obama, Europe needs to do what he cannot do, for example, by engaging with Hamas or by bringing Turkey closer to our foreign policy. We need to develop a common foreign policy where Turkey is fully integrated. We need to be able to build a coalition with Turkey and with the Arab countries to support President Obama's Middle East Policy. Furthermore, in some areas we need to be more dynamic and more assertive than President Obama can be. Now it is the time.

David Hacham

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Before entering into the cracks of the issues about our policies regarding the transatlantic dialogue in the Mediterranean, I would like to point out, very briefly, our Israeli governmental position. First of all, I would like to point out the Israeli position *vis-à-vis* the Palestinian and then *vis-à-vis* the Palestinian arena.

To start, I would like to highlight that we, Israel, accept the two-state solution as a final status to settle the problem to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

Secondly, Israel is ready right now to establish a political dialogue, to establish political negotiations with our Palestinian partners, and when I am speaking about partners, I am speaking about the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people.

Thirdly, Israel is ready to deal, to discuss, to tackle all the problems for the final status negotiation with the Palestinian, including Jerusalem, including settlements in all the territories, in the West Bank, and of course, the issue of the Palestinian refugees (those of 1948 and the offspring after 1948). This is the formal Israeli stand towards the Palestinian issue.

In this respect, I would like to mention something that has maybe been forgotten. Israel is not anymore in control, nor in a military conquest of the Gaza strip. We have already pulled out our forces, our settlements (the last one, from the Gaza strip area, four years ago) and, instead of flourishing this area of developing paradise of the Gaza strip, with the help of the international community, what happened was the *coup d'état* against the legitimate rule of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, the 12 June 2007, as well as the kicking out in a very cruel manner and the killing of many Fatah members in Gaza, taking control over Gaza.

Hence, the main obstacle to peace is not the Israeli side, as we are ready to resume negotiations right now. The main obstacle today is the split among the entity, among the Palestinian political system.

One of the major milestones in Israel-NATO relations has been the signing of the Individual Cooperating Programme (ICP), a platform for the promotion of cooperation in a wide variety of topics, including, first of all, the challenges facing in the Middle East, not only the State of Israel, but also NATO

Concerning the major areas of cooperation, Israel would like to increase coordination with NATO to face common challenges in the area regarding: the Iranian threat, terrorism and proliferation

There is also something to be taken into consideration: what is happening right now in Gaza is nothing but a frank line base of the radical Islamic fundamental groups in the area, first and foremost, lead by Iran; one of the most assertive supporter of Hamas in the Gaza strip area. Not to talk about missiles thrown from the Gaza strip area towards our civilians in the area. This has obliged Israel to evacuate more than half a million of citizens from this area.

Today, we, the Israelis, are ready and willing to negotiate to hopefully find a solution satisfying both parties. I would also like to add that today there is prosperity in the West Bank: just go to Ramallah. This is due to the cooperation between the Israeli side and the Palestinian Authority of Abu Mazen, and the help and assistance given to the Palestinian Authority by the international community.

In regards to the transatlantic dialogue, I would like to highlight our major observation concerning Israel policy towards the Members of NATO, towards dialogue. For this, it should be pointed out the achievements – basically in the last couple of years – and how the future policies must be in terms of integration or cooperation with NATO.

During the last couple of years we are witnessing a trend of increased cooperation with NATO members. As a matter of fact, this trend comes to be realistic on the big ground of the basic challenges facing the members of NATO in the Middle East. Here, it must be stressed both the efforts exerted by Iran to get nuclear capability during the last years, as well as what going on in the last couple of years in the Palestinian arena.

One of the major milestones in Israel-NATO relations has been the signing of the Individual Cooperating Programme (ICP), a platform for the promotion of cooperation in a wide variety of topics, including, first of all (and speaking in terms of strategic political dialogue) all the challenges facing in the Middle East, not only the State of Israel, but also NATO. That is combating terrorism, which is one of the basic challenges worldwide. In this framework, cooperation between NATO and Israel was developed in various spheres, such as: meeting of foreign ministers, ministers of defence, Israeli participation in NATO military exercises, and participation in active military exercise in the Mediterranean Sea.

Despite these areas of cooperation with NATO, Israel would like to see a more intensive bilateral dialogue and progress in their relations. Concerning the major areas of cooperation, Israel would like to increase coordination to face common challenges in the area. In this respect, we are thinking of a collective framework, which will deal with the core issues in the area: the Iranian threat, terrorism in the area (very essential, problematic and important) and the proliferation. For this, channels of strategic bilateral communication should be increased. They can serve eventually as a platform for the transferring of the Israeli positions and messages and to the widening of the relations for other countries. In addition, orientation to development connected to regional security should also be increased. Finally, as far as the military level is concerned, it should also be reinforced the promotion of relations and cooperation between Israel and NATO basically in scientific and military issues.

Moreover, from Israel point of view, NATO is a relevant strategic regional actor, with potential of defence, military and professional capabilities, which must take into consideration the threats steaming from our area, from the Middle East:

- First and foremost, it needs to be tackled one of the main characteristics of the Middle East and that is the lack of stability;
- Secondly, the strengthening of radical Islam phenomenon. There is not any single State in our area in the Middle East not having the problem of radical fundamental Islamic movements, which is a threat to the prevailing regimes (see Al Qaeda networks, the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan, bomb attacks from Al Qaeda to Europeans and to the United States). Needless to say that I am speaking of coalitions: Hezbollah, etc.;
- Thirdly, terrorism. As aforementioned, this is one of the major problematic characteristics of the present situation in our area. This also includes potential threats for oil resources, Iran (and the possible threat not only to the State of Israel, but even to the European community and to NATO in general).

In order to sum up, from the Israeli point of view, the relations with NATO are of high importance. Cooperation with NATO can serve as a platform for the promotion of common response to regional threats and challenges. Mutual relations are still slow and limited and it is, of course, in expansion. For this purpose, the ICP signed between Israel and NATO can serve as a platform to the expansion of spheres of cooperation and, despite difficulties, there is a convergence of interests between Israel and NATO, which can form a basis and expand the range of cooperation between the parties in the future.

Cooperation with NATO can serve as a platform for the promotion of common response to regional threats and challenges

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GLOBAL AND REGIONAL EVALUATIONS AND SCENARIOS

The United States will continue to maintain its position as a superpower in early 2020s. Yet, its general influence will decrease to a certain extent. That is, the US is not expected to be able to maintain its global hegemony given that the power centre will shift to Asia, with China emerging as the second great power. While some argue that China will pose a major threat to the US, others suggest that the US might be able to develop a multi-faceted relationship with China. It is expected that Japan will remain a crucial ally to the US. The rise of new powers in Asia, especially China, will make it necessary for decision-makers to develop strategies that consider China's new role as a key actor in international politics.

The Middle East is the most unpredictable region. The US-led military intervention will not start a process of democratization in Iraq. It was also predicted that the US will continue to put pressure on Syria, especially to influence the situation in Lebanon and Iraq. In the long term, the US might try to achieve a regime change in Syria. Regarding one of the most intractable disputes, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is predicted that while Hamas will maintain its public support, a division within the group may occur. The worsening of the living conditions in the Palestinian territories can lead to the adoption of radical tactics by other groups in future. Such changes may result in Israel's creating a basis for negotiations as it perceives that its unilateral policies do not yield positive results. It is also evaluated that the Middle Eastern countries may follow one of the three general paths in the future in order to become secular and independent States following a revolution of enlightenment.

It is predicted that in the 2020's, Turkey will continue to play a dominant role in its close neighbourhood. Preserving the unity of Iraq is becoming increasingly difficult, and Turkey will continue to observe closely the developments in Kirkuk, which is seen as an embryonic example of the country's state. A major mistake of the US is seen as its attempt to build a Kurdish State bordering Turkey. Such a State will not survive without US assistance. In fact, it has been evaluated that in the absence of Turkey, Iraq will face various problems that can only be solved with Turkey's contribution.

The rise of new powers in Asia, especially China, will make it necessary for decision-makers to develop strategies that consider China's new role as a key actor in international politics

The Turkish-Russian relationship, which continues to be developed, especially in the field of energy, is not an alternative to Turkish-EU relations

In the near future, Russia is expected to refrain from overtly opposing or challenging the US and the EU. Russia, which is increasingly using its “energy card” as a tool, will continue to be carefully observed by many, including Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship, which continues to be developed, especially in the field of energy, is not an alternative to Turkish-EU relations. The Caucasus geostrategic value is also expected to increase, gain increasing importance as the US, the EU and NATO plan to extend their influence over this region. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan can become NATO members by the 2020s, which will also lead to privileged relationship with the EU. Turkey should develop relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan to become a central force in the region. Moreover, Turkey can use and re-energize the Black Sea Economic Cooperation to implement its own policies in the region. Nevertheless, relations between Armenia and Turkey will continue to be shaped by the Karabakh problem. Concerning Turkey’s EU membership aspirations and the Armenian allegations in regard to the events of 1915, it must be noted that despite all pressures that may be exerted by the EU and US, Turkey will not accept the genocide allegations.

Although the Russian-Chinese cooperation in Central Asia as a counterforce to Western policies in the region is striking, it has been predicted that it will not last long. Shanghai Cooperation Organization will not be able to act as an efficient counterforce to the West. However, China continues to pose a threat to Russia in various ways, especially due to demographic developments. Thus, as a reaction to China’s rapid growth, an alliance between Russia, Japan and the US might emerge.

The Turkish approach to the region was quite enthusiastic during the early 1990s and should be re-vitalized in the coming years. By motivating a wider use of the Turkish language it might be possible to create a Turkish League by 2020, leading Turkey to play a stronger role in the Western World.

THREATS AND RISKS

No State or alliance has reached the capability to establish and maintain maritime security alone. To keep Mediterranean and its basin as a safe field, it is important that the countries of the region, NATO and the European Defence and Security system operate together and form joint platforms. International cooperation and coordination is essential. Leaving geopolitical competitions aside, keeping the sea lanes of communications open, safe and secure, along with important choke points, is an essential necessity. Trade doesn’t go to insecure and unsafe areas. Once sea lanes of communications and choke points become insecure and unsafe, the effects of its dire consequences can transcend far beyond the geopolitical and political competitions with no winner behind. The global partnership of regionally provided securities is essential for regional cooperation, to make world oceans and seas ever secure and safe for everybody and to deter those conducting illegal activities at sea.

In regards to threats challenging the security both in the Mediterranean area and globally, it should be highlighted that in the 21st century, concerns about maritime security will be marked by concentrating efforts to decrease transnational crimes such as drugs, weapon smuggling and sea

piracy; secure vital important sea lines of communication (SLOC); prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking on the sea; fight terrorism and human trafficking; provide aid in natural disasters (like tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes etc.); prevent illegal fishing and securing the natural life and environment in the sea.

Concerning energy security and resource conflicts, it should be underlined that two thirds of the world's energy resources will be used by developing countries, especially in Asia. Considering that the EU may be increasingly concerned regarding its growing dependence on Russia, the European Union may ask Turkey to arrange new transport networks. It is argued that its geographical position may allow Turkey to become an energy terminal rather than just being a transit country for energy.

Concerning terrorism, it is expected that it will dominate further the political debate in the 2020's, as global terror gains the capacity to inflict larger harm. Several factors contribute to the expansion of terrorism, such as: the growing world population; new dynamics caused by global warming; conflicts arising from the limited access to energy and water, as well as trends of global immigration. Although we are familiar with the causes and dynamics of terrorism because of our unfortunate experiences with it, terrorism will continue to pose a major threat due to the difficulty of restraining its impacts. Important security precautions will continue to be taken in order to prevent terrorism, but as new terrorist activities perforate these security structures the world-wide fear of terrorism will increase. Turkey will continue to be the target of religious and ethnic terror in the 2020s. If Turkey does not successfully tackle the issue of ethnic separatism and fundamentalist trends, it will have major difficulties in preventing future terrorist activities.

The idea that religions will play an even bigger role in the future compared to their effects in the 20th century is gaining wider acceptance. But it has been argued that the so-called clash between Islam and the West will lose its impact and that the Confucian and Hindu civilizations will begin to play a more dominant role. The Western civilization will gradually lose its hegemonic position and a more reconciling and harmonious period will begin. With regard to identity formation, experts acknowledge the difficulty of constructing a European identity, for the concepts of nation-state; nationalism and national identities continue to have a major influence in Europe. When defining Islamic identity, cultural elements of Islam need to be emphasized rather than considering it within political frameworks.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: EVALUATION AND PROSPECTIVE

The Transatlantic relations in the 21st century will remain to be the cornerstone of Global order. Strong transatlantic relations will make bigger contributions to the world peace. As Brzezinski says, "the strategic preference of the US should be the US and EU partnership". Together, the European Union and the United States of America constitute 10 per cent of the world population, 40 percent of the world trade and 60 percent of the aggregate income. If Turkey is left out of this structure, it might seek partnership with Russia and Iran. Unwanted Indian and Chinese

To keep Mediterranean and its basin as a safe field, it is important that the countries of the region, NATO and the European Defence and Security system operate together and form joint platforms

The Transatlantic relations in the 21st century will remain to be the cornerstone of Global order. Strong transatlantic relations will make bigger contributions to the world peace

partnership will be the rival for transatlantic relations, being the rising of Asia one of the main concerns regarding transatlantic relations.

In regards to the security challenges occurring in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East, the United Nations should be empowered in order to cope with these threats. The direction of the 21st century needs to subject to organizational structural changes; especially having countries located in the Middle East to be more respectful to the resolutions of the United Nations will make it possible to make a great contribution to peace.

Moreover, the role of NATO should be increased. One cannot say that NATO could not be successful after the Cold War. Enlargement of NATO towards the East, acting of member countries of Alliance together during the first Gulf War, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo and, the burden of responsibility in Afghanistan, are the things that must be considered as the successes of the alliance. The main thing that really shook NATO is Iraq. If the members of Alliance can prevent themselves from getting divided on the subject of Iraq, NATO will continue to have the strength to perform mission in fields of global terrorism, mass destruction weapons and regional disputes. Hence, NATO has the capacity to become the core defence power in areas going beyond mere defence, such as providing aid in cases of natural disasters by taking the position of being the joint force.

The means of struggle of the EU against these threats are restricted. But it seems that the US realized that it could not rely only on military power, but it would also need EU's support. US and EU policies should be harmonized and also both actors' and regional governments' interests should be taken into account with international coordination and partnership. Furthermore, our European allies should spend more funds for peace, defence and security. This is the example of the Alliance of Civilizations, a joint venture of Turkey and Spain to fight the growing racism and Islamophobia.

It is worth mentioning that while Europe is formulating strong policies on the subjects of Defence and Security, it is observed not to be much effective both in the Middle East and in Mediterranean basin because of the insufficiency of resources allotted to defence. It may be proper that Europe uses resources and capabilities of NATO within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Turkey took important assignments in NATO and security of Europe since the inception of the organization and made gains in form of experiences. It can be seen that the evident attitudes aiming at overlooking such experiences gained by Turkey in European expansion and ESDP implementations, with a view to keep Turkey outside of the decision making mechanisms, will not bring in any benefit.

United States aspirations to maintain a leadership position in the 21st century have been effective in shaping US policies. The country's failures in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iran and the realization of the difficulty of pursuing its current global security policy will force the US to put more emphasis on soft power. It has also been argued that the US will make a gradual shift from unilateralism to multilateralism beginning to attach more importance and show respect to international institutions.

Although it can not be denied that the US and EU are partners, there are subjects that require taking steps at Brussels. There are different views and approaches from the angle of foreign policy and have difficulties to reach an agreement on key issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol, International Penal Courts or the Nuclear Ban Test Treaty. Moreover, the styles of leaders are not reaching at a harmony at all times. Even more, they hardly show endurance to each other. Nevertheless, it is expected that there will be positive developments during the Obama Administration on these subjects. As for the EU, it can be said that it is facing difficulties when trying to configure itself as a political form with a united structure. Its internal divisions and uncertain stances can affect negatively the transatlantic relations.

TURKEY'S GROWING ROLE

Turkey is located at the Eastern end of the transatlantic region. Turkey is at the same time a European, Balkan, Black Sea, Caucasian, Middle East and Mediterranean country. It is one of the important economies of Europe and the World, member both of the United Nations and of the Security Council and in negotiation process with the EU to become a Member State. Moreover, Turkey is member of NATO since 1952, which has let Turkey to have a US-European defence and safety culture. Balkan, Caucasus, Middle East and African cultures sharing religious and cultural values with Turkey are closely monitoring Turkey, experiencing a process of access to NATO and benefiting from the experiences of Turkey for analyses of their state.

The rapid development of the country and the political cycles formed during the recent years have formed a base on which the country can act as a single nation. Its change of policy is an expression or sign of the principle called "Peace at home peace in the world" and it cannot be seen as the novel work of the current Administration alone. During the post Cold War period, the changes experienced in the US, Russian Federation, Middle East and Caucasus, are observed to form and provide the possibilities for Turkey to take roles as Regional Power. In this sense, Mr. Ronald Asmus's states that knowledge and experiences of Turkey in relation to the region are quite important not only for the US and NATO but also bear a significant and serious importance for the EU as well.

If Turkey mobilises all its human capital and institutions in a planned effort to reach its various national goals, it will be likely to join the world's leading powers and even to take place among the first ten. In order to reach this goal, Turkey has to extensively reform its economy, society, education system, environment and infrastructure. With its increasing economic prosperity and the co-existence of Islamic culture and a democratic political system, Turkey is likely to make greater use of both its soft power potential and its military/security capabilities.

Turkey and Transatlantic relations

European Union Membership is a political target for Turkey. However, the alliance of Turkey with the US originates for geo-strategic reasons. The EU is the most important business partner of Turkey, whereas the US is in many angles at second rank. Developments in the direction of

NATO has the capacity to become the core defence power in areas going beyond mere defence, such as providing aid in cases of natural disasters by taking the position of being the joint force

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Transatlantic “common market” or a “common economic region” are also being monitored by Turkey. As a country in negotiation process with the EU, there are many joint entrepreneurship fields regarding issues such as security, democracy, energy, World Trade Organization, climate change, Middle East, Black Sea or Central Asia.

Regarding Turkey’s EU membership, Turkey will have to overcome various obstacles, including arguments against the country’s membership based on its population, culture, religion and geographical position. The EU is also expected to offer Turkey alternatives to a full membership. Some have advised Turkey to construct a special-status relationship with the EU, a Customs Union Treaty, with relations limited to economic cooperation, handling all security-based relations within the NATO framework. Due to its growing economy, demographic characteristics and regional role, Turkey’s possible EU membership is expected to have a significant impact on the future of the Union.

Experts also argue that by granting rights to certain minorities, the EU increasingly causes many ethnic groups to label themselves as national minorities. If Turkey becomes an EU member, it may face rising pressure when it comes to meeting regional demands in this regard. The Cyprus issue will continue to dominate the Turkey-EU agenda, with the Greek Cypriots aiming to limit UN’s impact as a multi party body carrying the issue to the EU platform. This subject will continue to be used as a pretext for international pressure on Turkey, especially within in the context of EU Membership negotiations. Despite certain difficulties that may arise, Turkey should remain on the EU membership track.

The contributions of Turkey to regional peace

Currently one of the biggest difficulties faced by the EU and the US is the capability of rejecting the threats that may come from the Middle East. Concerning these difficulties, Turkey’s importance does not only rest on its geographical position but also on the fact that it is a modern democratic Muslim country. Turkey has significant knowledge and experiences about its region. If there is a transformation being experienced in the Middle East, it is important for the West to see Turkey on their side and to understand the importance of the democratic success of Turkey, which is as favourable and in the interests of the West.

Nevertheless, it must be known that the support of the US and the EU to the establishment of a Kurdish State at the southern borders of Turkey is a subject that will, at all times, create negative aspects in their relations. Built on the legacy of Ataturk, Turkey has managed to maintain democracy in a region dominated by authoritarian and non democratic regimes. In the near future, Turkey aims to create a belt of peace and cooperation in its close neighbourhood. The operations performed by Turkey in support of peace can be compiled under two main topics: support operations participating as units and international observation missions participating with personnel. In order to further pursue this role, Turkey should continue to develop its defence capabilities and deterrent power; contributing this way not only to the regional security, but to the security of Europe, the East Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, as well as the international system.

CONCLUSION

The strengthening of the transatlantic structure will be translated into positive effects for achieving peace and security in the world. For this to be attained there is a need to strengthen the UN and NATO and to receive greater contributions to defence spending on the part of the EU. The deepening of cooperation on issues such as maritime security, civil protection and crisis management operations represent an added-value when moving and acting towards the aforementioned objectives.

As far as Turkey-US relations are concerned, the current “give and take” relationship should be replaced with a more and just mutually profitable form of cooperation. Turkey’s importance for the US will continue as the superpowers interest will gradually shift towards Asia. If both sides act with caution and care, the relationship will continue to develop and focus more on essential strategic issues, including energy.

In this sense, there is also the strategic need to complete successfully the democratic reform process in Turkey, to anchor Turkey into the West structure in a complete and definite manner and to strengthen Turkey’s position into the transatlantic structure. Turkey has an important experience and position in Mediterranean Basin and Middle East. Therefore, keeping Turkey outside of the decision making mechanisms while this process is being completed will not result in positive outcomes.

Last but not least, the determining factors of Turkish policy-making will continue to be national unity and the sovereignty of the State in line with Ataturk’s vision of providing equal rights and freedoms to all its citizens. Turkey will move towards 2020 emphasizing and consolidating democratic values, freedoms and the rule of law and continue on a path of modernity.

If there is a transformation being experienced in the Middle East, it is important for the West to see Turkey on their side and to understand the importance of the democratic success of Turkey, which is favourable and in the interests of the West

A REGIONAL THIRD PARTY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

John Bell

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I would like to raise an issue that comes directly from my experience in the Middle East, more than in the Mediterranean. I hope that this still be a value to a larger framework.

With a regional perspective on Cairo, Beirut, Jerusalem, Gaza, I would like to focus on this area and, specifically, I would like to discuss an issue that I do consider an important one for transatlantic dialogue: it is the possible future presence of a regional third party force in the Middle East. I am not talking about a force that is due towards fighting terror, but a force that is for stabilisation.

Why to talk about such a force?

Basically, because of the level of distrust established between the parties over decades. Secondly, the fact that some States in the Middle East are weak, in my view means that this is an invaluable scenario and unavoidable one. Some may say that we already have forces such as UNDOF or UNIFIL.

To this, my response is:

- These, although they are often quite effective, are the result of past political conditions;
- We may see ourselves in new political conditions, before which I think in fact that we already are;
- Most importantly, as we have seen in the last few years, force security and defence in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, maybe is not enough good to be in a reactive mode; meaning that a sudden conflict flares up and Europe will have to appear on the scene.

Let me just say what such a regional presence should not be:

- It should not be in my view something like the EU border system mission in Rafah or the Northern temporary international presence in Hebron. They are too small, they are too de-contextualised from a larger circumstance to be effective, unfortunately;

An important issue for transatlantic dialogue is the possible future presence of a regional third party force in the Middle East. Not a force that is due towards fighting terror, but a force that is for stabilisation

The third force should be agreed by the parties, its main role should be monitoring, it should be customised to place and it should be under a political framework

- Secondly, I do not think that it should be NATO. There are too many perception problems with NATO being the umbrella for such an entity;
- It should not be under the service of a trusteeship, like in the West Bank and in Gaza. It is a very problematic notion because of the weak of the territories in terms of governance.

Then, what should it be?

- First of all, it should be agreed by the parties. In the Middle East this is *sine qua non*. Without the agreement of the parties, it would be a disaster. Moreover, it could even have to be agreed by parties who are not State actors;
- Secondly, it should be a third force whose main role is monitoring, as well as on the ground conflict resolution;
- Thirdly, it should be customised to place, meaning that if there is something in the Golan does not necessarily have to look like something in Gaza;
- Fourth and most importantly, it should be under a political framework.

There is a living example – many living examples – to point to. Maybe a vague indication is the UNIFIL presence under resolution 1701. It is a problematic mission. UNIFIL presence with 1701 is a very early precursor of the kind of things we might look forward to, whether we like it or not.

As far as scenarios are concerned, this is a crucial issue to look at. There are three possible scenarios in which such a force would appear:

1. The situation in which we are now: the situation of trustees (implicit or explicit trustees between Israel and all its neighbours, including with Palestine). The trustees' situation is problematic. It is suggested that trustees is the only way to get the best reflection of a balance of power in the region;
2. Reaction to conflict. During the last three of four years we have been in a very deluded form of war in the Middle East, which arose in Lebanon in 2006, in Gaza in 2009 and, in every point, there is either an international intervention or the consideration of an international intervention;
3. I would like to look at, not at the imminent moment, but at the end of the conflict scenario; my personally preferred one.

Let's imagine an end of conflict scenario, even if it is not imminent. My own view is that the tools are there. What would be required for peace is a regional security annex, longer than it exists and, within that annex, a definition of an international or third party presence and specifics of its role. This is the useful framework. It would have to have effective multilateralism. Moreover, such a force would have a variant of participation. For example, more American participation in the Golan, as it was discussed even in the negotiations in the 1990s, and more European participation in the West Bank in Gaza.

Some other features that must be included it is the role of Turkey. Turkey has a very important role because of its presence, its weight, its current diplomatic activity.

Furthermore, including the idea of human security is pretty important to the proper functioning of such a force, even if it is not fully implemented, as well as heavy levels of cultural training, often ignored.

Why all this is important for transatlantic dialogue?

There is no political framework without the US and there is no political implementation without the EU. They need to talk together. I like President Obama very much. I am very hopeful and happy with his speeches. I still hope that he will act, but I must say (since I have talked to a lot of Arabs) that, at the moment at least, and it is not irrevocable, people are very worried about the situation in the region; especially in Egypt, but also in many places.

Although I think that American intentions are good, the nature and character of diplomacy need to be reviewed. Here, it is important a more intensifying role of Europe. Europe may have an important role in the upcoming time, as a conscience, to remind the Americans that they should stick to the core issues and conflict resolution and not revert to conflict management, whose threat already exists.

As a last note, and it relates to the whole notion that I have sort of presented. If we look to the situation on the ground right now, despite the American intentions, Jerusalem is boiling – we all see it in the news – Hamas and Fatah are breaking up again, because of the elections call, and I do not need to discuss the larger region situation with Iran. I am not suggesting there is an imminent conflict, but I do think that there is a huge room for error and miscalculation and some of the moves come back to Europe.

In this sense, in the transatlantic dialogue, in such a future possible force, Europe has a responsibility here to: a) have the force aid that will probably end providing the third party forces on the ground; b) this scenario will need a political framework; c) there is a need for Europe to shape that political framework for long-term stability and in order to avoid being simply in a reactive mode once again.

What would be required for peace is a regional security annex, longer than it exists and, within that annex, a definition of an international or third party presence and specifics of its role

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José Antonio Ruesta Botella

- MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE
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APPROACH

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LE CONTEXTE GLOBAL

Al Qaeda (AQ) est une organisation politico-militaire (OPM) transnationale en guerre. Elle a besoin de financer ses campagnes et actions pour poursuivre ses objectifs. À défaut de pouvoir recourir à une économie formelle, elle le fait aux moyens de l'économie informelle, voire criminelle. Il s'agit particulièrement de trafics d'armes et de drogues, de trafics humains et d'enlèvements d'otages et de navires (piraterie).

Si AQ a, jusque là, largement préféré les actions terrestres et aériennes pour ses attaques terroristes, il semble aujourd'hui que cette organisation considère l'espace maritime comme hautement stratégique, tant en terme d'ambitions économiques (piraterie, trafic), que politico-militaires.

Afin de répondre à la question du terrorisme maritime susceptible de menacer la Méditerranée occidentale, il est utile d'analyser les ambitions et les actions de l'organisation sur le domaine maritime, à travers deux axes majeurs:

- Des motivations économiques : la piraterie et les trafics ;
- Des motivations politico-militaires : les actes terroristes.

Les principaux facteurs de risques liés au transport maritime			
Cargaisons	Navires	Personnes	Argent
-Utiliser la cargaison pour placer clandestinement des personnes et/ou des armes. -Utiliser la cargaison pour transporter des armes conventionnelles ou non.	-Utiliser les navires comme arme. -Utiliser un navire pour perpétrer un attentat. -Couler le navire pour perturber l'infrastructure.	-Attaquer le navire pour provoquer des pertes en vie humaines. -Dissimuler des terroristes sous l'identité de marins.	-Utiliser les recettes des transports maritimes pour financer des activités terroristes. -Utiliser des navires pour blanchir des fonds illicites destinés à des organisations terroristes

AL QAEDA ET LA PIRATERIE MARITIME

Si Al Qaeda a, jusque là, largement préféré les actions terrestres et aériennes pour ses attaques terroristes, il semble aujourd'hui que cette organisation considère l'espace maritime comme hautement stratégique, tant en terme d'ambitions économiques (piraterie, trafic), que politico-militaires

Pour mieux cerner la situation actuelle, il est nécessaire de distinguer la piraterie du terrorisme maritime. Selon ma perception de la question, la motivation de la piraterie est plutôt d'ordre lucratif, elle n'a ni dimension politique ni d'objectifs terroristes. Cependant, les liens entre islamistes et pirates sont extrêmement étroits, voire confondus. La nature de cette acointance réside dans une sorte d'interrelation latérale sur le plan matériel. Sur le plan tactique, AQ tire profit de la médiatisation de actions des pirates et inversement, les pirates se prévalent ainsi d'une justification politique dans leurs actes de pirateries.

Comme en atteste un certain nombre de rapports et d'articles, la piraterie génère un afflux de ressources financières important pouvant, de facto, alimenter certains mouvements islamistes en capitaux. L'investissement actuel d'AQ dans la piraterie maritime en Somalie est de fait incontestable.

Dès la constitution d'AQ, la Somalie avait occupé une place spécifique devenue considérable dans la stratégie mondiale de l'organisation à partir des premières années de la décennie 90, au moment où ce pays a connu le début d'un morcellement progressif. Depuis lors, nous trouvons la main d'AQ derrière les récents actes de piraterie dans le Golfe d'Aden. Les documents, les correspondances secrètes et les opérations de l'organisation révèlent clairement son intérêt très particulier pour la Somalie.

Ainsi en 1993, certains de ses dirigeants ont entamé un voyage dans ce pays, décrit par l'organisation comme celui du pardon. Son objectif inavoué était de créer des camps d'entraînement dans les villes de Bousaso, Luq et la province d'Ougadine ; des camps efficaces et actifs qui pourraient être alternatifs ou parallèles à ceux installés en Afghanistan. Dès lors, AQ a essayé de maintenir un point d'appui durable en Somalie en exploitant la situation de guerre civile et la fragilité du pouvoir central. Ses dirigeants visaient à le transformer en une plaque tournante de ses activités, un refuge sûr et une base arrière de ses mouvements et ses attaques terroristes qui visent les pays voisins.

Sur le terrain, cette activité, et contrairement à ce qui avait été prévu, n'a pas pu prendre une ampleur importante et croissante en raison de la guerre globale contre le terrorisme. Toutefois, l'organisation a maintenu une capacité à défendre son existence, surtout après avoir réussi à établir des alliances et des accords de principe avec certains groupes armés islamistes somaliens comme celui de « Shabab al islam », issu de la scission survenue en décembre 2007 au sein du mouvement des « tribunaux islamiques ».

Il est parfaitement clair que l'organisation a constaté que le maintien de ses activités en Somalie nécessite plus d'efforts, un élargissement des alliances sur le terrain et une garantie de financement afin de conserver la capacité à recruter de nouveaux membres, planifier et exécuter les opérations dans le temps et l'espace voulu. Dans ce sens, les dernières opérations de piraterie survenues aux larges des côtes somaliennes peuvent constituer un nouveau point de départ pour les activités de l'organisation.

Les cibles de ces opérations sont à la fois multiples et faciles à atteindre. Elles peuvent être des ports, des navires des marchandises, des navires militaires, des navires de pétroles qui transitent d'une manière permanente par le Golfe d'Aden et par l'Océan Indien. Et pour cela les moyens d'attaque et de soutien logistique ne manquent pas.

En outre et, dans le cas où les informations révélées par les services de renseignement norvégiens se confirment, AQ posséderait déjà ou aurait sous contrôle entre 15 et 23 navires avec des drapeaux du Yémen, de la Somalie et du Tonga.

Dans ce contexte, l'appel lancé par l'organisation à ses partisans au Yémen donne une importance stratégique à la navigation autour de la péninsule arabique. Étant donné l'importance du trafic maritime (en volume et en valeur), viser ces cibles est un bon moyen de pression économique sur les occidentaux et leurs alliés qui sont sensibles aux enjeux économiques, dans le contexte actuel de crise économique globale.

Il n'est pas à exclure que la main d'AQ se trouve derrière nombre des derniers actes de pirateries. D'ailleurs, il est fort probable que le soutien apporté par l'organisation aux opérations spectaculaires des pirates somaliens soit fourni dans le but de réaliser d'énormes gains financiers. Bien qu'il n'y ait pour le moment aucune preuve tangible sur la participation directe des combattants de l'organisation dans ces opérations, l'observation des groupes armés en général, révèle qu'ils ne laissent passer aucune opportunité pour accroître leur force et défendre leur survie. La preuve en est le trafic de drogue exercé par AQ afin de contourner le gel de ses fonds et le blocus de ses sources de financement.

La question somalienne est, de mon point de vue, importante à étudier afin de traiter la problématique du terrorisme maritime.

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AL QAEDA ET LE TERRORISME MARITIME

La volonté et les capacités d'AQ à investir le champ de bataille maritime

Dans un message intitulé « Le terrorisme maritime, une nécessité stratégique » diffusé par des sites islamistes proches de l'organisation en avril 2008, il était dit clairement que des éléments armés sillonnaient depuis plus d'un an les côtes du Yémen dans l'espoir de piéger des navires de commerce, de transport de pétrole ou de tourisme.

Ce message mettait aussi l'accent sur l'importance du contrôle de la mer arabe (mer d'Oman) et celle du Golfe d'Aden dans l'objectif de pousser « l'ennemi » à abandonner des points stratégiques et le rendre incapable de se défendre devant les frappes des combattants de l'organisation. Comme les précédents, ce message est revenu sur ce qu'il décrit comme des exploits de l'organisation, comme l'attaque du navire de guerre américain *USS Colde* en octobre 2000 et celui du pétrolier français *Limburg* en 2002.

L'appel lancé par l'organisation à ses partisans au Yémen donne une importance stratégique à la navigation autour de la péninsule arabique. Viser ces cibles est un bon moyen de pression économique sur les occidentaux et leurs alliés qui sont sensibles aux enjeux économiques. La question somalienne est, donc, importante à étudier afin de traiter la problématique du terrorisme maritime.

Et le message d'annoncer l'approche de l'heure de vérité pour l'alliance occidentale qui verra bientôt sa direction obligée de négocier avec Al Qaeda et surtout d'accepter les conditions de ses dirigeants à savoir: « *quitter la terre des musulmans, laisser les armes aux combattants, arrêter le soutien à l'occupation israélienne de la Palestine, ne plus intervenir dans les affaires internes des pays musulmans, et stopper le soutien à leurs dictateurs corrompus*».

Par ailleurs, certains indices, comme le détournement du chimiquier Dewi Madrim, au large de Sumatra en mars 2003, pourrait laisser croire que cette opération, suivie d'une prise d'otages sans demande de rançon, avait pour but d'acquérir l'expertise à une attaque maritime. Aussi, certaines informations reportées par différents rapports indiquent qu'Al Qaeda organiserait des formations en plongée sous marine de ses recrues et adeptes.

Al-Qaeda a ainsi clairement identifié le terrain maritime comme un espace propice à la mise en œuvre d'actions à finalité terroriste. En effet, suite à l'attaque du pétrolier français Limburgn, en octobre 2002, le bureau politique d'Al-Qaeda a affirmé, dans un communiqué « *Si un bateau qui ne nous a pas coûté 1000 dollars est parvenu à dévaster un pétrolier de cette taille, imaginez l'ampleur du danger qui menace l'artère commerciale de l'Occident que constitue le pétrole. Cette opération n'est pas seulement une attaque contre un pétrolier, mais également une attaque contre les lignes de transport internationales de pétroles et toutes ses différentes connotations* ».

La menace terroriste en mer Méditerranée

Le bassin méditerranéen fait face à un terrorisme de zone. La Branche d'Al Qaeda Maghreb Islamique (BAQMI), présente au Maghreb et dans tout le Sahel, est extrêmement mobile. Depuis son allégeance à Al Qaeda, BAQMI a adopté les méthodes et modes opératoires utilisés sur tous les théâtres d'opérations terrestres de cette dernière, à savoir en Irak, en Afghanistan, au Pakistan, en Inde, etc. Les terroristes de BAQMI ont ainsi recours aux attentats suicides (kamikazes aux voitures piégées, kamikazes aux ceintures explosives), ainsi qu'aux Road Side Bombs (RSB).

A cet égard, la Conférence de Nouakchott du 23 mai 2008, regroupant les Ministres de l'Intérieur des pays de la Méditerranée occidentale dans le cadre d'une réunion des 5+5 (Algérie, Maroc, Tunisie, Libye, Mauritanie, France, Espagne, Portugal, Italie, Malte), s'est tenue pour mettre en œuvre plusieurs mesures sécuritaires :

- Accentuation de la coopération policière et des échanges de renseignements ;
- Augmentation de la surveillance de l'espace maritime (création d'un centre opérationnel à Toulon en 2008) ;
- Coopération en matière de sécurité civile (formation, opérations conjointes, etc.)

La prise de conscience collective de la menace terroriste en Méditerranée occidentale constitue un premier élément d'analyse.

Cependant, il convient de rappeler qu'en 2002, les autorités américaines ont arrêté Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, le chef des opérations navales d'AQ à l'origine de l'attaque de l'*USS Colde*, qui aurait alors confessé la planification d'autres attaques dans le détroit de Gibraltar à l'image des actions terroristes menées dans le détroit de Malacca.

Par ailleurs, les récentes déclarations des autorités algériennes au sujet de l'affaiblissement BAQMI rendent plausible le report de ces actions terroristes sur le domaine maritime. En effet, la menace représentée par BAQMI est de plus en plus contenue. Ce groupe terroriste, de moins en moins efficace sur le champ de bataille terrestre, pourrait alors être tenté de manifester ses capacités et sa liberté d'action en mer par un acte terroriste majeur.

Aujourd'hui, BAQMI opère en toute quiétude au Sahel du fait de l'étendue de l'espace et des conflits de faible intensité qui minent la région. Ses actions criminelles lui permettraient de renforcer sa capacité financière pour se doter de moyens techniques et technologiques afin d'opérer en mer Méditerranée.

À ce titre, BAQMI pourrait se concentrer sur des attaques visant des navires marchands (porte-conteneurs, pétroliers et méthaniers) dont la capture, voire la destruction, lui assurerait une couverture médiatique maximale, sans retourner contre elle une opinion publique de moins en moins favorable, si elle attaquait des navires de passagers (ferrys). D'autres attaques pourraient cibler les pipelines transméditerranéens d'acheminement de pétrole et de gaz, les câbles sous marins transméditerranéens en fibre optique de communication et dans un futur, probablement les transporteurs d'énergie électrique du Maghreb vers l'Europe. Ces cibles sont hautement stratégiques dans l'espace économique de la méditerranée occidentale.

Cependant, l'attaque et le détournement de navires commerciaux nécessitent une haute technicité. La question subsiste quant aux réelles capacités de BAQMI à conduire des opérations terroristes d'une telle envergure comparées à celles menées actuellement sur les champs de batailles terrestres.

La lutte contre le terrorisme maritime dans le bassin méditerranéen

En dehors des différents exercices et accords bilatéraux, de nombreux moyens sont déployés afin de prévenir et de lutter contre le terrorisme maritime potentiel qui n'est pas le seul enjeu sécuritaire du bassin méditerranéen. En effet, le trafic de drogue et l'immigration clandestine mobilisent également les différentes forces de sécurité présentes sur la zone. L'Algérie, par exemple, a décidé de renforcer de façon exceptionnelle les moyens des services de sécurité en allouant un budget d'environ 4 milliards d'euros pour augmenter les capacités de réponse au terrorisme et au crime organisé.

En conclusion, j'insisterai sur le fait que la menace terroriste en Méditerranée occidentale est bien réelle. Nous assistons en cette nouvelle ère à l'innovation dans la piraterie maritime.

Depuis son allégeance à Al Qaeda, la Branche d'Al Qaeda Maghreb Islamique (BAQMI) a adopté les méthodes et modes opératoires utilisés sur tous les théâtres d'opérations terrestres de cette dernière, à savoir en Irak, en Afghanistan, au Pakistan, en Inde, etc.

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INTRODUCCIÓN

La importancia de las actividades que se desarrollan en el Mediterráneo, ya sean económicas, comerciales o turísticas, son esenciales para garantizar el bienestar y progreso de sus países ribereños. Baste decir que el 30% del comercio marítimo mundial tiene origen o destino en alguno de los 450 puertos o terminales del mar Mediterráneo. Además, las costas del Mediterráneo albergan a más de 150 millones de habitantes, cifras que se doblan en vacaciones estivales¹.

Esta beneficiosa actividad marítima se puede ver entorpecida por diversos riesgos que van desde el terrorismo internacional a los tráfico ilícitos de drogas o armas, sin olvidar los posibles efectos del cambio climático. Lo más relevante de estos riesgos es que se desarrollan en la mar, un área que por su inmensidad es difícil de vigilar y que no tiene fronteras en el sentido terrestre del término. En pocas palabras, son riesgos transnacionales cuya única manera de gestionarlos de forma coherente es a través de la coordinación entre los diferentes actores nacionales y agencias con competencias en la mar. Sin embargo, alcanzar esa necesaria coordinación y cooperación internacional no siempre es fácil.

Lo primero que hay que afirmar es que la seguridad marítima, entendida como el conjunto de medidas de prevención y respuesta para proteger el entorno marítimo de posibles amenazas y actos ilícitos intencionados, lo único que pretende es garantizar que las actividades lícitas de explotación económica y comercial de nuestros mares se puedan realizar sin interferencias.

Históricamente, la Armada Española siempre ha estado interesada en mantener el entorno marítimo libre de riesgos para contribuir al desarrollo económico de nuestra sociedad. Baste mencionar algunos hechos:

A partir del siglo XVI, los monarcas españoles, conscientes de la importancia de mantener libres de piratas las líneas de comunicación marítima del Mediterráneo en beneficio de sus intereses comerciales, en especial del Reino de Aragón, impulsaron un programa de construcciones para

La seguridad marítima lo único que pretende es garantizar que las actividades lícitas de explotación económica y comercial de nuestros mares se puedan realizar sin interferencias

1. COM(2009)466 final. Towards an Integrated Maritime Policy for Better Governance in The Mediterranean.

Con el fin de la Guerra Fría, la visión del papel de las marinas centrada en las misiones de proyección del poder naval, junto con una reducción de los presupuestos de defensa, se tradujo en un cierto abandono de las misiones de seguridad marítima. Ello ha facilitado la proliferación de actores dedicados a actividades ilícitas en la mar y ha dado lugar a que la seguridad marítima se considere como un asunto novedoso cuando no lo es

establecer permanentemente una Escuadra de Galeras con base en Cartagena, Nápoles, Sicilia y Génova. Dicha escuadra alcanzó en 1570 los 150 buques.

Posteriormente y ante la necesidad de asegurar el comercio interoceánico entre España y sus colonias americanas, amenazado por las incursiones de los corsarios ingleses y franceses, se creó en 1640 la Armada de Barlovento para mantener la autoridad española en el Golfo de Méjico y en el Caribe.

Pero esta preocupación no ha sido solo de la Armada, sino que ha sido compartida por todas las naciones marítimas de nuestro entorno. Históricamente estas naciones, al igual que España, han dedicado enormes esfuerzos para garantizar en la medida de lo posible la libertad de navegación, ya que es condición *sine qua non* para asegurar sus intereses económicos e intercambios comerciales.

¿Qué ha pasado para que el asunto de la Seguridad Marítima sea considerado como novedoso?

Una explicación es que durante la guerra fría el pensamiento naval solamente contempló los océanos como un escenario de confrontación entre las marinas de ambos bloques. En este escenario el mar Mediterráneo no era más que el flanco sur de Europa donde había que detener a la flota soviética en su única salida a mares cálidos. Después de la caída del muro de Berlín, el pensamiento naval asumió que la alta mar había perdido su interés al desaparecer la confrontación entre bloques y justificó que la misión principal de las marinas era la realización de operaciones de control del mar, o de proyección del poder naval, en beneficio de las operaciones en tierra.

Además, las marinas se vieron afectadas por el denominado dividendo de la paz, que apunta a los efectos que el fin de la Guerra Fría trajo para las principales potencias occidentales, en especial en lo relativo a la reducción sustancial de sus presupuestos de defensa. Esta reducción de presupuestos obligó a las marinas a disminuir sus capacidades.

Una visión del papel de las marinas centrada en las misiones de proyección del poder naval, junto con una reducción de los presupuestos de defensa, se ha traducido en un cierto abandono de las misiones de seguridad marítima. Este abandono ha facilitado la proliferación de actores dedicados a actividades ilícitas en la mar y ha dado lugar a que la seguridad marítima se considere como un asunto novedoso cuando no lo es.

Esta nueva realidad obliga a plantearse la pregunta ¿cuál es el papel de las marinas en el siglo XXI?

Cuando en nuestros Estados Mayores tratamos de darle una respuesta, lo primero que hacemos es definir el escenario estratégico del futuro y, muchas veces, la única conclusión que alcanzamos es que estamos en un periodo de cambio y que el futuro será complejo e impredecible. Sin embargo, los responsables de definir las capacidades de la Fuerza Naval del futuro debemos aportar nuestra prospectiva en el ámbito marítimo. En este sentido, podemos afirmar que las tareas de las marinas estarán

divididas fundamentalmente en misiones de disuasión y combate, como contribución naval a las operaciones conjuntas, en misiones de seguridad marítima y en misiones de diplomacia naval y ayuda al desarrollo de capacidades marítimas en países débiles.

En principio, la contribución de las marinas a las operaciones conjuntas las podemos clasificar en distintos tipos de operaciones navales:

- Operaciones de Disuasión: Es obvio que prevenir la guerra es mucho mejor que tener que hacerla. La disuasión se basa en dos factores, por un lado, en la existencia de una fuerza naval tecnológicamente avanzada que muestre su superioridad al posible adversario y, por otro lado, en un mensaje inequívoco respecto a la voluntad de usar esa fuerza naval;
- Operaciones de Control del Mar: Entendido como el conjunto de actividades encaminadas a mantener la libertad de acción de la fuerza naval en la mar. El objetivo último del control del mar es garantizar que la fuerza naval pueda efectuar operaciones de proyección del Poder Naval en tierra. Esta proyección se basa en el uso de aviación embarcada, misiles de largo alcance y unidades de Infantería de Marina y de operaciones especiales.

Como se ha manifestado anteriormente, las marinas nos hemos dedicado a prepararnos para realizar con eficacia estos tipos de operaciones, ya que considerábamos que había que adiestrar a la fuerza naval para los escenarios más peligrosos, suponiendo que este adiestramiento nos permitiría afrontar con garantías las operaciones de seguridad marítima.

Sin embargo, las recientes operaciones de seguridad marítima, como la operación ATALANTA de la Unión Europea, demuestran que esta suposición no es totalmente cierta, lo que nos obliga a definir con más precisión el papel de las marinas en relación con la seguridad marítima.

Para definir este papel debemos empezar por identificar los actores que operan en la mar y definir el marco jurídico por el que se rigen los distintos espacios marítimos, factores que condicionan la posible respuesta de los Estados en temas de seguridad marítima.

Con relación a los actores hay que mencionar lo dispersas que suelen estar las competencias en asuntos relacionados con la administración marítima.

Aunque cada país es diferente, en general nos encontramos con:

- Autoridades nacionales de gestión del tráfico marítimo y gestión portuaria. Estas autoridades usan sistemas propios de gestión de información como el *SafeSeamnet* para llevar a cabo sus funciones;
- Autoridades responsables del salvamento y rescate en la mar. Estas agencias tienen buques y aeronaves para realizar sus funciones junto a sistemas propios para la gestión de información como el anteriormente citado;
- Autoridades encargadas de prevención y lucha contra la contaminación marina que disponen de sus propios medios y de su sistema independiente de gestión de información como el *CleanSeaNet*;

Para definir el papel de la Marina, debemos empezar por identificar los actores que operan en la mar y definir el marco jurídico por el que se rigen los distintos espacios marítimos

Los actores o agencias con competencias en la mar son variados, dedicados a actividades diferentes y con competencias legales, en algunos casos, solapadas

- Fuerzas policiales, agentes de la autoridad del estado ribereño para hacer cumplir sus leyes en el mar territorial. En algunos casos tienen sus propios buques y aeronaves y sus sistemas de información como el SIVE de la Guardia Civil. En la UE está desarrollándose el sistema EUROSUR de control de fronteras.

Por lo tanto, tenemos que los actores o agencias con competencias en la mar son variados, dedicados a actividades diferentes y con competencias legales, en algunos casos, solapadas. Esta situación provoca que la coordinación de sus acciones en la mar sea mejorable, ya que no existen sistemas permanentes de intercambio de información.

El problema se agrava porque las agencias de la Unión Europea creadas para coordinar las actividades de los distintos países miembros, como son la EMSA, FRONTEX o MAOC-N, tratan de hacerlo en sus respectivas áreas sectoriales (transporte, inmigración y drogas respectivamente).

La multitud de actores y la dispersión de competencias en relación con la seguridad marítima no es la mejor manera para afrontar los riesgos de carácter transnacional de la mar. La única forma de mejorar la situación es mediante la coordinación de las actividades de las diferentes agencias y el necesario intercambio de información entre ellas de lo que se hablará más adelante.

Una vez analizados los actores que operan en la mar hay que abordar el marco legal de los espacios marítimos. En este sentido hay que señalar que las riberas del mar, en especial del Mediterráneo, cuna de las civilizaciones más adelantadas, siempre se han considerado vías de comunicación y comercio de uso común.

Sin embargo, la comunidad internacional sintió hace tiempo la necesidad de regular el uso de este espacio común. El último hito en este camino lo representa la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho de Mar de 1982², la cual constituye el principal instrumento legal regulador de las actividades en la mar y determina las obligaciones de los Estados sobre los distintos espacios marítimos, en un intento de armonizar los intereses de los Estados ribereños con los de los demás Estados de la Comunidad Internacional. La idea que preside su régimen jurídico es atribuir al estado ribereño una soberanía más o menos plena sobre sus aguas próximas, en función de su menor o mayor lejanía de sus costas. Hay que señalar que el término frontera es ajeno a la citada convención, ya que los espacios marítimos que regula comienzan donde terminan las fronteras de los Estados y, por ello, son objeto de regulación internacional³.

En virtud de dicho tratado en aguas marítimas interiores, la soberanía del estado ribereño es plena y en el mar territorial casi plena, pero garantizando el derecho de paso inocente y el derecho en tránsito en los estrechos utilizados para la navegación internacional. En la zona económica exclusiva y en la plataforma continental, está limitada a la exploración y explotación de los recursos naturales y otros derechos de contenido económico.

Otra precisión importante sobre la citada Convención es que reconoce al buque de guerra como instrumento para el mantenimiento del orden

2. Turquía, Siria, Israel y Libia no han ratificado la citada Convención.

3. Ver "Marco Jurídico de la Seguridad Marítima" Fernando Marín Castán, en. AA.VV. (2008) *Impacto de los riesgos emergentes en la seguridad marítima* Cuadernos de Estrategia 140. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Madrid, pp. 171-242.

y seguridad en la mar, regulando expresamente su definición, estatuto, responsabilidades e inmunidades. Además atribuye de forma directa al buque de guerra la competencia sobre el ejercicio del derecho de visita, apresamiento de buques piratas, ejercicio del derecho de persecución y de las facultadas de ejecución para la protección y preservación del medio marino.

Además, conforme a otras convenciones internacionales, el buque de guerra tiene competencias ante delitos contra la seguridad de la navegación marítima, incluyendo terrorismo y tráfico de armas de destrucción masiva, delitos relacionados con los tráficos ilícitos de personas y drogas, y ante infracciones relacionadas con al contaminación marina.

Sólo el 16% del Mediterráneo corresponde al mar territorial y es en esta franja donde la soberanía del Estado ribereño es plena y donde operan la mayoría de las agencias civiles con competencias en la mar.

El resto del Mediterráneo, en principio, se considera alta mar donde la principal autoridad legal es el buque de guerra. Además, para operar en la alta mar se necesitan buques y medios de mando y control tecnológicamente complejos y avanzados que no están en muchos casos disponibles para las agencias civiles. Por lo tanto, para garantizar la seguridad del Mediterráneo es fundamental el apoyo de las marinas.

Así, examinado el papel de los distintos actores y el marco legal de los espacios marítimos, se considera que el papel de las marinas en seguridad marítima podría ser el siguiente:

- En el mar territorial. Los principales actores deben ser las agencias civiles con competencias. Las marinas deben apoyar sus actividades mediante acuerdos bilaterales;
- En la alta mar las marinas deben ser los actores principales:
 - En zonas de alta mar cercanas se deben buscar acuerdos regionales con los países vecinos para misiones de seguridad marítima. Esta cooperación vecinal en el Mediterráneo no está exenta de dificultades. La diferente percepción entre las dos orillas de los riesgos y de las amenazas es un factor importante que tiene que tenerse en cuenta para el establecimiento de acuerdos regionales de cooperación;
 - En zonas de alta mar “fuera de área” como puede ser Somalia, las marinas deben operar en el seno de organizaciones de seguridad y defensa como la UE y la OTAN.

Una vez establecido el posible papel de las marinas en el ámbito de la seguridad marítima, conviene hablar de los distintos elementos que la constituyen:

- Conocimiento del Entorno Marítimo, imprescindible para planear de forma eficaz las operaciones de seguridad marítima;
- Operaciones de Seguridad Marítima, acciones concretas para prevenir y mitigar los riesgos;
- Acciones para el fortalecimiento de las capacidades de seguridad marítima en estados ribereños, mediante actividades específicas encaminadas a desarrollar en los países con mayores dificultades para asumir de manera eficaz sus propias funciones en relación a la seguridad marítima.

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La situación actual es que distintas organizaciones usan sus propios sistemas de información optimizados para la realización de las funciones que tienen asignadas. El problema es que estos sistemas no están interconectados y, por lo tanto, no están contribuyendo a mejorar el conocimiento global del entorno marítimo

Con respecto al conocimiento del entorno marítimo, la situación actual es que distintas organizaciones usan sus propios sistemas de información optimizados para la realización de las funciones que tienen asignadas. Así, tenemos por un lado los ya mencionados *SafeSeaNet* y *SafeCleanNet* o sistemas nuevos como EUROSUR y MARSUR, actualmente en desarrollo. El problema es que estos sistemas no están interconectados y, por lo tanto, no están contribuyendo a mejorar el conocimiento global del entorno marítimo, esencial para poder organizar operaciones de seguridad marítima con eficacia.

Para corregir esta deficiencia, la UE está impulsando la interconexión de los distintos sistemas de vigilancia marítima en los Estados miembro⁴ para crear un espacio de información común a partir del cual las distintas agencias puedan, mediante su propio análisis, obtener una *Maritime Situation Awareness* (MSA) de acuerdo a sus necesidades.

La Armada está muy interesada en contribuir a mejorar la interconexión de los actuales sistemas para conseguir un espacio común de información que mejore la eficacia de las operaciones de seguridad marítima. Así, en esta línea participa en el Proyecto Piloto de la Comisión Europea de Integración de Vigilancia Marítima en el Mar Mediterráneo y sus accesos Atlánticos⁵.

Es evidente que para mejorar la seguridad del Mediterráneo no resulta suficiente con los sistemas de intercambio de información entre los países de la UE, sino que hay que extenderlos a todos los países ribereños. El proyecto SAFEMED⁶, la posible extensión del servidor AIS del Mediterráneo o el *Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Centre* de la Marina italiana son iniciativas que tratan de mejorar el conocimiento del entorno marítimo en el Mediterráneo.

Con respecto a las operaciones de seguridad marítima, tanto la UE y la OTAN están empezando a mostrar un marcado interés por ellas y en algunos casos han comenzado el trabajo conceptual. La OTAN ha desarrollado un borrador de concepto en el que establece operaciones con carácter permanente en la zona Euro-Atlántica y operaciones de contingencia fuera de área.

Lo que esta claro es que ambas organizaciones deben buscar la cooperación de los países Mediterráneos en actividades de seguridad marítima.

En este sentido, la cooperación de la UE con los países de la orilla sur del Mediterráneo no es un tema nuevo⁷ y, desde hace tiempo, se están desarrollando actividades entre la UE⁸ y los países mediterráneos para trabajar conjuntamente en misiones de cooperación en varias áreas. Entre ellas pueden destacarse las emergencias civiles, los ejercicios militares conjuntos, la seguridad medioambiental y la transferencia de material industrial y tecnológico.

Por otro lado, otras agencias de la UE como FRONTEX están promoviendo la cooperación entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo. Además, la inclusión de algunos países de la ribera sur del mediterráneo en la operación *Active Endeavour* de la OTAN, contra el terrorismo internacional en el ámbito marítimo, es también un caso interesante de cooperación entre orillas.

4. COM(2009) 538. *Towards the integration of Maritime Surveillance: A common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain.* Brussels.
5. http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/tenders_proposals/mare_2008_13_en.htm
6. COM(2009) 466. *Towards an Integrated Maritime Policy for better governance in the Mediterranean.*
7. "Option Paper on dialogue and cooperation on ESDP between the EU and Mediterranean Partners", *Council of the European Union*, 19 February 2003, 6276/1/03, págs. 4-5.
8. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm

Desde el punto de vista de la Armada, además de otorgar gran importancia a la cooperación internacional en operaciones de seguridad marítima, se estima que el espacio físico donde deben concentrarse en el futuro los esfuerzos de este tipo de operaciones son las vías marítimas.

Por último y respecto a las actividades tendentes a incrementar la capacidad de los estados ribereños no europeos en el ámbito de la seguridad marítima, cabe decir que existe mucho trabajo por delante aunque existe una amplia toma de consciencia, tanto en el seno de la UE como de la OTAN. A nivel regional, la realización del ejercicio SeaBorder en el marco de la iniciativa 5+5, es un ejemplo de cómo mejorar el entendimiento y contribuir a un mejor adiestramiento en esta área.

Para finalizar y como resumen de las misiones de las marinas en seguridad marítima se puede decir que:

- Las marinas tienen que ser capaces de efectuar operaciones de disuasión y combate en apoyo a la acción conjunta y operaciones de seguridad marítima;
- En el mar territorial las operaciones de seguridad marítima serán normalmente en apoyo de agencias civiles;
- Las marinas deberían impulsar la cooperación entre vecinos para las operaciones de seguridad marítima regionales en alta mar;
- Las marinas deberían buscar la cooperación internacional en el seno de organizaciones de seguridad y defensa, como la UE o la OTAN, para las operaciones de seguridad marítima en espacios alejados.

El proyecto SAFEMED, la posible extensión del servidor AIS del Mediterráneo o el *Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Centre* de la Marina italiana son iniciativas que tratan de mejorar el conocimiento del entorno marítimo en el Mediterráneo

MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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In the post-Cold War era, the Mediterranean Sea has become increasingly important in terms of maritime security (including anti-terrorism, anti-trafficking and anti-immigration). In this context, maritime security cooperation has become crucial. My chapter discusses the geopolitical shift from the Atlantic towards the Mediterranean, the current challenges in terms of maritime security and the prospects of North-South maritime security cooperation in the region.

THE GEOPOLITICAL SHIFT FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

During the Cold War era, under the threat of an invasion of Western Europe by Warsaw Pact's land and air forces, the European navies were integrated within the Euro-Atlantic system of defence. In case of war, they would have had to supply Europe for the war effort, i.e. to perform logistic tasks, and to defend Europe's maritime approaches and the Euro-Atlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), i.e. to secure the command of the Atlantic.

To counter the Soviet military threat, the decisive theatre for the naval forces was the Atlantic Ocean. Indeed, in case of conflict, the Soviet submarine fleet might have revealed dangerous for Western logistics¹. This being said, the importance of the Mediterranean SLOCs for Europe's economy, notably regarding energy supply, could not be neglected. However, within the global Euro-Atlantic defence structure, the Mediterranean was clearly a sub-space, i.e. a theatre among others, even if since the 1960s the presence of the Soviet *Eskadra* gave a new strategic importance to this area, and if the US has always maintained a strong naval presence there (the 6th Fleet). As for the Europeans, only France, the UK, Italy, and, to a lesser extent, Spain, gave a certain strategic importance to the Mediterranean. The UK's interest was due to overseas interests², Italy and Spain due to obvious geographical reasons, and France for both motives.

1. The perception of this threat (certainly exaggerated) was based on the huge number of attack submarines operating in the Soviet Navy at that time and on the Western dependence on supplies via maritime transport (see notably Robert J. Hanks, *The Unnoticed Challenge: Soviet Maritime Strategy and the Global Choke Points*, Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Inc, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Washington D.C., 1980, p.44). For a balanced analysis of the real Soviet threat for Western trade, see Hervé Coutau-Begarie, *La puissance maritime soviétique*, Economica, Paris, 1983, pp.111-119.
2. Since 1967, the principal effort of the Royal Navy's conventional forces had been officially reoriented towards the defence of the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs, and its Mediterranean effort seriously diminished.

During the Cold War, the Mediterranean region had never lost the particularity of being a frontier zone between the North and the South and, thus, the theatre of some conflicts possessing their own dynamics (the Israel-Arab wars, the Suez crisis, the Algerian war, Lebanon war, etc.)

During the Cold War, the Mediterranean had been considered as a geostrategic space among others within the broader Euro-Atlantic defence system resulting from the bipolar division of the world, where issues were global rather than regional. That said, for some actors, the Mediterranean had kept a greater strategic importance: for the coastal States, such as Italy and Spain, but above all, for the UK and France due to their overseas interests and policies. Moreover, the Mediterranean region had never lost the particularity of being a frontier zone between the North and the South and, thus, the theatre of some conflicts possessing their own dynamics (the Israel-Arab wars, the Suez crisis, the Algerian war, Lebanon war, etc.), which also determined the role of naval forces in the area.

However, the East-West rivalry had always complemented and, in a sense, exceeded the North-South antagonism, such as during the Suez crisis or the war of October 1973. Thus, the fact that the Mediterranean was a point of contact between the North and the South was not the main determinant of policies and strategies towards the Mediterranean during the Cold War, for everything was first and foremost dictated by the bipolar division of the world. One can thus state that during the Cold War, the Mediterranean had lost its strategic importance relatively to the Atlantic space, although its importance in terms of line of communication and of space of friction between the North and the South had continued.

Then, the end of the Cold War, that is to say (in military and strategic terms) the end of the permanent risk of a global, total and nuclear (thus apocalyptic) war, engendered the redefinition of the strategic and security policies, given budgetary restrictions and the emergence of "new" risks and threats towards Europe in particular and the "West" – or the "North" – in general. Concretely, all the European States (despite certain differences in the definition and perception of threats, and some differences in the timeline) have evolved from a conception of Europe's defence based on the territorial defence of the continent and the defence of the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs against an invasion by the forces of the Warsaw Pact, towards a broader concept of security, encompassing terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, transnational criminality, illegal immigration and environmental degradations.

The probability for the European naval forces to be engaged in missions such as coastal defence or defence of the SLOCs has very much decreased, for the threat of a powerful, foreseeable and long-term naval enemy has disappeared along with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, with the broadening of the security agenda, the naval forces, given their basic characteristics that are flexibility, mobility, versatility and interoperability, are naturally engaged in interventions and crises management, but also counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, counter-trafficking and even marine environment protection³.

Geostrategically speaking, the importance of the Atlantic Ocean tends to decrease, since the Euro-Atlantic SLOCs are not anymore threatened. In contrast, in the eyes of the Europeans, the Mediterranean, whose importance has less to do with SLOCs and more with the crises and instabilities surrounding it, has gained importance in terms of security⁴. In the post-Cold War era, the Mediterranean is at the centre of a security

3. For a comprehensive review of the evolution of the naval missions after the end of the Cold War, see Basil Germond, *Les forces navales européennes dans la période post-guerre froide*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2008, 295p.

4. Basil Germond, "Multinational Military Cooperation and its Challenges: the Case of European Naval Operations in the Wider Mediterranean Area", *International Relations*, Vol.22, No.2, June 2008, pp.173-191.

nexus, where the two shores, although interdependent, have developed a certain antagonism and have developed a feeling of distrust towards each other. The “Northern” States fear the instability that the “South” represents (terrorism, immigration, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, etc.), while the “Southern” States fear the growing culture of projection and intervention developed by Europe (and the US)⁵ and cannot satisfy with the somewhat neo-colonial economic policies developed by the “North”⁶.

Both NATO and the EU are concerned about security in the Mediterranean. The two organizations have explicitly stated the importance of this area in terms of security⁷. If both actors have developed cooperative tools, such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the EU Barcelona Process and the subsequent Union for the Mediterranean, their *de facto* objectives are related to energy security, counter-immigration, counter-terrorism, counter-trafficking, etc.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet *Eskadra* in May 1991, the Europeans (and the US) control the Mediterranean and can freely deal with two broad categories of issues: regional and internal conflicts (such as in the Balkans, the Gulf, the Middle-East, North Africa, etc.), which call for (naval) interventions, and the transnational threats, which call for efforts in terms of maritime security. Both issues are obviously linked, as the second (criminal actors, terrorists) feed from the first (conflicts, weak States). I will now concentrate on the second aspect, i.e. maritime security.

MARITIME SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The very nature of the maritime *milieu* facilitates the proliferation of transnational threats. Indeed, the sea is uninhabitable and one cannot occupy it in a classical military manner. Thus, it is relatively difficult for the States to control the sea. Consequently, the sea “represents a space of liberty for criminal non-State actors, which can operate in a vast space without facing many police constraints”⁸. Combating transnational threats at sea or coming from the sea, requires day-to-day police activities, sometimes in blue waters. It is mainly a notion of peacetime, as it does not constitute a reaction to an aggression by another State and does not (normally) imply war operations. On the one hand, it is the transposition at sea of Max Weber’s notion of the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence⁹. But on the other hand, it goes beyond this notion and beyond the classical definition of police activities, as it requires operating outside territorial waters, sometime within foreign States’ territorial waters.

Maritime security requires the establishment of rules (normative level) and then the setting up of controls and repression (operational level). It also requires an efficient intelligence network, as the sea is wide and hard to monitor. Indeed, hundreds of ships greater than 100 tons transit through the Mediterranean daily and only some of them may transport illegal cargo/passengers. At the operational level, the naval forces hold a central position, as they enforce law in the territorial waters, the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and in the international waters (right of hot pursuit, struggle against piracy, control of the ships flying the flag of

Maritime security requires the establishment of rules (normative level) and then the setting up of controls and repression (operational level). It also requires an efficient intelligence network, as the sea is wide and hard to monitor

5. Giovanni Arcudi, “Forces de police et forces armées, sécurité et défense: où sont les frontières ?”, in Arcudi Giovanni, Liechti Michel, Vonlanthen Marisa, *Frontières entre police et armée*, Cahier du GRIPI, No.2, 2004, p.18.
6. For a similar type of analysis, see Muge Kinacioglu, “From East-West Rivalry to North-South Division: Redefining the Mediterranean Security Agenda”, *International Relations*, Vol.15, No.2, 2000, pp.27-39.
7. NATO, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Roma, 8 November 1991), in *NATO Basic Texts*, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>> (10 February 2007); NATO, *The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Washington DC, 23-24 April 1999), in *Press Release*, NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>> (February 2007); *EU, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels, 2003).
8. Basil Germond, “The Naval and Maritime Dimension of the European Union”, in Gérard Bossuat and Anne Deighton (eds), *The EC/EU: a world security actor?*, Soleb, Paris, 2007, p.352.
9. Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf*, Reclam, Ditzingen, 1992, p.6 (first published in 1919).

their States and the application of other international rules and conventions). In addition to the repression of illegal activities (enforcement), naval forces carry out presence and surveillance operations in order to deter criminals and terrorists by ostensibly showing the flag.

Traditionally, police and constabulary tasks have been neglected by naval practitioners, strategists and academics, as they do not correspond to the “noble” image, by which navies have been usually represented, i.e. prestigious naval battles on the high seas. However, since the end of the Cold War, due to strategic realities, this perception has changed. Indeed, great naval battles are even less likely to happen than during the Cold War. Then, the current scenarios put the main emphasis on projection operations, but also on counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and, more generally, on the struggle against criminality at sea and the promotion of good governance at sea (maritime security).

Navies must participate in police operations, but in order to secure the sea, purely military means are not sufficient and the struggle against transnational criminality requires varied means and services (such as coast-guards) to operate at sea.

As discussed above, since the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean area has been identified as a fundamental security area. In fact, in terms of security, Europe and the Mediterranean are more strongly linked today than during the Cold War era, because most of the “new” security challenges identified by the Europeans are now localized in this area¹⁰. The Mediterranean constitutes the main route towards Europe for incoming transnational threats, such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Moreover, the adjacent Horn of Africa suffers a huge increase of piracy and robbery at sea. Consequently, European States, NATO and the EU are strongly involved within the wider Mediterranean area¹¹.

Antiterrorist operations in the wider Mediterranean

Following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent “war on terror” (as depicted by the US government), the Europeans have been active with their US partner in the struggle against terrorism at sea¹². The most significant example is given by two operations taking place in the wider Mediterranean initiated in the aftermath of September 11¹³. Since October 2001, on the fringe of the military operations in Afghanistan, but still in the framework of operation Enduring Freedom, a large international coalition (led by the US) has been acting in the Indian Ocean and at the Horn of Africa to prevent terrorists from using the sea as a means of transportation or making attacks, such as the ones against *USS Cole* or the French tanker *Limburg*.

In the Mediterranean *per se*, from October 2001 until March 2003, operation Active Endeavour (under the aegis of NATO) had a mandate to monitor the ships in the eastern part of the Mediterranean (deterrence) and from March 2003 its mandate was extended to on-board inspections (and from February 2003 until May 2004 to escorting civilian ships through the Strait of Gibraltar). After March 2004 the operation was extended to the whole Mediterranean. This ensures not only deter-

10. Basil Germond, “De l’Atlantique à la Méditerranée: vers une réorientation de la géostratégie navale dans l’espace euro-atlantique depuis 1989”, *Les Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, No.71, T.2, décembre 2005, pp.227-244.

11. The conception of a wider Mediterranean, initially developed by the Italian military to justify their “out of area” operations, has rapidly gained credit, since “the security challenges of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean stretch well beyond their geographic boundaries; their geopolitical dimensions encompass the Atlantic approaches to Gibraltar, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, and even Central Asia. From a Western point of view, it results in a ‘wider Mediterranean’ arena” (Giampaolo Di PAOLA (Admiral), “Security Challenges of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean”, Paper presentation, 21st International Workshop on Global Security - *Global Security: A Broader Concept for the 21st Century*, Berlin, 7-10 May 2004). This enlarged Mediterranean basin goes from Gibraltar, or even the coasts of Senegal (on the Atlantic front), to the Horn of Africa and the Western part of the Indian Ocean (Salvatore RUZITTO (Rear Admiral), “The new roles of European navies: the maritime and air surveillance”, Assembly of the WEU, Lisbon, 18 September 2007, p.2.).

12. Struggling against terrorist threats coming from the sea also translates into land-oriented legal and technical policies, such as containers security and seaports monitoring.

13. This issue has been discussed in Basil Germond, “Multinational Military Cooperation and its Challenges” *op.cit.*, pp.178-179.

rence, but direct involvement to maintain and exert command of the sea¹⁴. These two operations constitute an ideal-type of complex naval cooperation within a multilateral composite network gathering national units, on-call and standing naval forces.

The tangible results of these operations are very difficult to estimate. Officials declare that the deterrent effect is clear, basing their statements on the fact that there were very few cases of terrorism at sea, and attributing to themselves the merit of this positive situation, saying that the allied controls are successful in deterring terrorists¹⁵. One has to remain cautious regarding these potential deterrent effects since the correlation seems not to be evident. Nevertheless, one can notice some positive side effects in terms of reducing transnational criminality, notably smuggling activities¹⁶. These anti-terrorist operations illustrate that the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea is a comprehensive task, which requires to deal with various threats at once and to operate far away from the territorial waters.

Struggle against transnational criminality (piracy and trafficking) in the Mediterranean

Apart from the case of terrorism discussed above and of illegal immigration examined below, the Mediterranean Sea is used by criminal non-State actors in two main ways threatening European security¹⁷.

Firstly, there are acts of piracy¹⁸. European waters are not the theatre of such activities, as the coastal areas are sufficiently well policed. This prevents potential pirates to benefit from rear bases, which are essential to prepare and execute attacks at sea¹⁹. Close to Europe, however, the Somali coasts are currently challenging in terms of piracy. Recent attacks against European commercial ships and boating have called attention to this region. Piracy and robbery at sea at the Horn of Africa have become a serious problem, since the collapse of the Somali State and the chaotic situation ashore provide pirates with rear bases to support their raids.

Following the increase in the number of raids in 2007 and 2008, the UN Security Council passed three resolutions between May and October 2008. Resolution 1816 (June 2, 2008) authorises States to use "within the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery"²⁰. In the meantime, various States, including Europeans, have sent naval units in the region to deter pirates, as well as to signify their support to the ships flying their flag, and NATO has sent units to protect ships bringing humanitarian aid to Somalia. On 5 November 2008, the Council of the EU launched the first ever European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) naval operation, operation Atalanta²¹. It has the mandate to deter, prevent and respond to acts of piracy and robbery at sea, including within Somali territorial waters²².

Secondly, the majority of criminal activities at sea concerns arms and especially drug trafficking. Arms' trafficking includes small arms, light weapons and weapons of mass destruction (or at least some of their components); it is thus linked to warlordism, civil war, insurgencies

14. NATO Diplomatic Division, *Combating terrorism at sea*, Briefing, April 2004. Between October 2001 and January 2005, 59,000 ships were identified, of which 80 were subject to control on board, and 488 allied ships were escorted in the Gibraltar Strait (NATO Diplomatic Division, *NATO and the fight against terrorism*, Briefing, March 2005, p.6.).
15. See for example the statement (concerning Enduring Freedom) of Vice-admiral Xavier Rolin, Commander of the French forces in the Indian Ocean, quoted by Agence France Presse (AFP), *Coopération militaire entre les marines française et érythréenne*, 9 November 2004.
16. NATO Diplomatic Division, *Combating terrorism at sea*, *op.cit.*, p.4.
17. See notably *European Security Strategy*, *op.cit.*, pp.4-5; Commission of the European Communities, *Green Paper: Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union*, *op.cit.*, Background Paper No.6 on Maritime Safety and Security, pp.29-31.
18. Legally speaking, "piracy" describes actions performed in international waters; actions performed within territorial waters are called "robbery at sea".
19. In fact, the risky zones in terms of piracy and robbery at sea listed by the International Maritime Bureau are located in the waters near China, Indonesia (especially the Strait of Malacca), Nigeria, in the vicinity of some Brazilian ports, and off Somalia and at the Horn of Africa. International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Service, International Maritime Bureau, <<http://www.icc-ccs.org>>.
20. UN Security Council, Resolution 1816 (2008) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5902nd meeting on 2 June 2008, S/RES/1816 (2008), p.3.
21. On Atalanta, see Basil Germond and Michael E. Smith, "Interest-Definition and Threat-Perception in the EU: Explaining the First ESDP Anti-Piracy Naval Operation", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.30, No.3, December 2009, pp.573-593.
22. Council of the EU, "Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast", in *Official Journal of the European Union*, 12.11.2008, pp.33-37.

The areas most concerned by illegal immigration, like for drug smuggling, are the less policed regions, but also more generally the maritime routes towards Spain, France, Greece, Malta and, above all, Italy

and obviously terrorism. Drug trafficking includes cannabis (from North Africa), cocaine (from South America) and heroin (from Asia, essentially from Afghanistan). The risky zones for Europe are the most remote regions, such as the North of the UK and Ireland, or more likely, the least policed areas, such as the Balkan coasts in the Adriatic Sea or the Black Sea; for geographical reasons (Morocco is the world's main cannabis provider²³), the Strait of Gibraltar is also a hot spot. In addition, since controls in the Caribbean are more rigorous, the cocaine route tends to go through Africa before redirecting towards France and Spain, thus merging with the cannabis route²⁴.

Within the Mediterranean, navies and multinational forces are monitoring the sea on a daily basis and, depending on the information transmitted by the various national and multilateral intelligence mechanisms, can intercept smugglers. These actions are restricted by the fact that, according to the international law of the sea, one is theoretically not authorised, on the high seas, to intercept ships flying foreign flags without flag States' consent. The Europeans thus rely upon multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements or *ad hoc* compromises with flag States²⁵. Multinational forces (such as NATO standing naval forces or EUROMARFOR) and multilateral operations (such as Active Endeavour and Enduring Freedom) also play a role in narcotics interdiction.

Anti-illegal Immigration in the Mediterranean

Although it is still a controversial issue, mass and illegal immigration is considered by the European States and by the EU as a threat to their security. Concerning illegal immigration through the sea, I shall specify that in the majority of the cases, illegal migrants must not be classified as the authors of the criminal activity at sea. The instigators are the human smugglers, who are the real criminals in these affairs. The migrants often die while crossing the Mediterranean on boat people²⁶, and smugglers are even ready to throw them into the sea in order not to suffer a *flagrante delicto* when they see the police forces arriving.

Thus, the daily activities of naval forces (including coast-guards) consist not only in deterring the smugglers and arresting the illegal immigrants, but also in helping endangered small boats and migrants (Search & Rescue – SAR). The areas most concerned by illegal immigration, like for drug smuggling, are the less policed regions, but also more generally the maritime routes towards Spain (the Strait of Gibraltar, the Canaries Islands), France, Greece, Malta and, above all, Italy (the Strait of Otranto and Sicily).

Italy is confronted to massive immigration flows from the Balkans, especially since the fall of communism in Tirana in 1991. In 1997, following the new influx of migrants consecutive to the Albanian financial crisis, Italy decided to strengthen its naval device by signing with Albania an agreement authorizing Italian naval forces to operate in Albanian territorial waters in order to intercept and roll back migrants coming from Albania. Since then, Italian naval forces (*Marina*, *Guardia di Finanza* and *Guardia Costiera*) have played an important role²⁷. Thus, since 2004, the route from Albania to Italy through the Strait of Otranto has been less frequented, thanks to the intense monitoring activities carried out by

23. Tim Boekhout and Van Solinge, "Drug use and drug trafficking in Europe", *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, Vol.89, No.1, 1998, p.101.
24. Christophe Cornevin, "Les trafiquants de cocaïne investissent les routes du haschisch", *Le Figaro*, 13 septembre 2005, p.8; AFP, *Opération antidrogue en Méditerranée*, 29 juin 2006.
25. See William C. Gilmore, "Narcotics interdiction at sea: The 1995 Council of Europe Agreement", *Marine Policy*, Vol.20, No.1, 1996, pp.3-14; Michael Byers, "Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol.98, No.3, July 2004, pp.526-545.
26. On the issue of boat people, see Michael Pugh, *Europe's Boat People: Maritime Cooperation in the Mediterranean*, Chaillot Paper No.41, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2000.
27. In 2002, a quarter of Italian navy's sailing hours were devoted to the struggle against illegal immigration. Derek Lutterbeck, "Policing Migration in the Mediterranean", *op.cit.*, p.67.

the Italian services and the aid given upstream by Italy to the Albanian services²⁸. Since the middle of the 1990's, Italy has also faced a serious clandestine immigration flow from North Africa (notably from Libya), via Sicily and notably the island of Lampedusa, where migrants are landing almost on a daily basis. Moreover, due to the efforts in the Adriatic, a great part of the migrants has redirected towards the Sicily route²⁹.

In Spain, since 1995, the phenomenon of illegal immigration from North Africa (via Ceuta and Melilla) has become very important. In this case, the role of naval forces is relatively limited, as the majority of the interceptions are done ashore. Navies' role is often limited to SAR, as migrants' skiffs often capsize³⁰. Since 2004, the number of migrants using the Gibraltar route has decreased, thanks to the intensity of controls carried out ashore, notably in Ceuta and Melilla³¹. On the contrary, as in the case of Italy, this diminution coincides with an increase of arrivals via the Canaries route (from Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal). This route seems to be privileged as the number of controls at sea has been quite low so far³².

Since a couple of years, the Maltese route is also well valued because of the geographical location of the island (close to the African coasts, half way to Italy) and as Malta is member of the EU since 2004. Greece has also faced a flow of illegal immigration since the end of the 1990s and notably the beginning of the 2000s, via Turkey. France is less affected by the phenomenon of boat people. Officials say that it is due to the deterrent effect of controls at sea, but it seems that the geographical factor is a better explanation³³.

To deter, to arrest or to rescue illegal migrants in the Mediterranean, States engage their navy, coast-guards and police forces. But since 2005, the EU is also involved through its specialized agency FRONTEX, which has coordinated various operations conducted multilaterally by European navies in the Aegean Sea, in the Western Mediterranean, off Malta, as well as off Senegalese coasts and Canaries Islands.

Maritime security often requires the States to act outside their territorial waters, sometimes within foreign States' territorial waters, in order to cope with terrorism at sea, piracy, arms and drug smuggling, as well as illegal immigration. Inter-State coordination and multilateral operations (at the EU or NATO level) are crucial in order to secure the sea. Indeed, criminal actors use the maritime space to their advantage, by exploiting legal disparities, as well as inefficient coordination between services within and between the different countries. Consequently, cooperation in the field of the struggle against transnational threats at sea is an imperative requirement, although not so easily achievable.

MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

In the Mediterranean, maritime security cooperation implies not only intra-European or Europe/US maritime cooperation, but also North-South maritime cooperation, which requires not only technical, tactical and operational cooperation, but also confidence building, coalition building, dialogue, etc. In parallel to bilateral cooperation, NATO and

Cooperation in the field of the struggle against transnational threats at sea is an imperative requirement, although not so easily achievable

28. BBC Monitoring international Report, *Albanian minister hails cooperation with Italy in stemming crime, migrants*, July 5, 2006.

29. Lutterbeck, *op.cit.*, p.75.

30. PUGH, *L'Europe et ses boat people*, *op.cit.*, II. 4.

31. AFP, *Espagne: l'immigration clandestine par la mer en baisse de 18% en 2004*, 7 janvier 2005.

32. François Musseau, "Immigration clandestine: 'On est en plein chaos'", *Libération*, 6 septembre 2006, p.10.

33. For the official point of view of the French General Staff, see *Etat-major des Armées, Sauvegarde maritime: une dimension de sécurité renouvelée*, Paris, 2004, pp.9-10.

the EU are the principal multilateral actors involved in fostering maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean.

As the traditional naval actor in the Mediterranean, NATO has the necessary experience and assets to foster cooperation in the area. With strong capabilities in terms of “hard security”, it has credibility for coalition-building. Moreover, the participation of the US implies more assets, more power and more leverage. Nevertheless, NATO also has some disadvantages: indeed, there is a strong misperception by the “South”, which perceives NATO as a way of (US) domination; the “West” (or the “North”) is perceived as a whole (i.e. non-discrimination) and a whole dominated by the US³⁴. Consequently, NATO has not proved good enough in terms of coalition building in the Mediterranean; for example, only Morocco has agreed to contribute to operation Active Endeavour. Moreover, operationally speaking, NATO has a relative weakness regarding “soft security”; indeed, it has few competences in the field of counter-immigration and marine environmental protection.

Compared to NATO, the EU has some advantages: it has a stronger expertise in “soft security” (counter-immigration and maritime safety); thus, it has a comparative advantage in civilian power projection (i.e. exercising the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence at sea). The EU has developed a comprehensive approach to maritime security; its *Integrated Maritime Policy*, defined in October 2007, seeks to harmonize the various European policies concerning maritime affairs in order to promote good governance at sea and to struggle against the transnational criminality at sea³⁵.

The EU’s approach is flexible, cross-pillar and interagency; consequently, the EU has a comparative advantage in fostering maritime cooperation between States. That said, as well as for NATO, there is a growing misperception of the EU’s policies by the “South”. This is due to the fact that the EU is developing two geostrategies towards its frontier zones and neighbours: the “Fortress Europe” strategy, which seeks to make the EU impregnable by hermetically sealing its external borders (notably illegal immigration), and the “Imperial Europe” strategy, which seeks to project security outside the EU’s external boundaries so as to obtain security inside (interventionism)³⁶. Finally, the EU has a relative weakness regarding “hard security” capabilities (maritime power and forces projection).

Therefore, both actors have advantages, as well as limits. Thus, the two actors clearly complement each other³⁷. Together they can boost maritime security cooperation in the Mediterranean, if they manage to get beyond their divergences, to avoid duplications and concurrence, and to develop a comprehensive and integrated approach to maritime security in the Mediterranean (including “soft security-hard security” integration and civil-military coordination) instead of a sector-based and institution-based approach.

Above all, Europeans and Americans should promote better North-South cooperation regarding maritime security in the Mediterranean. Southern partners should be more involved in maritime security: confidence-building measures should be improved, such as port calls and common exercises; information sharing (on transnational threats) is also very

34. On that matter, see Basil Germond, “Multinational Military Cooperation and its Challenges”, *op.cit.*, pp.184-186.

35. Commission of the European Communities, *An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union*, Brussels, 10 October 2007, COM(2007) 575 final. The rationale behind the formulation of a European maritime policy is to integrate horizontally the sector-based policies and actions, “based on the clear recognition that all matters relating to Europe’s oceans and seas are interlinked, and that sea-related policies must develop in a joined-up way if we are to reap the desired results”. The overall goals are very ambitious: “An Integrated Maritime Policy will enhance Europe’s capacity to face the challenges of globalisation and competitiveness, climate change, degradation of the marine environment, maritime safety and security, and energy security and sustainability”.

36. Basil Germond, “From Frontier to Boundary and Back Again: The European Union’s Maritime Margins”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.15, No.1, forthcoming January 2010.

37. Basil Germond, “Venus Has Learned Geopolitics: The European Union’s Frontier and Transatlantic Relations”, in Jussi hanhimäki, Georges-Henri Soutou and Basil Germond (eds), *Transatlantic Security from the Cold War to the 21st Century*, Routledge Handbooks, Routledge, London and New York, forthcoming May 2010.

important, but the exchange of information must be reciprocal and help southern partners as well; participation in Western-led operations (such as Active Endeavour, or the EU-coordinated anti-illegal immigration operations) must increase.

Maritime security cooperation must effectively benefit both sides of the Mediterranean and must be perceived as such by the “South”. Thus, communication must be improved, so as to get better perception and image. The threats (piracy, immigration, terrorism) must be better differentiated from the South: threats are originating in the South but the “South” is not a threat *per se*.

Emphasizing the regional (Mediterranean) rather than the functional dimension (terrorism, immigration, etc.) may also reveal positive, and forums such as the Union for the Mediterranean (EU) and the Mediterranean Dialogue (NATO) remain effective platforms in fostering maritime security cooperation, although they should be complemented by national/bilateral initiatives. In any case, the US must participate, so as to show the American good will, and de-securitize their discourse (i.e. emphasizing the need for regional cooperation rather than the functional threat of terrorism or else), which seems to be the policy that the Obama administration is likely to pursue. Finally, emphasizing a comprehensive approach rather than a sector-based one could reveal positive, although one has to keep in mind that some States will only agree to cooperate on some aspects (for example terrorism) and not on others (for example illegal immigration).

In conclusion, the importance of the sea for security has tremendously increased in the post-Cold War era. The Mediterranean is a security nexus at the centre of Europe, US, and Southern security interests, whose importance derives from the localization and concentration on its shores and waters of many security problems now considered as priorities (regional conflicts and intra-State crises and instability, transnational threats, etc.). A comprehensive and multilateral approach to maritime security in the Mediterranean is the key, but it must follow some rules, including a better taking into account of the South’s interests and a better implication of the South. This may only be possible if confidence and sacrifices are reciprocal.

Maritime security cooperation must effectively benefit both sides of the Mediterranean and must be perceived as such by the “South”

GRUPO DE TRABAJO: PROTECCIÓN CIVIL

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IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION IN 2010

Raül Daussà i Pastor

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Le pourtour méditerranéen est une zone à risques (bâtiments, transports, risques naturels ou technologiques), mais également soumise à des agressions (terrorisme, guerres, risque nucléaires, radiologiques, biologiques et chimiques (NRBC), mouvements de populations, etc.).

Certains États disposent de savoir-faire, mais l'expertise n'est pas assez partagée dans ce domaine. Le renforcement de la coopération entre États représente une opportunité, notamment dans le domaine de la formation et de l'action opérationnelle, car elle concerne l'ensemble de la population de la région. L'Union pour la Méditerranée (UpM) est une opportunité pour unir leurs efforts, en renforçant la coopération entre États riverains en matière de protection civile en termes de formation, d'anticipation et préparation, d'assistance mutuelle, et par la mise en œuvre d'un espace méditerranéen de protection civile en Méditerranée.

Cet espace de protection civile doit concrétiser, progressivement et en liaison avec le mécanisme européen de protection civile, une politique de solidarité fédérant l'ensemble des acteurs impliqués dans la prévention, l'alerte ou l'aide à la gestion opérationnelle et à la coordination post-catastrophe (tremblements de terre, feux de forêts, inondations).

Cette dynamique a été mise en avant lors de la présidence française de l'Union européenne (UE), notamment par la création d'un véritable réseau européen de formation, le soutien au développement de l'assistance mutuelle européenne, ainsi qu'aux forces d'intervention rapide (FIRE) successives¹, dont la mise en œuvre opérationnelle s'effectue déjà en Méditerranée.

HISTORIQUE

Le Programme Pilote d'Euromed

Le programme « EUROMED » de protection civile concernant un projet pilote pour la création d'un système « Euro-Méditerranéen de

Le renforcement de la coopération entre États représente une opportunité, notamment dans le domaine de la formation et de l'action opérationnelle, car elle concerne l'ensemble de la population de la région

1. France, Italie, Portugal et Espagne ont déjà créé, en 2006, dans le cadre de l'UE, une coopération entre protections civiles nationales, la force d'intervention rapide (FIRE 4), élargie à la Grèce (FIRE 5) ainsi qu'à Chypre (FIRE 6).

Débuté le 5 mars 2009, le programme EUROMED-PPRD Sud constitue actuellement l'ossature de la coopération régionale entre l'UE et les pays méditerranéens

réduction, de prévention et gestion des désastres naturels et d'origine humaine » fut initié conjointement par l'Égypte et l'Italie en 1996. Il s'est déroulé de 1998 à 2003 à la satisfaction générale de l'ensemble des pays participants.

Les actions entreprises par le projet pilote étaient centrées sur les risques et aléas naturels et d'origine humaine qui prédominent dans la région méditerranéenne, ceux qui constituent une menace particulière à la vie, à la propriété, à l'environnement et au bien-être de la société en général.

Le Programme intermédiaire d'Euromed

La mise en œuvre du programme intermédiaire a débuté le 15 février 2005 et s'est achevée le 31 mars 2008. La direction exécutive du programme intermédiaire fut confiée à la France et co-piloté par l'Algérie, l'Égypte, l'Italie et la France avec la participation de la Commission Européenne.

Les actions réalisées avec la participation active de plus de 700 experts ont permis de développer la solidarité de l'ensemble des pays d'EUROMED en cas de catastrophe en accentuant la prise de conscience des différents experts pour une meilleure protection des populations.

Toutes ces actions ont permis de renforcer la cohésion entre les directions de protection civile des pays méditerranéens et des pays européens. En fonction des résultats obtenus et de la pertinence des actions, ce programme intermédiaire est suivi du programme de planification et de réduction des désastres en Méditerranée (PPRD). Son objectif est d'assurer la continuité des actions du programme intermédiaire. Le PPRD débutera au cours du 1er trimestre 2009 et doit s'achever en décembre 2011.

Le Programme de Prévention, de Réduction et de Gestion des Désastres Naturels en Méditerranée (P.P.R.D.)

Le programme à long terme appelé désormais programme de prévention, de réduction et de gestion des désastres naturels en Méditerranée (PPRD), dont la direction exécutive a été confiée à l'Italie dans le cadre d'un consortium comprenant l'Algérie l'Égypte, la France et les Nations Unies (ISDR).

Débuté le 5 mars 2009, le programme EUROMED-PPRD Sud constitue actuellement l'ossature de la coopération régionale entre l'UE et les pays méditerranéens.

Ce programme s'achevant en décembre 2011, il apparaît opportun de réfléchir aux objectifs futurs de la coopération unissant au profit de tous, les efforts des différents acteurs européens et méditerranéens de protection civile.

LA SUITE DU PROCESSUS DE BARCELONE : LA CRÉATION DE L'UNION POUR LA MÉDITERRANÉE

Le sommet du 13 juillet 2008, fondateur de l'Union pour la Méditerranée, a souhaité renforcer la coopération entre États riverains en matière de protection civile en termes de formation, d'anticipation et préparation, d'assistance mutuelle et a précisé que la protection civile doit être l'une des grandes priorités de l'UpM.

Lors de la conférence des ministres des affaires étrangères de l'UE, tenue les 3 et 4 novembre 2008 à Marseille, le Conseil a insisté sur l'importance du programme intermédiaire de protection civile qui a renforcé les dispositifs de prévention, de préparation et de gestion des risques naturels et des risques liés à la main de l'homme en méditerranée et préparé les fondations du PPRD, en précisant que ce programme se terminera en 2011 et qu'il était nécessaire de mettre en œuvre un nouveau dispositif s'inscrivant dans le cadre de l'UpM.

L'ESPACE MÉDITERRANÉEN DE PROTECTION CIVILE

La réalisation de cet espace méditerranéen de protection civile se base sur l'expérience acquise dans les différents programmes de protection civile réalisés tant dans un cadre bilatéral qu'Européen, et des suggestions des États Membres de l'Union Européenne, des partenaires méditerranéens, ainsi que des différents acteurs du secours en Méditerranée et, en particulier, dans les directions générales de protection civile.

Cet espace méditerranéen de protection civile doit permettre de fédérer l'ensemble des pays de l'Union pour la Méditerranée dans le cadre de la protection des populations méditerranéennes, en développant un véritable réseau des responsables nationaux de formation et opérationnels de protection civile des pays de l'UpM.

Véritable socle des actions de protection civile, cet espace permettra de fédérer l'ensemble des pays de l'Union pour la Méditerranée dans le cadre de la protection des populations méditerranéennes et développera l'ensemble des domaines d'action de la protection civile et de ces acteurs en complément et en articulation avec le mécanisme européen de protection civile et en partenariat avec le bureau de protection civile de la Ligue Arabe.

Destiné à être effectif dès 2012, à l'issue du PPRD Sud, les actions développées ne devront pas être un doublon des politiques communautaires ou internationales, mais s'inscrivent comme un outil opérationnel pérenne et permanent, chargé de décliner les orientations de l'Union pour la Méditerranée en matière de protection civile.

La disposition offerte par le mécanisme d'établir des accords bilatéraux avec les pays partenaires permet déjà de débiter ce processus.

Dans l'espace méditerranéen de protection civile, cinq grands champs de coopération seront développés : la prévention, l'alerte précoce, la formation, la préparation à l'engagement des différents acteurs et la coopération opérationnelle

Au sein de cet espace, cinq grands champs de coopération seront développés : la prévention, l'alerte précoce, la formation, la préparation à l'engagement des différents acteurs et la coopération opérationnelle.

La prévention

Ce volet est un point substantiel qu'il est nécessaire de développer rapidement, notamment : l'identification des risques partagés, la cartographie de ces risques, le développement des échanges d'expérience et de savoir-faire en matière d'adaptation des normes. Ces points constituent quelques uns des objectifs de cette coopération qui doit être renforcée en développant des actions cohérentes, notamment dans la préparation des plans de prévention.

L'alerte précoce

Le bassin méditerranéen ne dispose pas encore d'un système d'alerte précoce, en particulier pour le risque tsunami. Pour y pourvoir, les États riverains de la Méditerranée et autres partenaires de l'UpM, avec l'aide de la Commission Européenne, dans le cadre du dispositif validé par l'UNESCO (SATANEM), doivent s'organiser pour mettre en œuvre un véritable dispositif d'alerte aux populations.

La formation

L'objectif est de renforcer le développement des connaissances mutuelles, du partage d'expérience pour atteindre la convergence des organisations, des pratiques et des standards au travers du réseau européen (en construction) des écoles nationales de protection civile et des instituts universitaires associés, qui pourrait ainsi être élargi aux partenaires méditerranéens. Ainsi, des formations « diplômantes » et reconnues par l'ensemble des services de protection civile de l'espace euro-méditerranéen pourraient être développées et un « manuel de protection civile euro-méditerranéen » pourrait être élaboré.

Par ailleurs, dans la continuité du renforcement du réseau de formation, la possibilité de points focaux présentant les garanties de qualité nécessaires, pourrait être explorée afin de réaliser des formations « diplômantes » reconnues.

La préparation à l'engagement opérationnel

L'engagement conjoint de services de protection civile de plusieurs pays exige au préalable une bonne connaissance des partenaires et de nombreux exercices communs. Un programme spécifique qui comprendrait une politique d'exercices visant à développer la cohésion opérationnelle pourrait être développé pour une période transitoire (2012–2017 par exemple).

La coopération opérationnelle

La décision du Conseil du 8 novembre 2007 instituant un mécanisme révisé de protection civile prévoit déjà que les pays tiers peuvent coopérer au mécanisme. Afin d'établir un espace euro-méditerranéen plus large dans le domaine de la protection civile au travers de champs de coopération à identifier, les pays partenaires devraient être associés étroitement au mécanisme, avec la possibilité de se connecter à terme au réseau CSIS d'échange d'informations, de déclarer leurs modules et autres capacités de protection civile et de contribuer sous toutes les formes aux opérations de secours coordonnées.

Dans l'attente de ces modifications, afin de développer la cohésion et la coordination opérationnelles, il est nécessaire de favoriser :

- Le développement d'une véritable politique d'exercices, pour développer la cohésion opérationnelle entre tous les pays de la Méditerranée. Des exercices de grande ampleur, ainsi que des exercices d'état-major devront se dérouler régulièrement, de façon optimale au moins deux fois par an. Ces exercices permettront de tester l'ensemble des chaînes opérationnelles, ainsi que l'intégration des équipes de secours et de protection civile dans une chaîne de commandement sous l'autorité de l'État assurant son organisation ;
- Le renforcement de l'assistance mutuelle en cas de catastrophes survenant dans un pays par l'envoi immédiat d'experts de haut niveau pour conseiller le responsable des opérations de secours. La constitution d'un réseau d'experts permettrait d'identifier des intervenants capables de se projeter rapidement dans le ou les États sinistrés (base de données) ;
- La constitution ou le renforcement au sein de chaque pays ou États membres de modules ou détachements de protection civile permettant une couverture efficace du ou des risques locaux et régionaux pouvant ensuite être mis à disposition d'un pays sinistré en cas de catastrophe dans le cadre d'une procédure coordonnée.

Afin de développer la cohésion et la coordination opérationnelles, il est nécessaire de favoriser le développement d'une véritable politique d'exercices, le renforcement de l'assistance mutuelle en cas de catastrophes et la constitution ou le renforcement- au sein de chaque pays ou États membres- de modules ou détachements de protection civile

CIVIL PROTECTION: A KEY CONTRIBUTOR TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

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*"We need stable and predictable relationships with our neighbours.....
if we don't 'export' stability, we risk 'importing' instability"¹*

INTRODUCTION

The pressures on the Mediterranean region are building. On top of the traditional natural hazards of the region (earthquake, extreme weather events such as flash flooding, forest fires and the manmade hazards derived from urbanisation, industrialisation and mass transport) are placed the potential impact of climate change, high population growth, South to North illegal migration, urban risk, conflict and terrorism. The capacity of the Mediterranean countries to provide sufficient levels of safety, security and political and economic stability to diminish societal pressures will depend on the success of the region's governments to counter these trends; and the effectiveness of Civil Defence/Civil Protection (CD/CP) systems play a crucial role in this. A key element will be their ability to efficiently co-operate and coordinate to maximise the region's capacity and capabilities.

One of the obstacles to greater cooperation is the narrowing, but still considerable disparity, among the CD/CP organisations of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. In part, this is a reflection of the differing resources of the various countries. A more entrenched factor however, is their imbedded institutional structures that derive from the history of each of the countries and the role of CD/CP in that history. If progress in cooperation among the Mediterranean Countries is to be achieved, external actors need to recognise and be aware of the historical factors and the countries themselves need to recognise and overcome the impediments to progress that this history gives rise to. The historical factors that have influenced the evolution of CD/CP systems in Mediterranean countries need to be taken account to support a common understanding in the development of a comprehensive cooperation based on equal-footing and not on a donor-recipient approach.

The capacity of the Mediterranean countries to provide sufficient levels of safety, security and political and economic stability to diminish societal pressures will depend on the success of the region's governments to counter these trends; and the effectiveness of Civil Defence/Civil Protection systems play a crucial role in this

¹ Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations. Speech at American Chamber of Commerce's Plenary meeting Brussels, 13 October 2009

DEVELOPMENT OF CD/CP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION – A GLANCE AT THE HISTORICAL CONTEXTS

Often some CD/CPs structures have emerged as a consequence of the need to respond to imminent events or a near term threat rather than as the outcome of a long term vision incorporating a risk anticipatory plan or model

In order to understand the CD/CP system and structure in the Mediterranean region, one should examine the historical context out of which each country's CD/CP has originated and developed. CD/CP organisations do not develop in a vacuum. Often, however, some CD/CPs structures have emerged as a consequence of the need to respond to imminent events or a near term threat rather than as the outcome of a long term vision incorporating a risk anticipatory plan or model.

The present day CD/CP structures of the Mediterranean Countries are therefore a reflection of their histories, including; *inter alia*,

- System of government and its priorities;
- Development of government institutions;
- Hazards to which the country is exposed, risk, vulnerability and resilience levels;
- Extent to which the country has been exposed to war, conflict or the threat of these;
- Society's tolerance to risk in the principle hazard exposures.

The wide variations in the mix of the above factors among the Mediterranean countries has resulted in a substantial divergence in the scope and effectiveness of their CD/CPs systems, notwithstanding that some of these have been long established. (See attached appendix for examples).

A review of the histories of the Mediterranean countries' CD/CP systems shows that their formation and establishment was linked to either the threat of conflict/war or due to the exposure of the country to particular natural disaster categories.

In the first case, the Arab-Israeli conflict marked either creation and/or amendments of laws which were merely directed towards protection of civilians during wartime disasters and air raids. This influence has dominated CD/CP trends for several decades with modest amendments in the CD/CP laws and regulations according to development of political conditions in the volatile region and influenced by political stability factors. All CD/CP in the region are under the authority of the Ministries of the Interior, except in the case of Israel, which is under the jurisdiction of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). In the case of Syria, the CD is affiliated to the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment but, in practical terms, its operational activities are linked to the Ministry of Defence.

Attempts to unify and better coordinate CD/CP across the broad spectrum of relevant ministries through the creation of cabinet level decision making bodies, such as the Supreme Council of Civil Defence in Egypt, has not proved universally successful. In the instance of Egypt the Supreme Council met only once in 1970 and in Syria met twice in the last 35 years. In some Med-Countries in which CD/CPs operate under jurisdiction of either Ministry of Defence or Interior there is a degree of implicit restriction and confidentiality in the exchange of information, knowledge-sharing and transparency, even in an area of humanitarian nature such as protection of civilians.

Within these ministries, priorities and human and financial resources allocation may be skewed toward other security-related activities, *inter alia*, anti-terrorism, countering drug and human trafficking and other criminal activities. The decision making process is often centralised at the headquarters of the ministry's concerned which leaves a limited marginalised space for CD/CP senior officers to act without consultation and/or approval of their superiors in particular issues related to cooperation with other foreign bodies. It is therefore critical to engage a wider spectrum of personnel in civil protection activities including a good cross-section of high level decision makers, planners and strategists at the Ministries' headquarters to actively participate in regular intra-governmental links and not restrict EU cooperation within the Mediterranean region to first responders and low and middle ranking officers.

Further, without concluding the long outstanding Arab-Israel conflict, development of CD/CP, especially in what is called the "front line countries", has been arrested and still focuses on protection of civilians in wartime disasters and whilst other types of manmade and natural hazards are relatively marginalised as regards, *inter alia*; prevention, risk reduction, intervention, search and rescue (SAR), disaster preparedness, public awareness and training.

It is suggested that, reflecting the present circumstances and those political developments that have given rise to increased instability in the region, confidence building measures may still be highly appropriate. Confidence building in an area of collectively beneficial action under the Political and Security Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 was the founding purpose of the first Euro-Med Pilot programme on civil protection. Co-operation in CD/CP remains an area where substantial practical benefits to participating governments can be achieved and the engagement of CD/CP organizations and their governments at all working levels would make a major contribution to confidence building at a time when it is needed as never before.

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THE IDENTITY OF CIVIL DEFENCE/CIVIL PROTECTION

It is convenient for Civil Defence/Civil Protection to be considered as an activity undertaken by a defined organisation that is clearly shaped by the type, size and frequency of the common hazards with which a country is, or have been, confronted. Occasionally, the nature and level of anticipated hazards and the risks attributed to them may also be factored into the designated CD/CP capabilities. Too often the public's perception of CD/CP (and seemingly, on occasions, policymakers' also) is frequently defined by the role and actions of first responders such as fire fighters and SAR. Without in any way diminishing the vital role played by these professionals in prevention, risk analysis and reduction, protecting life and property CD/CP extends, or should extend, deep into the structure of Civil Society.

THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX

CD/CP starts with the responsibility of government for the safety and wellbeing of its citizens by such means as health and safety regulations, zoning and construction laws and public health standards and regula-

A crucial element of effective CD/CP is therefore good governance. Even where the standard of governance is high, key elements critical to CD/CP is not often the responsibility of ministries that have CD/CP as a priority responsibility nor do they necessarily integrate CD/CP relevant actions with co-actors unless centrally directed to do so

tions. After all, the first line of protection in an earthquake should be structures that are built to withstand, not rescuers retrieving victims from the rubble. Not only do protective laws and regulations have to be publicly communicated, comprehensive, relevant and practical; they also need to be enforced unwaveringly, consistently and fairly if compliance and their objectives are to be achieved.

A crucial element of effective CD/CP is therefore good governance. Even where the standard of governance is high, key elements critical to CD/CP is not often the responsibility of ministries that have CD/CP as a priority responsibility nor do they necessarily integrate CD/CP relevant actions with co-actors unless centrally directed to do so. Good CD/CP also depends upon the awareness of citizens of key issues and the development of a safety culture. This is why we need to think in terms of an overall CD/CP “system” that gives rise to a resilient and safer society incorporating:

- Co-operation, coordination and participation of all government departments in the prevention, risk reduction and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery processes;
- Active involvement of private sector, NGOs and the civil society;
- Engagement of industry and commerce in bringing about a safer and more resilient economic and production base;
- Ensure that the population at large understands and observes the need for safe conduct in the *inter alia* work place, transportation systems and in the home. CD/CP should be taken to the “grass roots”.

SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE/CIVIL PROTECTION

Preservation of life, property, economic well-being and social cohesion are the shared objectives of both Security and CP authorities. If security risks are adequately communicated to CD/CP, measures that will at least mitigate their impact can be put in place and effective response procedures planned. Also CD/CP has a role in communicating vulnerabilities to security authorities so that hazard and risk can be accurately quantified.

In addition, part of effective security is the containment of destructive social elements, including drug trafficking, large scale organised crime, terrorism and extreme levels of social unrest. However, social unrest can flow from the shortcomings of government itself and an inadequate attention to the protection of citizens from natural disasters and man-made large scale accidents, such as major transport accidents, building collapses, is one such source. An effective CD/CP system will minimise the potential source of such trouble. Apart from the humanitarian and economic benefit, the allocation of resources to bring about effective CD/CP is money well spent.

GOVERNANCE

Governance is a sensitive issue and no country is as good as it should be. A period of few catastrophic events tends to lead to complacency and often, where a more stringent CD/CP approach would incur costs or reduce short term financial gain, slackness creeps into the system. The

countries of the EU have experienced major events, such as a large scale release of toxic chemicals, wildfires, floods, earthquakes, major rail accidents and severe chemical plant explosions. Post event enquiries have determined that most of these incidents, or their outcomes, could have been anticipated and were therefore either preventable or the outcomes could have been substantially better mitigated.

Whilst the performance of the Northern Mediterranean countries remains high in comparison to those of the South, if the North, however, is to lead the region by example, it needs to make an extra effort to deal more rapidly and effectively with lapses in its own governance. The generally superior performance of the European Governments in CD/CP stems in part because of superior financial resources but, most particularly, because CD/CP issues have been resolved through generally effective governance embodying a combination of technical and legal enquiry and monitoring by independent institutions.

Ultimately, the EU Commission has played a vital role in securing a safer environment across a variety of areas of direct relevance to CD/CP and the Soveso Directives are an obvious example of this. Importantly, the existence of safety standards applicable equally to all EU Member States prevents the lowering of safety standards in competitive industries for commercial advantage. Also, there are a number of key factors that have made a particular contribution to the maintenance of high CD/CP standards and which have supported good standards of governance, such as:

- The ability of public opinion to exert pressure on government, including the commentary of a free media;
- Partnership development of the CD/CP with all sectors of the civil society, private sector and NGOs including knowledge sharing, transparency, cooperative action in awareness raising, participation of various actors and stakeholders in decision making process;
- The ready availability of accurate, timely and relevant data to support good quality planning and decision making.

All Mediterranean countries should give strong consideration to improving their performances in the above areas if safer and sustainable societies are to be achieved. It should also be noted that emergency situations and/or conflict environments can require strong intervention by CD/CP staff, such as enforced rapid evacuation or quarantining, and in such circumstances, they should be well educated/trained on the application of human rights and international humanitarian law.

THE MILITARY AND CD/CP

Even in countries where there is a clear constitutional restriction on the engagement of the military in civil society, there are mechanisms in place to enable their deployment at times of large scale disaster or certain types of emergency, such as air/sea rescue operation. Clearly, the military have resources that can be essential in a civil emergency response, such as helicopters, temporary bridging, emergency accommodation and supplies, etc. To be effective, however, military support in a disaster response requires organisation, planning and training to be effective

Whilst the performance of the Northern Mediterranean countries remains high in comparison to those of the South, if the North, however, is to lead the region by example, it needs to make an extra effort to deal more rapidly and effectively with lapses in its own governance

from command and control issues down to joint CD/CP personnel training and drills.

COOPERATION

It should be noted that emergency situations and/or conflict environments can require strong intervention by CD/CP staff, such as enforced rapid evacuation or quarantining, and in such circumstances, they should be well educated/trained on the application of human rights and international humanitarian law

Initiatives in cooperation between North and South, such as the EuroMed series of projects/programmes, as well as bilateral arrangements, have secured worthwhile progress in advancing the capabilities of CD/CP systems in the Southern Mediterranean countries. However, the exchange of information and cooperation has been largely confined to technical issues with little engagement by high level policy and decision makers; at these levels, there remains a perception within the Southern Mediterranean countries that CD/CP is largely confined to first responders, SAR and the Emergency Medical Services. Cooperation has two basic goals:

- To exchange experience and information in, *inter alia*, prevention, mitigation, risk reduction, preparedness, response, early recovery and recovery process;
- To share resources ranging from providing assistance at times of large scale disasters to sharing education, training and drill resources.

AREAS FOR COOPERATION

Standardisation

A major factor inhibiting cooperation is the lack of standardisation of terms, technologies, methodologies and equipment among the Mediterranean countries. This is only natural given the independent histories of the Mediterranean countries but, if long term cooperation is to be effective, there is a clear benefit from identifying areas where standardisation can be achieved and taking steps to achieve these.

Holistic CD/CP

Effective CD/CP in the 21st century requires a strategy that incorporates all government sectors and at each stage of the process from prevention through to mitigation, intervention and recovery. CD/CP must develop beyond the response mode and have the ability to support all functions of government in achieving a better performance in prevention, mitigation, risk reduction, response and recovery. Further it should have the ability to support response planning across a range of hazards and disaster scenarios. Cooperation in CD/CP should therefore be extended to include those elements able to contribute to a better management of risk and further safety culture in society. This should include *inter alia*:

- Those responsible for formulating and implementing policy;
- The commercial and private sector and NGOs;
- The media;
- Educators.

Security and CD/CP

Security and CD/CP must develop an effective *modus operandi* to ensure that whilst security is not compromised, CD/CP is able to mount an effective counter to potential loss of life and damage from terrorist incidents. CD/CP also needs to support security in identifying and countering vulnerabilities, including running joint scenarios to develop outcomes, assess probabilities and plan prevention/mitigation measures.

Raising the Status of CD/CP

CD/CP entities are often subordinate elements of the Interior Ministries and have relatively low status. This is often reflected in their budgets and the career paths they offer. This needs to be changed if performance and capacities are to be raised and particularly if personnel capable of dealing with technologically complex hazards and risks are to be recruited and retained.

Effective CD/CP in the 21st century requires a strategy that incorporates all government sectors and at each stage of the process from prevention through to mitigation, intervention and recovery

APPENDIX. A CROSS-SECTION HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT CD/CP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Examples from countries whose CD structures have been largely shaped by threat of conflict/war

Egypt

In 1936 when the use of chemical weapons was introduced during the Ethiopian-Italian war, Egypt assigned the Ministry of Health the responsibility of examining means for protection of civilian population. In 1938, the government established an "Administration of Civilian Protection" and, during World War II, a Ministry of Civil Protection was established but was dissolved at the end of the War. In 1953, the Civil Defence Administration (CDA) was established within the Ministry of the Interior. In 1959 Law No. 148 was issued, which constitutes the statutory framework for the provision of civil defence in Egypt to the present day.

The Law focussed on protection of civilians and maintenance of life support systems, mainly during war time disaster. Following the Camp David Peace Accord between Israel and Egypt in 1979, the Law was amended in 1980 to be more compatible with the regional political and security progress that ended the war between the two countries. The amendments redefined the CD tasks and the challenges of focusing on both man-made and natural disasters in both peace and war. In 2008, the CDA had been renamed to the "General Administration of Civil Protection" (GACP), but without any major changes to its substantive structure or regulations. The 50 years old law is still in effect. Interestingly, Egypt did attempt to address the problem of coordinating CP across the broad spectrum of relevant ministries by forming the Supreme Council of Civil Defence. The concept never became reality as the Council only met once in 1970.

Syria

According to the available information, the Civil Defence since 1947, a year before the Israeli-Arab war in 1948, was under the jurisdictions of the Ministry of Interior. In 1971, the General Directorate of Civil Defence was transferred to then the newly established Ministry of Local Administration². The CD is more operationally linked with the Ministry of Defence than the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment which merely, among others, shaped to respond to the impact of conflict and follows from the wars with Israel and the continuing state of tension within the region. The Highest Council for Civil Defence, which seems to be copied from Egypt (also for several other Arab Countries through the seconded Egyptian experts) met only twice in the last 35 years.

Lebanon

The Civil Defence was established in 1956, which marked the second war between Israel and Egypt and followed by another Legislative Decrees for No. 50 of 5 August 1967, which issued two month after the Israeli-Arab war of June 1967. During the civil war in Lebanon (1975-90) and due to the absence of state organizational structure, several political parties and NGOs had created their civil defence organizations, which operated in their controlled areas of political and military influence. With resuming of the state control over the entire country, the Lebanese General Directorate of Civil Defence has been established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities. Currently, the CD in Lebanon is largely comprising fire fighting, search and rescue, training and education and emergency medicine.

Israel

The CD system in Israel is relatively large and more complex than in any other modern country³. The creation of kibbutz settlements marked the foundation for present-day Israeli CD. In kibbutzes all adults, including women, participated in defending their settlements. In 1951, the Israeli CD Organization was established. It largely mandates the measures and resources needed to protect the civilians from hostile actions. Other organizations namely Police, Medical and Defence Departments were also engaged in the CD system.

During the Gulf War, the former Israeli CD (HAGA) was still in existence and in operation, with its CD Central Command. The HAGA was an integral part of the overall Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Following the second Gulf War⁴, which was the first war since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War in which centres of civilian population faced significant threat, the HAGA has been restructured in February 1992 to a self-independent and autonomous organization: The "Home Front Command" (HFC), in order to overcome shortages and gaps in the old system. The HFC aims at coordinating all activities related to the civil defence operations for the civilian and military organizations under one single coordinating body. Ever since its creation, efforts have been made to turn the HFC into a civilian body, but so far, without success⁵.

2. Recently renamed the "Ministry of Local Administration and Environment".

3. J.R. Christiansen and R. H. Blake, Israeli Civil Defence Today, Journal of Civil Defence, June 1990, Geneva.

4. M. Tag-Eldeen, Protection of Civilian Population and Rescue Services in Modern Warfare: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War, (the former Swedish Rescue Services Agency "SRSA" – recently the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency "MSB"), FOU Rapport P21/080/92, Stockholm.

5. Ibid.

It should be noted that the immediate restructuring of the civil defence, following the Gulf War, represents brief bureaucratic procedures and an instantaneous response to new directives steamed from the actual demands and experience in order to cope with the dynamic development. In April 2008, Israel conducted the largest emergency exercise, which includes evacuation, emergency response, SAR, protection of civilians and key industrial establishment from hostilities and war. All of which are focusing on protection and preparedness in a war-related activities.

Jordan

The CD was initiated to protect the civil population from conflict. CD was undertaken by civilian groups under leadership of the municipalities under the authority of a 1939 Defence Law. In 1948 (Law No. 7/1948) and after this period, as a result to actions progress and unstable of this region, the needs emerged for establishing a new institution to protect civilians from war woes. In 1953 a CD board was created and in 1954 CD committees were established throughout the country to implement CD measures. In 1956, when Egypt was invaded, a temporary Civil Defence Law was issued (No. 35) that created a Civil Defence Directorate under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior and formed the High Council of CD.

Later on, in 1959 the aforementioned Law was replaced by the CD Law (No. 12). In response to conflict and the threat of conflict, civil defence continued to evolve as part of the Ministry of Interior until in 1970 the Civil Defence Directorate was segregated from public security and became the General Directorate of Civil Defence with a separated administration. In 1978 CD was given its own independent budget. CD Law was consolidated and elaborated by Law No 18 in 1999. It should be noted the Jordanian CD has made a considerable progress in dealing with other types of natural and manmade disasters and out posted SAR teams to other affected countries during a disaster.

Tunisia

An example of a country whose CP structure has been largely shaped by threat of natural hazards is Tunisia, which is particularly prone to flash flood, earthquake and forest fire

The CP systems were formed as a response to these serious flooding in 1969, whose damage cost was estimated at over 10% of its GNP. Further serious flooding in 1973 led the government in March 1975 to establish the Adjoined Administration of Civil Protection. Originally attached to the National Guard, it was subsequently transferred in December 1993 to an independent administration, the "National Civil Protection Office", under the Ministry of the Interior. The continuing threat of flooding combined with potential earthquake risk has incentivised Tunisia to maintain the effectiveness of its CP system.

LA UNIDAD MILITAR DE EMERGENCIAS (UME) EN EL SISTEMA NACIONAL DE PROTECCIÓN CIVIL

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UNAS CONSIDERACIONES PREVIAS

Desde que los Ejércitos dejaron de ser una serie de grupos armados, temporalmente organizados para guerrear y se convirtieron en la Edad Moderna en organizaciones estables, permanentes y regidas por los principios de unidad, jerarquía y disciplina, en este momento pasaron a ser herramientas e instrumentos del Estado; se convirtieron en una *"ratio regis"*.

Los Ejércitos han sido y son utilizados no sólo para ejercer la "acción exterior del Estado", sino también para actuar en el interior, interactuando con el resto de las Organizaciones Estatales e Instituciones en múltiples aspectos, muy especialmente en proporcionar garantía de bienestar y seguridad a sus propios ciudadanos.

La sociedad actual demanda, cada vez más, que el Estado sea el garante de su seguridad global. Una exigencia que trasciende la asistencia cotidiana ampliando sus demandas a nuevos requerimientos en el terreno de las emergencias. Y es que, en la actualidad, a la capacidad de respuesta diaria de los Cuerpos y Fuerzas de Seguridad del Estado y de los servicios de Protección Civil de las diferentes Administraciones, se une la necesidad de afrontar con eficacia y garantía los retos que amenazan la seguridad y el bienestar de los ciudadanos en los supuestos de grave riesgo, catástrofe, calamidad u otras necesidades públicas.

Hagamos un breve repaso de los casos en los que la Sociedad ha actuado ante diferentes riesgos como tal, sin distinción entre *"sociedad civil"* y *"sociedad militar"*, sino como esa única sociedad a la que los militares, como ciudadanos que de ella procedemos, servimos con vocación y pasión.

LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS EN LA SEGURIDAD DE LOS CIUDADANOS

Limitándonos a las últimas décadas, las Fuerzas Armadas han actuado en numerosas ocasiones en beneficio de la seguridad de los ciudadanos mediante "mecanismos preventivos" e "intervenciones".

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Las Fuerzas Armadas en “prevención”

Entre las actuaciones preventivas llevadas a cabo por las Fuerzas Armadas cabe destacar:

- La protección de instalaciones y de vías de comunicación ante posibilidad de atentado terrorista en períodos electorales, en grandes acontecimientos deportivos (Mundiales de Fútbol 82, Olimpiadas 92, Copa América 2008, etc.), así como en eventos y “cumbres” de trascendencia nacional (EXPO 92 y 98, Conferencia de Madrid 2005, Cumbre Iberoamericana 2006, etc.);
- “Impermeabilización” de fronteras: Ceuta y Melilla (2000, 2001 y 2005);
- Establecimiento de vigilancia contra incendios forestales en época estival: Operación “Centinela Gallego” en Galicia.

Las Fuerzas Armadas en “intervención”

Además de estas misiones preventivas las Fuerzas Armadas han actuado siempre en “primera línea” cuando una catástrofe o una calamidad han afectado a la sociedad española:

- Inundaciones: Valencia (1957), Sevilla (1962), País Vasco (1982), Badajoz y Guadalajara (1996);
- Montaje de puentes tras inundaciones: Monzón y Villafranca de Ebro (2006), Sobradiel (2007);
- Rescate de víctimas en accidentes aéreos: Mejorada del Campo (1983) y en grandes incendios forestales: Guadalajara (2005);
- Vigilancia marítima en la lucha contra la inmigración ilegal: Operación “Noble Centinela” (Canarias y Estrecho de Gibraltar);
- Montaje de campamentos de acogida de inmigrantes (Canarias 2006);
- Colaboración en la extinción de grandes incendios por medios aéreos del 43 Grupo de FFAA (“apagafuegos”) desde el año 1971 y medios terrestres (Galicia 2006);
- Limpieza de costas contaminadas (“Prestige”, 2002);
- Actuación en grandes nevadas;
- Transporte de órganos para transplantes;
- Colaboración con la Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria realizando misiones de vigilancia aduanera (EA);
- Colaboración con otras instituciones y organismos en las tareas de búsqueda y salvamento marítimo y terrestre.

Todas estas actuaciones de las Fuerzas Armadas han sido prestadas con los medios de dotación de las distintas unidades militares y con el trabajo del personal destinado en las mismas. A pesar de no ser el empleo normal de estos medios y de que el personal no estaba formado específicamente para su actuación en este tipo de situaciones, los resultados fueron siempre de gran efectividad y muy valorados por la población civil.

ANTECEDENTES HISTÓRICOS DE LA UME

La Brigada de Artillería Volante

En el año 1797 Manuel Godoy creó la Brigada de Artillería Volante, precursora de la “Artillería a caballo”, siendo encuadrada en el Real Cuerpo de Guardias de Corps. El Coronel D. Vicente María de Maturana, creador de esta Brigada, redactó su “Reglamento para la formación, servicio y permanente conservación de la Brigada de Artillería Volante del Real Cuerpo de Guardia de Corps”, cuyo artículo XVI considero de interés transcribir: *“(...) será uno de los objetos principales de la Brigada emplearse en socorro de la Humanidad, en cualesquiera aflicción pública, y especialmente en apagar incendios, ocupándose de los trabajos de más riesgo y confianza, para lo que acudirán vestidos a propósito, y armados de todos los útiles y herramientas de los gastadores a la primera señal de fuego que ocurra en la población donde se halle y dirigirán el manejo y servicio de las bombas hidráulicas que se pongan a su cuidado”.*

El 43 Grupo de Fuerzas Aéreas

Ya más recientemente, el Ministerio de Agricultura (hoy Ministerio de Medioambiente y Medio Rural y Marino), preocupado por el grave problema de los incendios forestales, decidió adquirir los dos primeros aviones CANADAIR CL-215, el 8 de febrero de 1971, que quedaron encuadrados en el 803 Escuadrón de Fuerzas Aéreas, con sede en la Base Aérea de Getafe.

Desde ese año hasta la actualidad, esta Unidad aérea (conocida familiarmente como “apagafuegos”) ha adoptado distintos nombres y desde 1980 ostenta la denominación de 43 Grupo de Fuerzas Aéreas. La Unidad ha sido diseñada, equipada e instruida específicamente para intervenir con ocasión de grandes incendios forestales, tanto en territorio nacional, como para colaborar con otros países de nuestro entorno cuando son afectados por incendios que rebasan su propia capacidad de actuación.

En la actualidad cuenta con 17 aviones (14 CL-215T y 3 CL-415 CANADAIR). A lo largo de sus 38 años de historia, esta Unidad ha sufrido cinco accidentes graves en los que han perdido la vida quince de sus miembros.

¿POR QUÉ UNA “UNIDAD MILITAR DE EMERGENCIAS”?

La organización del Estado en Comunidades Autónomas ha llevado a procesos de transferencia de competencias en diferentes materias. La gestión de las emergencias ha sido una de estas transferencias y lo ha sido, hasta el nivel 2, a las Administraciones municipales y autonómicas por diversa legislación, basada en la Ley 2/1985, de 21 de enero, sobre Protección Civil.

Hoy, la nueva Directiva de Defensa Nacional 1/2008 busca: "Promover la plena integración de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias en el Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil, sobre la base de la cooperación entre Administraciones Públicas en esta materia, así como canalizar, a través de ella, otros medios y recursos que aporten las Fuerzas Armadas en caso de emergencias"

A partir del momento en que se produjeron estas transferencias, la Administración General del Estado se dotó de una estructura administrativa de coordinación, dirección y formación (hoy Dirección General de Protección Civil y Emergencias), pero con insuficientes medios a aportar cuando los medios de las Comunidades Autónomas se veían desbordados.

Determinados acontecimientos ocurridos al principio de los años 2000 (las grandes nevadas de Burgos, el hundimiento del "Prestige", pero, sobre todo, el incendio de Guadalajara en julio de 2005) vinieron a demostrar que la Administración General del Estado debía poner ante los ciudadanos algo más que una normativa y una estructura de coordinación en "casos de grave riesgo, catástrofe, calamidad u otras necesidades públicas". El Estado debía tener en sus manos una herramienta potente, preparada, eficaz y de suficiente entidad que garantizara su seguridad y capaz de reforzar a las Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas cuando éstas se vieran superadas por la magnitud de la emergencia.

De forma simultánea a estos acontecimientos, el Presidente del Gobierno formulaba la Directiva de Defensa Nacional 1/2004, de 30 de diciembre, una de cuyas directrices para la actuación de las Fuerzas Armadas, decía: "Colaborar en el Sistema de Protección Civil y, junto con otras instituciones del Estado, contribuir a preservar la seguridad y el bienestar de los ciudadanos". Se estaba gestando una nueva misión explícita (aunque ya asignada de forma implícita) para las Fuerzas Armadas.

Hoy, la nueva Directiva de Defensa Nacional 1/2008, vigente desde su firma por el Presidente del Gobierno con fecha 31 de diciembre de 2008, no hace más que venir a refrendar lo dicho en la anterior y en una de sus directrices para desarrollar la Política de Defensa dice: "Promover la plena integración de la UME (ya se nos cita de manera expresa) en el Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil, sobre la base de la cooperación entre Administraciones Públicas en esta materia, así como canalizar, a través de ella, otros medios y recursos que aporten las Fuerzas Armadas en caso de emergencias"

CREACIÓN DE LA UME

Existen dos referencias normativas básicas previas a la creación de la UME: la Directiva de Defensa Nacional 1/2004, a la que acabamos de hacer referencia, y la Ley Orgánica 05/2005 de la Defensa Nacional, de 17 de noviembre, que venía a sustituir a otra Ley Orgánica del año 1980 (modificada en 1984).

Por Acuerdo de Consejo de Ministros de 7 de octubre de 2005, enmarcado en el tiempo entre las dos normas citadas, se decide la creación de la UME.

La Unidad Militar de Emergencias quedó definida como un Mando Conjunto, formado por personal de todos los Ejércitos, encuadrado en la estructura operativa de las Fuerzas Armadas y dependiendo orgánicamente de la Ministra de Defensa y operativamente del Jefe de Estado Mayor de la Defensa (JEMAD) para llevar a cabo su misión.

La creación de la Unidad coincide, en el espíritu y en la letra, con la Unidad necesaria para llevar a cabo la nueva misión que, un mes después, vendría a establecer el artículo 15.3 de la Ley Orgánica 5/2005 de la Defensa Nacional, que decía: *“Las Fuerzas Armadas, junto con las instituciones del Estado y las Administraciones públicas, DEBEN preservar la seguridad y el bienestar de los ciudadanos en los supuestos de grave riesgo, catástrofe, calamidad u otras necesidades públicas, conforme a lo establecido en la legislación vigente”*.

Es decir, el Gobierno, con la creación de la UME, optaba, para solucionar el problema expuesto con anterioridad, por la creación de una Unidad Militar de *“intervención rápida, con plena disponibilidad, con presencia en todo el territorio nacional y que responda de manera ágil y eficaz a las necesidades de la sociedad española ante catástrofes o emergencias que pongan en peligro la seguridad de los ciudadanos”*.

Ahora bien, ¿por qué una Unidad militar para este cometido? Por diferentes razones:

- Por la disponibilidad plena y absoluta de sus miembros;
- Porque el funcionamiento y organización de las Fuerzas Armadas, bajo los principios de unidad, disciplina y jerarquía, garantizan el mando único y la coordinación necesaria para cumplir el objetivo;
- Porque los Ejércitos poseen un profundo “sentido nacional” para hacer frente a emergencias de “interés nacional”;
- Por utilizar, como algo connatural, medios de Mando y Control similares a los utilizados en emergencias;
- Por su capacidad logística, de transporte, sanitaria, etc.;
- Por su capacidad de reacción rápida y eficaz;
- Por contar con los medios técnicos necesarios;
- Por su capacidad de aceptar e integrar refuerzos (tanto militares como civiles).

Las Fuerzas Armadas han colaborado desde hace años con las Autoridades Civiles en situaciones de emergencia, pero ahora cuentan con una Unidad especializada en ello, cuentan con una Unidad que se hace cargo de la nueva misión asignada a las Fuerzas Armadas y se enfrenta a las emergencias con auténticos profesionales, con verdaderos especialistas.

No es una idea nueva ni original: tanto Francia (Estado fuertemente centralista) como Suiza (Estado confederal), así como Rusia y Estados Unidos (NORTHCOM) tienen militares en estas tareas.

LA UME Y LA COMUNICACIÓN

La creación y el desarrollo de la UME ha tenido diferencias importantes si se compara con la creación y el desarrollo de una unidad “standard” de las Fuerzas Armadas, que puede nacer, organizarse, instruirse y desarrollarse sin tener una excesiva relación con su entorno.

La creación de esta Unidad y su posterior consolidación ha estado íntimamente relacionada con el mundo exterior. La UME ha sido y es una Unidad de “relaciones”:

El Gobierno, con la creación de la UME, optaba por la creación de una Unidad Militar de “intervención rápida, con plena disponibilidad, con presencia en todo el territorio nacional y que responda de manera ágil y eficaz a las necesidades de la sociedad española ante catástrofes o emergencias que pongan en peligro la seguridad de los ciudadanos”

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- Relaciones con las Instituciones (incluidos el Ministerio de Defensa y los propios Ejércitos);
- Relaciones con órganos de las diferentes Administraciones (Central, Autonómicas y locales);
- Relaciones con las diversas entidades susceptibles de sufrir situaciones de emergencia (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, Red Eléctrica, ENAGAS, CLH, AENA, Autoridades Portuarias, etc.);
- Relaciones con las empresas civiles capaces de suministrar equipos, algunos completamente nuevos y desarrollados por la propia Unidad para hacer frente a los riesgos a los que nos tenemos que enfrentar;
- Relaciones con los medios de comunicación social.

Es decir, la Unidad Militar de Emergencias es el caso más nítido en el seno de las Fuerzas Armadas de Unidad nacida para el servicio directo al ciudadano, de Unidad necesitada de una intensa relación con su entorno. Es una Unidad que depende de la comunicación para nacer, crecer, desarrollarse y llevar a cabo sus actividades.

Lógicamente, la UME ha sido y es una Unidad observada, analizada y enjuiciada de forma intensa por los medios de comunicación social.

El nacimiento o la creación de la Unidad provocó ciertas reticencias iniciales:

- Reticencias internas, en el seno de las Fuerzas Armadas (por motivos de encuadramiento y organización, de captación de Cuadros de Mando y personal de tropa, etc.);
- Reticencias externas, ya que hacía aparición un nuevo “actor” en el complejo escenario de las “emergencias”;
- Reticencias en los Medios de Comunicación Social, que reflejaban todo lo anterior y a ello unían las posturas de sus diferentes líneas editoriales.

Fue, permítaseme el símil, como si sobre un tablero en el que existía un puzzle con diferentes piezas, reflejo del Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil, con un hueco libre, hueco de una forma determinada, se intentara rellenar con una pieza de forma cuadrada, que no se ajustaba en un principio a la forma exacta del hueco, que rozaba y chocaba con las demás.

El procedimiento para lograr este ajuste, para rellenar este tablero con un puzzle completo en el que todas las piezas encajasen ha sido: la comunicación y las propias actuaciones de la Unidad.

Esa comunicación se produjo en dos sentidos:

- Desde la UME, explicando quiénes éramos, qué pretendíamos, despejando dudas, deshaciendo incógnitas, espantando temores de que no se venía a “militarizar” a nadie, que no veníamos a suprimir puestos de trabajo, que no veníamos a sustituir a nadie sino a colaborar con todos;
- Desde el resto de los actores, contándonos y nosotros escuchando con humildad, sus problemas, lo que esperaban de nosotros.

La comunicación ha sido, pues, la gran protagonista de nuestra Unidad, la que, junto a nuestras actuaciones, ha constituido la argamasa que ha permitido que la nueva pieza del puzzle se ajustara perfectamente a su

hueco y formar, con ello, un Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil potente, eficaz y eficiente.

LA UME EN LA ACTUALIDAD

Tras tres años de funcionamiento real (cuatro desde su creación el 7 de octubre de 2005), la Unidad Militar de Emergencias cuenta con 3600 efectivos, que suponen un 92% de cobertura de su plantilla. De éstos, 219 son mujeres. Este personal ha sido estrictamente seleccionado, rigurosamente instruido tanto en aspectos militares como en todos aquellos relacionados con emergencias y está altamente motivado.

La Unidad despliega un Cuartel General, un Regimiento de Apoyo a Emergencias, una Agrupación de Medios Aéreos y el I Batallón de Intervención en Emergencias en la Base Aérea de Torrejón de Ardoz, además de otros cuatro Batallones de Intervención en Emergencias en Sevilla, Valencia, Zaragoza y León y dos Unidades de Intervención en Emergencias en Gran Canaria y Tenerife.

En cuanto a capacidades, se ha alcanzado una importante capacidad en la lucha contra incendios forestales (LCIF), una capacidad significativa en la lucha contra riesgos de inundaciones, grandes nevadas y rescates, así como una capacidad incipiente en la lucha contra los riesgos tecnológicos (nucleares, radiológicos, químicos, biológicos, etc.).

El material con el que está dotada la Unidad para atender a todas estas emergencias se puede considerar "puntero" y de primera calidad. Destacar el sistema de telecomunicaciones que permite establecer una red de puestos de mando móviles que garantiza, no sólo las comunicaciones propias, sino también aquellas de todos los que intervienen en la emergencia; a pesar de que la infraestructura de comunicaciones terrestre quedara destruida, mediante el uso intensivo de satélites, tanto militares como civiles.

Con respecto a la operatividad, la UME está en alerta permanente 24 horas sobre 24 los 365 días del año, preparada siempre para actuar.

Para alcanzar estas cotas de operatividad, la UME desarrolla un exigente programa formativo. Como resultado del mismo, se han formado en el Campamento Básico de Emergencias un total de 3150 hombres y mujeres y se han realizado 559 cursos de diferente tipo, en centros de formación de las Fuerzas Armadas, del resto de Administraciones Públicas (especialmente en la Escuela Nacional de Protección Civil) y en empresas privadas.

ÚLTIMAS ACTUACIONES DE LA UME

Hagamos un breve repaso de los resultados de la Campaña de Lucha Contra Incendios Forestales 2009.

Esta Campaña ha sido especialmente dura. La reiterada solicitud de intervención de la UME por parte de las Comunidades Autónomas nos ha llevado a actuar en treinta y un incendios forestales en poco más

Se ha alcanzado una importante capacidad en la lucha contra incendios forestales, una capacidad significativa en la lucha contra riesgos de inundaciones, grandes nevadas y rescates, así como una capacidad incipiente en la lucha contra los riesgos tecnológicos

La UME es una Unidad Militar por la que se desarrolla el encuadramiento, organización y funcionamiento de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias y Directiva 05/08 del JEMAD y lo es tanto en su creación como en su espíritu y en sus actuaciones

de dos meses y, en los últimos días de julio, a hacer frente a ocho incendios simultáneamente.

En la campaña hemos desplegado 5200 hombres y mujeres, se han utilizado 1500 vehículos y se han recorrido cerca de 700.000 kilómetros.

El 43 Grupo de Fuerzas Aéreas ha volado 1600 horas, ha efectuado 560 salidas y ha lanzado sobre las llamas más de 28 millones de litros de agua y, por primera vez, el Batallón de Helicópteros de Emergencias ha intervenido en operaciones reales de extinción de incendios y en misiones de reconocimiento y coordinación aérea.

Si algo positivo ha tenido este terrible período, en el que ha arvido parte del Patrimonio medioambiental español y que ha causado la muerte de nueve compatriotas que luchaban, al igual que nosotros, contra estos incendios, ha sido el altísimo grado de exigencia que ha supuesto, para todas las Unidades que conforman la UME, esta lucha sin cuartel contra el fuego. Esta exigencia ha constituido una auténtica reválida para nuestra Unidad, una auténtica “prueba de fuego”, y nunca mejor empleada esta frase.

Esta reválida nos ha servido para comprobar que la formación que impartimos en la UME es la correcta, que la instrucción individual y el continuo adiestramiento de las Unidades son aspectos fundamentales para alcanzar el nivel demostrado en esta campaña. Se han puesto a prueba procedimientos de actuación, de mando y control, de relevos de unidades, así como materiales y equipos, que han resultado satisfactorios.

Hemos comprobado también que el despliegue de los Batallones y de los destacamentos temporales es el adecuado y su funcionamiento y rapidez de actuación ha sido el esperado.

La UME, en fin, se ha consolidado como un instrumento del Estado para hacer frente a emergencias. Se ha convertido en la Unidad que el ciudadano espera ver aparecer, en los momentos comprometidos, porque le proporciona algo tan importante como es la seguridad, pero ya no sólo espera nuestra presencia, sino que la exige.

La UME ha estado, en fin, en todos los sitios desde los que se ha solicitado su intervención y lo ha hecho rápidamente y siempre con la entidad de fuerza que se ha requerido.

ALGUNAS CONCLUSIONES

La UME es una Unidad Militar (es un “Mando Conjunto de la estructura operativa de las FAS”, según Orden DEF/1766/2007, de 13 de junio, por la que se desarrolla el encuadramiento, organización y funcionamiento de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias y Directiva 05/08 del JEMAD y lo es tanto en su creación como en su espíritu y en sus actuaciones. Cumplimenta la nueva misión asignada a las FAS (LO. 5/2005 de la Defensa Nacional) como Unidad especializada, bien adiestrada y altamente motivada. Es el instrumento de primera intervención (Directiva 05/08 del JEMAD) y canalización del resto de las FAS en caso de catástrofe o calamidad.

Como tal, está integrada en el Sistema Nacional de Protección Civil para sumar esfuerzos y para contribuir, con el resto de Administraciones e Instituciones, a resolver de forma rápida y eficaz las situaciones de riesgo, catástrofe o calamidad que afecten a los ciudadanos. No ha venido a sustituir a nadie sino a colaborar con todos. La UME es una herramienta del Estado y, como tal, ha demostrado su efectividad en la actual Campaña de Lucha Contra Incendios Forestales.

En tres años de funcionamiento efectivo, la UME ha alcanzado unos importantes niveles de desarrollo, de organización, de adiestramiento y de motivación. Las relaciones y la comunicación de la UME con los Ejércitos, con los diferentes órganos directivos del Ministerio de Defensa, de la Administración General del Estado, de las Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas y con el resto de órganos relacionados con las emergencias se pueden considerar inmejorables. La experiencia ha demostrado que la presencia de la Unidad infunde confianza a los españoles, ya que, ante situaciones difíciles, la sociedad percibe de manera clara y agradece profundamente que todos los recursos del Estado, incluidas sus Fuerzas Armadas, estén disponibles y actúen con eficacia y rapidez.

Además de proporcionar seguridad, la UME se ha convertido en un elemento fundamental de unión entre las dos partes (militar y civil) de esta única sociedad, ya que es esta Unidad la que tiene un acceso más directo y muchas veces más comprometido, con todos los sectores de una sociedad que nos debe y nos tiene que valorar por nuestra utilidad y eficacia.

La UME ha hecho de la humildad su seña de identidad y ha convertido su lema *¡PARA SERVIR!* en la guía de todas sus actuaciones, demostrando con ello su espíritu de servicio a España y a los españoles.

La UME se ha convertido en un elemento fundamental de unión entre las dos partes (militar y civil) de esta sociedad

THE OSCE'S POSSIBILITIES TO FULLY DEVELOP AN ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION IN 2010

Raül Daussà i Pastor

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The work of the Office of the Co-ordinator of The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Economic and Environmental Activities in the area of civil protection is connected to the prevention and management of conflicts as well as with confidence building measures in a post conflict and post disaster situation.

Different activities ranging from co-operation at local level, training of technical personnel, remediation of military or industrial legacies, or neutral assessments of environmental degradation caused by conflicts are presented as examples of how environmental co-operation over natural resources can be a factor for promoting peace and stability, and on the other hand, how environmental damage or natural disasters can trigger or escalate an existing conflict.

The lessons learned in the OSCE area can be used in the Mediterranean region, and that is why the OSCE¹ is exploring possibilities to fully develop an environment and security assessment in the Mediterranean region in 2010.

THE OSCE'S ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANDATE

Although not primarily an economic organization, the OSCE is involved in economic and environmental activities, operating on the premise that promoting economic prosperity and co-operating on environmental problems can contribute to the enhancement of international security and stability.

The OSCE promotes a continuous dialogue through regular meetings of its permanent bodies in Vienna, such as the Permanent Council and the Economic and Environmental Committee. Economic and Environmental

The lessons learned in the OSCE area can be used in the Mediterranean region, and that is why the OSCE is exploring possibilities to fully develop an environment and security assessment in the Mediterranean region in 2010

1. With 56 States drawn from Europe, Central Asia and America, the OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization, bringing comprehensive and co-operative security to a region that stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and puts the political will of the participating States into practice through its unique network of field missions. More information on www.osce.org

Earthquakes, floods, chemical spills, radioactive accidents or terrorist attacks can have a severe economic and environmental impact, and therefore the benefits of preparedness and response activities are in line with the mandate of the OSCE

Officers operate on the ground in the OSCE Field Presences in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, acting in support of the Chairman-in-Office, is charged with strengthening the ability of the Permanent Council and the OSCE institutions to address economic, social and environmental aspects of security.

The Co-ordinator's regular priorities are:

- To enhance the OSCE's interaction with relevant international organizations;
- To strengthen the economic, environmental, and social components in the work of OSCE missions and field activities;
- To deepen interaction with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly;
- To broaden OSCE contacts with non-governmental organizations and the private sector;
- To formulate a programme of work for appropriate additional activities in, and relating to the OSCE's economic dimension.

The Co-ordinator, who works under the direct supervision of the Secretary General, is assisted by an office staff of 16 persons.

THE OSCE MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS FOR CO-OPERATION

The OSCE maintains special relations with six Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.

This relationship goes back to the Helsinki Process and the Helsinki Final Act, which included a Mediterranean chapter stating that security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole. This inter-linkage has been underscored in subsequent CSCE/OSCE documents, such as the Istanbul Charter for European Security and the Maastricht OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the XXI Century. Permanent Council decision 571 decided to explore new avenues of co-operation and interaction and to explore the scope for wider sharing of OSCE norms, principles and commitments.

Over the years, the OSCE has been able to share its experience with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation on a number of topics, including OSCE economic and environmental dimension commitments. Through ongoing dialogue and joint activities with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, the OSCE shares its expertise and provides insight into current developments and is open to reciprocal enrichment provided by them².

ROLE OF THE OSCE IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Earthquakes, floods, chemical spills, radioactive accidents or terrorist attacks can have a severe economic and environmental impact, and therefore the benefits of preparedness and response activities are in line with the mandate of the OSCE.

2. For a list of Summaries of seminars with Mediterranean Partners, visit the OSCE's external Cooperation in website (<http://www.osce.org/ec/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10&grp=322>)

Furthermore, if such events take place in a conflict-prone region, the possibilities for escalation are enormous. Depending on the state of the conflict phase, the OSCE activities related to civil protection differ in scope and intensity.

During the Early Warning and Conflict Prevention phase, the OSCE focuses on conducting assessments of environmental and other threats to security and stability, particularly of a transboundary nature, including monitoring of indicators. Such assessments might lead to foster co-operation over natural shared resources and promotion and exchange of best practice and experiences. Furthermore, the OSCE is a forum for preventive diplomacy, thus promoting dialogue and confidence building before the actual conflict could escalate further³.

During the Conflict Management phase, the role of the OSCE focuses on the organization of neutral of environmental and economic assessments, which can become an important factor to prevent conflict escalation. Finally, during the Post Conflict and Post Disaster Rehabilitation phase, the OSCE's activities focus again on capacity building for local, national and regional institutions dealing with emergency preparedness and response, as well as general support to the processes of post conflict and post disaster rehabilitation by means of organizing Confidence and Security Building seminars, or advocating civil-military co-operation.

EXAMPLES OF OSCE ACTIVITIES ON CIVIL PROTECTION

The following concrete examples of OSCE interventions linked to civil protection in different regions of the OSCE area of operation correspond to different situations in relation to the phase of conflict and origin of the threat: from natural disasters like earthquakes, landslides and forest fires to military and industrial legacies, these OSCE activities aimed at minimizing conflict and promote co-operation over natural resources could be replicated in the Mediterranean region.

Environmental Assessment Mission to fire-affected territories in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region

On October 3-13, 2006, the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities led an Environmental Assessment Mission to fire-affected territories in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Mission's Mandate was to assess the short-term and long-term impacts of wildfires and to make recommendations on how to counteract any detrimental impact of the fires and to make recommendations on an environmental operation in the region, as foreseen in UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/285.

The OSCE led a team of local experts, appointed by the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as international experts from the United Nations Environmental Program, the Global Fire Monitoring Centre, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Council of Europe. The Mission's Report, submitted to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on November 28, 2006, outlined a series of recommended actions to implement joint capacity building and training

3. Upon request of a participant State, the OCEEA can facilitate initial contacts between delegations concerned over a specific environmental or economic threat. Such meetings are organized in close doors and are not publicized.

The weak ratification and implementation of oil spills related conventions and international agreements among the OSCE participating States in the Caspian Region might cause problems in the event of a major oil spill

activities in the affected territories in the areas of fire management, fire prevention/preparedness, and fire suppression. Building on the good will and constructive engagement demonstrated by the parties during the Mission, the OSCE developed activities to assist in the implementation of the recommendations aimed at providing confidence-building measures.

Disaster preparedness and risk reduction in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

The countries sharing the Ferghana Valley (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are increasingly prone to natural disasters, which come as a result of environmental degradation and unsustainable development policies. These countries are located in one of the most seismically active areas of the world, where seismic and hydro-meteorological hazards, such as floods and droughts, regularly cause substantial economic and environmental damage. Land and mudslides is thus a common feature of the natural disaster profile of all three countries sharing the Ferghana Valley.

In this context, the OSCE participated in 2007 in a project led by the United Nations Development Programme aiming at strengthening national and local capacities in natural disaster risk management (DRM) and foster community work and cooperation towards reducing future natural disaster risk as conflict-generating factor.

Among the results of the project, a comprehensive natural disaster risk mapping was undertaken and small scale pilot projects on risk identification, disaster preparedness and response were implemented. Finally, the project increased local awareness and understanding of how to prepare for and reduce the future risk of disasters.

Building National Oil Spill Response Capacities in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan

The weak ratification and implementation of oil spills related conventions and international agreements among the OSCE participating States in the Caspian Region might cause problems in the event of a major oil spill. International agreements, like the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC) and the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, have not been signed by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, although the OPRC has been ratified in Azerbaijan.

The OSCE, during its 2008 Economic and Environmental Forum process, recognized that there is an urgent need to refresh, develop and/or update the procedures and recommendations in the national contingency plans of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and ensure its compliance with the Draft Regional Contingency Plan, and at the same time provide training to oil spill response personnel.

With that in mind, a project is currently being implemented aiming at updating and implementing the national oil spill response capacity through national Contingency Plans for oil spill preparedness and

response in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and identifying technical, organisational and institutional shortcomings in preparedness and response capacities, including the training of oil spill response personnel.

Elimination of Ukraine's Mélange (Liquid Rocket Fuel Component) Stockpiles

After the end of the Cold War, large stocks of the highly toxic liquid rocket fuel component known as *Mélange*⁴ were left on Ukrainian territory. Approximately 16,700 tons of *mélange* are stored at seven facilities around the country, posing a severe danger to public health and the environment. As the *mélange* storage containers are corroding rapidly, with more than 20 per cent seriously damaged, the risks are increasing.

Ukraine requested financial and technical resources to dispose of the *mélange*. In 2005, the OSCE conducted an initial assessment of storage facilities and disposal methods, which concluded that the facilities had to be eliminated within three to four years. The tender process for a disposal contract was organized in 2009 and disposal of the dangerous substance started in November 2009.

MAPPING ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY ISSUES IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION

The OSCE has been addressing environmental security issues in the Mediterranean region since 2007, when the OSCE Office of Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) assisted the Spanish Chairmanship in organizing a workshop in co-operation with NATO on water scarcity, land degradation and desertification in the Mediterranean region, with the aim to identify environment and security aspects.

The meeting which took place in Valencia, on December 2007, gathered scientists and diplomats and recommended to further research the linkages of environmental degradation and security in the Mediterranean Region, and pointed out at the environment and security initiative (ENVSEC)⁵ as an example to carry out assessments.

In order to continue the process and to follow up on the recommendations from the Valencia report, the OSCE participated in an experts' workshop organized in Barcelona in March 2009. The workshop focussed on mapping the issues, based on the ENVSEC methodology, and gathered experts from both rims of the Mediterranean, as well as various international organizations.

The result of the workshop is the report "Environment and Security Issues in the Southern Mediterranean Region⁶", which makes the case that environmental problems (water shortages, land degradation, pollution) can become security threats if not addressed and resolved. The report states that the Mediterranean is one of the world's most vulnerable areas due to its basic climatic and environmental features, combined with its cultural, geopolitical and economic complexity, offering high potential for social and political instability.

4. *Mélange* is a complex mixture of extremely active chemical substances, easily evaporating and highly toxic, hygroscopic, including concentrated nitric acid, saturated with nitrogen tetroxide and various additives. Due to the extensive period of storage of *Mélange* and its hygroscopic nature (i.e. attracting moisture from the atmosphere), the H₂O share has strongly increased (Table 2.1). As a result of shrinkage and corrosion the effectiveness of the inhibitors has decreased, leading to destabilization and active decomposition of the *Mélange* itself which can therefore not longer be used as rocket fuel component. In the event of disaster it will prove hazardous to human health and the environment. Nitric acid (HNO₃) evaporates as a reddish-brown fume with pungent smell. It is not combustible, but reacts with water or steam to produce heat. Contact of concentrated nitric acid with combustible materials may increase the hazard of fire and lead to an explosion. Contact with nitric acid or inhalation of nitric gases will result in severe cauterization of skin, mucous membranes, the respiratory system (pulmonary oedema) and eyes.

5. The ENVSEC Initiative works to assess and address environmental problems, which threaten or are perceived to threaten security, societal stability and peace, human health and/or sustainable livelihoods, within and across national borders in conflict prone regions. The Initiative collaborates closely with governments, particularly foreign, defence and environment ministries, national experts and NGOs. Together with the stakeholders ENVSEC has carried out assessments and published reports illustrated by maps, for understanding the linkages between environment and security in the political and socio-economic reality of South Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Based on the assessments, the Initiative develops and implements work programmes aimed at reducing tensions and solving the problems identified.

The ENVSEC initiative was established in 2003 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) became an associate member of the Initiative in 2004, through its Public Diplomacy Division. From 2006 onwards the Initiative is strengthened with two new members: the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE); and the Regional Environment Centre for Central and Eastern Europe (REC). More on www.envsec.org

6. The report is available at www.medsec-net.org

The report "Environment and Security Issues in the Southern Mediterranean Region" states that the Mediterranean is one of the world's most vulnerable areas due to its basic climatic and environmental features, combined with its cultural, geopolitical and economic complexity

Moreover, the report concludes that if the economic disparity between North and South continues to increase and if the impacts of climate change on the region turn out as predicted, the risk of conflict will affect the whole region, or even the whole world. The report is complemented by a set of highly communicative, esthetically attractive maps making the complications visible and understandable "at a glance". Some of the maps go beyond the usual geographical and statistical facts and figures, also working with the perceptions and opinions of stakeholders participating in "mapping exercises".

The report provides an innovative approach to analyse and communicate and, eventually, contribute to finding solutions to persistent problems. For that matter, concrete suggestions on how to "zoom in" on identified environment and security "hot spots" are proposed in the report.

The OSCE will explore the possibility of participating further in future consultations, expert analysis and cartographic communication within the proposed MEDSEC partnership (a circle of organizations, institutions and research centres engaged in addressing environment and security issues in the Southern Mediterranean).

PERSPECTIVES FOR 2010

The OSCE possesses as of 2009 a new instrument to fund activities of the OSCE Mediterranean Partners. This instrument should facilitate the participation of experts in activities related to the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments.

Climate Change, which has not been specifically mentioned in this paper, can become the main threat multiplier in the Mediterranean region, exacerbating water scarcity and desertification resulting in population movements and potential conflicts where rule of law is weak.

The OSCE is conducting a study on the linkages of climate change and security in different regions (including the Mediterranean) by developing a series of scenarios that will assess the impact of climate change on natural resources, energy and food availability, and their repercussions. These scenarios will provide another tool for co-operative action and policy recommendations that can have implications for civil protection.

GRUPO DE TRABAJO: MISIONES DE GESTIÓN DE CRISIS

- UNIFIL: A CRISIS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Timur Goksel

- LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS DEL EJÉRCITO ESPAÑOL:
ACTIVIDADES Y MISIONES EN EL MEDITERRÁNEO

José Javier Muñoz Castresana

UNIFIL: A CRISIS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Timur Goksel

*Former Senior Advisor,
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This is not going to be an academic and properly organised lecture with emphasis on goods and evils of international organizations in conflict management and peacekeeping. Having worked 33 years for the UN, 24 of them in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, I will freely share my experiences with you, without worrying about being politically correct. I am not after a UN civil servant anymore. I can name names now. I am already retired. I can't be retired again.

Because of time restraints I am not going to get into the fascinating history of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was set up in 1978 following Israel's partial occupation of South Lebanon. At that time, the conflict was between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Lebanon was in the midst of the violent civil war. Nothing was ripe for a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed in Lebanon. But, under severe US pressure, UNIFIL was created. It was actually the last UN peacekeeping mission approved in the Cold War era. PLO's military presence in Lebanon ended with the 1982 Israeli invasion. UNIFIL, which had come to manage the PLO-Israeli conflict in Lebanon, found itself trying to manage a new conflict, this time between non-state Lebanese forces and Israel. UN never thought what this radical change would mean for the peacekeepers in South Lebanon.

Israel did not abide by 1978 Security Council Resolution that set up UNIFIL and demanded Israel to withdraw. That happened only in 2000, not under international pressure but as a unilateral move under the pressure of the Lebanese resistance, mainly Hizbullah, and public opinion pressure in Israel. UNIFIL was subsequently reduced in numbers and its deployment was restricted to observing the Israel-Lebanese border.

Following the 2006 Israel-Hizbullah War, UNIFIL was expanded and made more "robust" by UNSC Resolution 1701 in a bid to ensure the "cessation of hostilities" between IDF and Hizbullah. EU troop contributions increased substantially, but this did not improve the efficiency or the robustness of UNIFIL II which, despite US/Israeli efforts to transform it into an enforcement mission, remained as a peacekeeping mission.

Lebanon was in the midst of the violent civil war under severe US pressure, UNIFIL, which had come to manage the PLO-Israeli conflict in Lebanon, found itself trying to manage a new conflict, this time between non-state Lebanese forces and Israel. UN never thought what this radical change would mean for the peacekeepers in South Lebanon

UNIFIL is not a solution, but a conflict management tool. It does not solve the conflict. If nothing, it provides an instant, unique channel of communication between two countries that are technically at war

UNIFIL's expanded presence; especially the political clout it has acquired with the strong European participation has so far thwarted the resumption of hostilities. But, to that extent, there has been no serious political action to resolve the conflict and bring it to closure with determined US and EU action. This wishful thinking presupposes at least a modicum of European unity. Given the dominance of national interests over foreign policies of most EU nations, I am afraid it is bound to stay as wishful thinking. Consequently, either this UN force too will stay "interim" for an indefinite period or one day will be forced to helplessly watch the resumption of hostilities.

UNIFIL is not a solution, but a conflict management tool. It does not solve the conflict. But it is an essential tool that is worth every penny, most pennies anyway, spent on it. If nothing, it provides an instant, unique channel of communication between two countries that are technically at war. Since its very first days, UNIFIL prevented conflicts that could have erupted out of misunderstandings. Today officers of Lebanese and Israeli armies meet regularly under UNIFIL chairmanship to discuss all border problems. Look at the rhetoric raging in the Middle East and imagine what could happen if you did not have the UN in the middle talking to both sides.

There have been many instances when the Israeli army contacted UNIFIL to ask about suspicious movements near the border or to inform UNIFIL of an activity they would undertake that could be misinterpreted by Hizbullah. Hizbullah leaders in South Lebanon used to call me at my Haifa residence often to inquire about what saw as suspicious, hostile Israeli army moves.

Of course not to be ignored is the unheralded humanitarian services UNIFIL has rendered to this much neglected region of Lebanon. In 1978, when UNIFIL arrived, the area had a population of 15,000 people who had nobody looking after them. Within 3-4 years that population went up to more than 200,000, thanks to services and some semblance of security provided by UNIFIL.

When villages are populated, schools and businesses are open and life returns to normal, the likelihood of those areas to be used to launch attacks are minimal. Today, unlike the original force, which had no budget for humanitarian activities, UNIFIL has funds for quick impact projects and, especially, the European contingents mobilise significant funds from their home countries. One beneficial aspect of this is that the villagers who long gave up of state services are now learning to deal with official bodies instead of first running to the nearest non-state activist.

EU Member States, particularly France, Italy, and Spain, play a leading role in UNIFIL today. More EU contingents are likely to join. European commitment should not be discouraged because some UN bureaucrat will say "oh, we have too many Europeans, let's get some from other continents."

While EU troops are essential because of their professional background and the political clout they enjoy with the parties in this conflict, such deterrence only works as long as the parties to the conflict find that the current truce works to their advantage. EU troops have unfortunately also become high-profile targets for jihadist groups now operating with impunity in Lebanon.

These threats have prompted EU troops within UNIFIL to over-emphasise force protection, to the point of neglecting the real mission. Democratic countries with free news media and developed public opinions have become over sensitised to casualties they suffer in foreign missions. This, in turn, has been putting great pressure on their commanders to avoid casualties, sometimes by taking extreme measures to the detriment of the mission.

Although, in principle, these troops are under UN command and are not supposed to be taking orders from their national commands, in reality, they first report to their homes and regularly ask for permission for any action that remotely be risky. They take extreme and aggressive protection measures not to suffer casualties. They introduce electronic countermeasures against Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs). They minimise contacts with the local population, whose sentiments are ignored. They withdraw behind fortifications and barbed wire. Don't forget that these national commanders are evaluated by their home commands, not the UN. Their careers' advancement depends on what their own superiors think about them, not what the UN command thinks. Moreover, they are paid by their own army, not the UN. If the UN command, for whatever reason, does not act like a true field commander, who keeps track of what his units are doing, does not want to hurt feelings by taking corrective action and insists on being politically correct, what you end up with is a colourful and well looked after international force, with impressive parades but cut off from the people they are there to protect.

Worse are ineptness, inexperience and aloofness of the "supreme command" in New York. There is nobody there who will tell the field commands that what they are doing is wrong and is damaging UN credibility. There is nobody who will tell the commander in the field that they should stop being a *prima donna* and *faux* diplomat and instead be a true commander? Does anyone wonder who runs UNIFIL from New York today? Just ask. I am afraid at the first sign of serious trouble, national commands will take over and the international force will disintegrate.

This extreme risk aversion cannot be overruled by the UN command who would not want to be accused of not caring for the lives of the soldiers. As a result, friendly contact with the local population is ruptured. UNIFIL had always enjoyed the trust of the people who at times took risks to protect these foreign soldiers they saw as their guests. The best source of intelligence has always been the friendly villagers. Once you lose that trust, you are on your own. Original UNIFIL which had to survive on its own during heavy battles in its region was always very careful to respect local sensitivities and at times take risks to protect the people. I think the people have paid back generously.

Moreover, the technical countermeasures introduced, such as jamming devices against IEDs, etc., do not mean much in South Lebanon. Israeli army, certainly one of the most technologically advanced in the world, constantly developed such countermeasures but kept on sustaining casualties that eventually led to its withdrawal from Lebanon. The US military has a force about 5000 with separate command dealing only with IED's in Iraq and have spent billions of dollars to deal with that threat. Don't forget that one of the best protected Prime Ministers was

While EU troops are essential because of their professional background and the political clout they enjoy with the parties in this conflict, such deterrence only works as long as the parties to the conflict find that the current truce works to their advantage

National commanders are evaluated by their home commands, not the UN. Their careers' advancement depends on what their own superiors think about them, not what the UN command thinks

killed in the middle of Beirut in broad daylight. In Lebanon, we have an axiom that says: "If they want to get you, they will".

Another disturbing product of excessive risk aversion is the danger it poses to the harmony within the force. While European contingents are taking series of protective measures, including severe restrictions on movement of their troops and cutting off their contacts with the local people, other contingents are trying to move around freely, visit and shop in villages. But, this is restricted by force-wide security rules. Soldiers come to Lebanon and leave without seeing Beirut. Rules imposed by the European units and their aggressive postures that turn the people against UNIFIL are severely resented by other contingents. This affects the cohesion and overall harmony of the force. There is a need for EU contingents with UNIFIL to be reduced. Downsizing would lower their profile and make their targeting more difficult, but will not reduce the political clout of the force.

EU national authorities should coordinate more closely with their UNIFIL counterparts when intervening in the local politics of Lebanon or even when making statements about UNIFIL. UN failed badly in giving public diplomacy support to the new UNIFIL and allowed the troop contributors a free hand to say what they want. The public acceptability of UNIFIL troops were compromised by foreign policy statements or blunders and some contingents were received by indifference, if not seen as a potential enemy. In peacekeeping, public perceptions are vital. You are not sending your soldiers to fight. So why are you talking as if you are?

The presence of 28 troop contributing to UNIFIL may seem like an ideal situation. It gives it an international flavour with troops from all continents and religious backgrounds, but it seriously hampers practical coordination and communication. It is UN's wishful thinking and ignorance of military culture to recruit troops from all over the world without taking into consideration the differences in quality, equipment, training and suitability of these troops for a complicated mission such as UNIFIL.

I remember a contingent that refused to send out night patrols because of their beliefs. Another refused to post officers at checkpoints because in their military culture that is not what officers do. They sit at the officers club and chat all day. At crisis times, language always was a serious impediment. Joint action on the ground was practically impossible. UNIFIL should consider reducing the total number of contributing nations, but UN headquarters is still increasing their numbers.

As in all peacekeeping missions, for UNIFIL too, composition of the force is paramount. Luckily for UNIFIL, UN had no problems in recruiting countries. A force based on the Mediterranean basin and European countries will have better acceptability, meet less hostility and achieve more respectability than troops from far continents. Cultural and geographical proximity are always strong force multipliers.

The true problem is these issues are hardly ever addressed by the UN, which is simply incapable of putting together, deploying and running a large force. Once the Security Council decides to set up a peacekeeping force, it becomes an administrative and logistical task for the UN secretariat. Where do we find the soldiers? How do we move them to the mission

area? How do we house and feed them? Minimal consideration, if any, is given to suitability of those troops to the mandate and the mission area. What are the parameters of our intervention? Will the mission require peace building? State building? Do you have the funds and the right staff?

Sadly still very much neglected is the internal cultural compatibility, the ability of such a diverse collection of civilians and military to work together harmoniously in a conflict zone.

At one point in not too distant future, Europe will have to get more intimately involved in the Middle East. It is not only the Arab-Israeli conflict and the oil we should be concerned with. The Arab nation state suffering from political incompetent governance, corruption, injustice and indifference to meeting the basic needs of the society is in danger of disintegration. Instead of trying to address the wrongs, we see more concentration of power in the hands of a few in the security regimes that dominate the region.

There are so many disconnects in our region between the rulers and their subjects, rich and poor, urban and rural, educated and illiterate. There is a new breed of Islamist, populist political leaders emerging in the Middle East to challenge the traditional, family based and usually corrupt regimes. The region is being flooded with new generation of weapons and military know-how in the hands of non-state groups. At the moment, their efforts are directed at challenging their ruling establishments and co-opting their heavily armed but generally incompetent military forces while slowly creating states within states.

At one point, these movements will dominate internal politics of their countries and will adopt Palestine as their key problem and that is when we will feel the impact of this regional conflict on international security. People are increasingly critical of autocratic regimes and pledge their loyalty to fundamentalist groups who care about their plight and hungry families. Basic and modest demands of the large segment of the society are not met. Worse is the sense indignity and humiliation that masses feel. The only help and compassion that the poor are getting are from Islamic charities and welfare units of groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas. Why are we surprised then when people declare their loyalty to politicians or groups instead of state institutions which have failed to perform their primary functions?

The lessons learnt from both UNIFIL and UNIFIL II, as well as two minor EU missions to Israel-Palestine conflict, should be analyzed before any large-scale EU intervention into the Middle East, particularly in Palestine. Any mission should have realistic objectives that help advance conflict management between the conflicting sides, in parallel to general initiatives aimed at solving the underlying political problems. If this does not occur, then all such operations will either become permanently "interim", such as UNIFIL, or face an embarrassed suspension right when they are most needed, as EUROBAM.

It is time for the EU and the Mediterranean countries to start thinking about these issues because rise in violent socio-religious movements is threatening the Arab countries, while more and more people believe that negotiations do not produce results but struggle does.

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EU troops should not be deployed to Palestine unless this action is perceived as impartial and there is a parallel, effective advancement of the comprehensive political agenda. For this to occur, we have to think of an EU with a united vision, which is not reluctant to use its considerable economic and political clout to resolve the conflict. It may well be the right time for EU to stop acting as a cash cow to the Middle East conflict.

José Javier Muñoz Castresana

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Es el Mediterráneo un lugar de encuentro y de tránsitos estratégicos, así como un área de confluencia de regiones con niveles de desarrollo muy distintos. La fuerte asimetría económica, política, cultural, social, religiosa y demográfica que existe en un espacio tan restringido, entre países desarrollados y otros en vías de desarrollo, puede llevar, en un momento dado, a la inestabilidad de la región. Por lo tanto, con objeto de evitar que se produzca una fractura entre el norte y el sur o entre el este y el oeste, existe una necesidad de diálogo permanente entre sus países ribereños. Esta necesidad se concreta en la multiplicación de las iniciativas de cooperación regional en distintos foros internacionales.

Como representante del Ministerio de Defensa, quisiera referirme de manera más concreta a las actividades y misiones en las que participan nuestras Fuerzas Armadas en el exterior, en el Mediterráneo, y la relación que mantienen con países amigos y aliados de la zona.

En primer lugar, citaré el Diálogo Mediterráneo de la OTAN, creado en 1995, que cuenta hoy con la participación de siete países: Argelia, Mauritania, Marruecos, Túnez, Egipto, Israel y Siria. Esta iniciativa permite incrementar el nivel de "interoperabilidad" en general, por el gran número de actividades de formación y adiestramiento que ofrecen los países de la Alianza, aunque la relación formal entre una gran organización internacional y cada uno de estos países, individualmente considerado, dificulta la plena participación de todos los socios de forma coordinada en las actividades ofrecidas. No es realmente una misión, sino un medio de contacto y de intercambio de ideas y experiencias, que permite participaciones militares limitadas, especialmente en ejercicios, a los países de la iniciativa.

Al margen del Diálogo Mediterráneo y por lo que se refiere a misiones militares concretas, se puede decir que la participación de países de la ribera sur del *Mare Nostrum*, tanto en operaciones de la UE como de la OTAN es casi nula, con la excepción de Marruecos en la operación Althea.

Este hecho puede tener su justificación en alguna o varias de las siguientes cuestiones:

Con el objeto de evitar que se produzca una fractura entre el norte y el sur o entre el este y el oeste, existe una necesidad de diálogo permanente entre sus países ribereños

Al margen del Diálogo Mediterráneo y por lo que se refiere a misiones militares concretas, se puede decir que la participación de países de la ribera sur del Mare Nostrum, tanto en operaciones de la UE como de la OTAN es casi nula, con la excepción de Marruecos en la operación Althea

- Dificultades internas para aportar los recursos económicos, de personal y de material;
- Cierta falta de relación con la Comunidad Internacional y con las grandes organizaciones de Defensa;
- Desconfianza o desinterés, en integrarse en operaciones lideradas por organismos internacionales occidentales;
- Poco apoyo de sus opiniones públicas a la participación en misiones que no sean dirigidas directamente por la ONU;
- Las operaciones OTAN y UE pueden suponer una cierta carga de posicionamiento ideológico para algunos países.

Por el contrario, su participación en operaciones de Naciones Unidas apunta a que:

- Consideran a este organismo como fuente primera de legalidad para organizar nuevas misiones;
- Prácticamente todos los países tienen la capacidad de desplegar observadores y pequeñas unidades en teatros alejados del Mediterráneo, algo mucho más sencillo que aportar grandes unidades militares;
- De alguna manera buscan tener algún peso o presencia en este ámbito, al margen de los posibles beneficios económicos, dado que la ONU sufraga las aportaciones militares a las misiones.

Por lo que respecta a operaciones de la ONU en el Mediterráneo, FPNUL (Fuerza Provisional de las Naciones Unidas en el Líbano) es sin duda la más importante.

En julio de 2006, tras una incursión fronteriza que se saldó con la muerte de ocho soldados israelíes y la captura de dos de ellos, se produjo la crisis israelo-libanesa de verano de 2006 con el bombardeo israelí de parte de la infraestructura del sur del país y la respuesta armada de Hezbollah sobre las ciudades del norte de Israel.

En agosto de ese año, la Resolución 1701 (2006) del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU - prorrogada por las 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008) y 1884 (2009) - permitió incrementar la fuerza de FPNUL hasta los 15.000 efectivos, ampliando también el mandato de la misión. España se comprometió desde el principio y envió un contingente de unos 1.100 efectivos, al que se le asignó la operación en el sector Este del despliegue.

Dentro de FPNUL, las fuerzas españolas están presentes en tres áreas: el grueso del contingente constituye el núcleo de la Brigada Multinacional Este, ubicado en la base "Miguel de Cervantes", en el término municipal de Blat (cerca del pueblo de Marjayoun). También se encuentran tropas españolas en el Cuartel General de la misión, en Naqoura. Por último, participan activamente en la Célula Militar Estratégica para FPNUL en la sede de Naciones Unidas, en Nueva York. Entre mayo de 2008 y junio de 2009, el Director de la Célula fue un General de División del Ejército de Tierra español. Está previsto que desde principios del próximo año, el Comandante de la Fuerza y Jefe de Misión sea un general español.

Desde el inicio de la operación, han fallecido ocho militares españoles, seis de los cuales murieron en el atentado terrorista del 24 de junio de 2007 en Jiam.

En el ámbito concreto de la UE, la participación en operaciones de Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa (PESD) supone un nexo de cooperación, como demuestran la Misión de Policía de la Unión Europea para los territorios palestinos (EUPOL COPS) y la Misión de Asistencia Fronteriza de la UE para el Paso Fronterizo de Rafah (EU BAM Rafah). Sin embargo, la participación en operaciones militares, es, como decía antes, casi nula. La presencia de Marruecos en Althea nos dice, no obstante, que esta colaboración puede extenderse al ámbito militar, también en otros países.

La Iniciativa 5+5 en el ámbito de la Defensa sí está dando frutos y supone una esperanza de mayor relación entre algunos países mediterráneos. Por ello y por el importante liderazgo que ejerce nuestro Ministerio de Defensa, me referiré a ella con detalle.

Esta iniciativa fue propuesta por Francia en 2004 y se inspiró en el formato del Diálogo político 5+5 que reúne a Argelia, Francia, Italia, Libia, Malta, Marruecos, Mauritania, Portugal, Túnez y España. El objeto de esta iniciativa de seguridad era y es desarrollar la cooperación multilateral, llevando a cabo actividades prácticas en el marco de un plan de acción anual aprobado por los Ministros de Defensa, para reforzar el entendimiento mutuo y la confianza, con el fin de promover la seguridad en el Mediterráneo Occidental.

Las actividades de la Iniciativa se centran en cuatro áreas de cooperación: la vigilancia marítima, la seguridad aérea, la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas en apoyo a las Autoridades de Protección Civil y la formación.

En sólo cinco años, el número de actividades (seminarios, conferencias de altos cargos de Defensa o ejercicios) ofrecidas y organizadas por todos sus miembros se ha incrementado desde 4 en 2005 a más de 30 en 2009. También es notable que hayamos pasado de actividades nacionales a las cuales se invitaba a observadores de los países miembros de la Iniciativa, a actividades propias del 5+5 organizadas específicamente por y para los propios miembros.

Ello ha sido posible porque en las distintas áreas de cooperación no se considera el uso de la fuerza militar en operaciones de combate y, por lo tanto, los temas son muy poco controversiales, ya que no implican una carga política importante.

Además, la Iniciativa viene teniendo un éxito creciente a lo largo de sus 5 años de existencia, por ser informal y muy práctica. En este momento es un foro en el que los países del sur tienen gran confianza y participan plenamente con sus socios europeos.

Ahora, ha llegado el momento en el que las actividades y los ejercicios organizados deben servir para desarrollar, comprobar y validar nuevos procedimientos operativos comunes. En este sentido, España está desarrollando un Manual de procedimientos comunes del 5+5 en materia de seguridad marítima, tal como se ha hecho en el marco aéreo con la elaboración del "Manual de Procedimientos entre los Países Miembros de la Iniciativa 5+5/Defensa referente a la Cooperación en materia de Seguridad Aérea contra una Amenaza Aérea no Militar", que firmaron los Jefes de Estado Mayor del Ejército del Aire en 2008.

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Todo ello son logros concretos que favorecen claramente el incremento de la interoperabilidad entre las Fuerzas Armadas de los diez países.

En este ámbito, el desarrollo y uso del sistema de Centro Virtual Regional de Control de Tráfico Marítimo (V-RMTC 5+5), proyecto propuesto por Italia y operativo desde 2007, proporciona una herramienta común para las operaciones de seguridad marítima. Este sistema ya se ha utilizado en varios ejercicios de la Iniciativa, en el marco de la vigilancia marítima, tales como el ejercicio CANALE 08 propuesto por Italia y Malta, el SEABORDER 08 y 09 organizado por Portugal y España, así como el ejercicio EL MED 08 organizado por Argelia.

El ejercicio SEABORDER 09, en el que los países socios participaron en el proceso completo de planeamiento, ha despertado mucho interés entre los participantes. Por tanto, a pesar de que no haya de momento actos de piratería en el Mediterráneo, algunos países magrebíes mostraron su interés por incorporar este tema en el escenario de un próximo ejercicio y, así, ir más allá del tradicional asunto de la inmigración ilegal. Desarrollar esta propuesta llevaría a que países no europeos del Mediterráneo puedan contribuir a operaciones de lucha contra la piratería, siempre y cuando haya un acuerdo político.

Por otra parte, se desarrollan varios proyectos de mayor alcance, además de las cuatro áreas de cooperación identificadas, que participan a mejorar la interoperabilidad.

En el ámbito de la contribución de las Fuerzas Armadas a la Protección Civil, en caso de catástrofe de gran magnitud en un país de la Iniciativa, se van a estudiar los documentos necesarios para proporcionar un marco legal a la materialización de la asistencia mutua entre países miembros.

En caso de llegar a existir, tal marco legal podría dar pie a la elaboración de acuerdos multilaterales relativos a la participación de los países no europeos de la Iniciativa 5+5 Defensa en operaciones conjuntas combinadas con sus socios europeos, en el marco de la PESD o de la OTAN.

El Colegio 5+5 de Defensa, del cual España ha estrenado el curso de nivel superior el 28 de septiembre de 2009, tiene por objetivo mejorar el conocimiento común sobre problemáticas de Seguridad y Defensa en el Mediterráneo, así como intercambiar experiencias y establecer contactos personales. Ello permitirá desarrollar la "interoperabilidad de las mentes".

El Centro Euromagrebí de Investigación y Estudios Estratégicos para el Mediterráneo Occidental promovido por Túnez en 2006, tiene previsto estar ubicado en este país. Este centro tiene un enfoque distinto al del Colegio 5+5 de Defensa, por dedicarse a la investigación y análisis prospectivo del entorno estratégico del Mediterráneo occidental. Su objetivo será mejorar la identificación de los intereses estratégicos compartidos y desarrollar una visión estratégica común.

También conviene mencionar, por último, el futuro Centro de formación en desminado humanitario que ha propuesto Libia.

Más allá, se abren nuevos campos de cooperación a iniciativa de los países miembros. Además, Argelia ha organizado este año el primer seminario

sobre geodesia militar con objeto de unificar los sistemas geodésicos de los países del Mediterráneo Occidental. También se han celebrado seminarios sobre las estructuras militares de mando conjunto, actividades relacionadas a las operaciones de mantenimiento de paz, y se ha tratado la posibilidad de cooperar en las operaciones de evacuación de no combatientes (NEO).

Especialmente importante, desde el punto de vista puramente político, ha sido el primer curso de formación de oficiales superiores, que fue organizado por España en Madrid, la última semana de septiembre 2009, en el que se debatió sobre la contribución de la Iniciativa 5+5 Defensa a la seguridad en el Mediterráneo. En las conclusiones de los trabajos de grupo, se hacía hincapié en que había que trabajar más adelante sobre las diferencias de percepción de los riesgos y amenazas en la región, entre los distintos países de la Iniciativa.

La mejor forma de contribuir a la mejora de la seguridad en el Mediterráneo es analizar las razones del éxito de la Iniciativa 5+5, tales como son su carácter informal, el enfoque *bottom-up*, los logros muy concretos, la flexibilidad y la sencillez de las estructuras, para difundir este método de trabajo.

Sin embargo, para no perjudicar el buen funcionamiento de la Iniciativa, no se pretende, de momento, ampliarla a otros países, sino explicar y exportar dicha metodología de funcionamiento a otras partes del Mediterráneo, para que los países que lo deseen construyan su propio marco subregional de cooperación práctica en materia de defensa y seguridad.

Las distintas propuestas de cooperación en la región mediterránea son complementarias y, por lo tanto, deben seguir desarrollándose independientemente. Sin embargo, sin formalizar una relación entre ellas, es responsabilidad de los países pertenecientes a varias organizaciones informar a sus socios sobre los desarrollos y logros en las otras instituciones.

Es en este espíritu que España va a organizar una reunión informal de Ministros de Defensa en formato 27+5 durante su presidencia del Consejo de la UE en el primer semestre de 2010, el 23 de febrero en Palma de Mallorca, invitando a los cinco países magrebíes.

Para finalizar, no quisiera dejar de citar la Unión por el Mediterráneo, que ha sucedido al Proceso de Barcelona en 2008 y que no tiene una dimensión de seguridad y defensa, aunque la estabilidad de la región sea su meta final. El proyecto de Unión por el Mediterráneo, promovido por Francia y apadrinado por Alemania, supone reactivar la política euro-mediterránea del Proceso de Barcelona mediante una estructura más institucionalizada para reforzar el acercamiento con los países de la ribera sur a través del "desarrollo de nuevos proyectos de dimensión regional".

La propuesta franco-alemana implica la creación de una estructura permanente con participación de los países de la ribera sur del Mediterráneo para dar mayor visibilidad, promover nuevos proyectos y supervisar su realización. La Unión por el Mediterráneo cuenta con dos co-presidentes, uno procedente de los estados de la UE y otro de los países de la ribera sur. Estos co-presidentes tendrán un mandato de dos años y se responsabilizarán de preparar las reuniones ministeriales entre la UE y los países mediterráneos y una cumbre cada dos años.

El ejercicio SEABORDER 09, en el que los países socios participaron en el proceso completo de planeamiento, ha despertado mucho interés entre los participantes. A pesar de que no haya de momento actos de piratería en el Mediterráneo, algunos países magrebíes mostraron su interés por incorporar este tema en el escenario de un próximo ejercicio y, así, ir más allá del tradicional asunto de la inmigración ilegal

CONCLUSIONES

- EL MEDITERRÁNEO EN LA PRESIDENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE LA UE

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A nadie le sorprenderá que el Mediterráneo sea una prioridad de la política exterior española y, por lo tanto, que también sea una prioridad para la presidencia española del Consejo de la UE.

Me gustaría hacer referencia especial a la Unión por el Mediterráneo (UpM), puesto que será en Barcelona donde tendrá lugar la segunda cumbre, después de la primera en París, en julio de 2008. Tampoco debemos olvidar que será Barcelona la ciudad elegida para acoger la sede del secretariado de la UpM, una de las instituciones novedosas de este partenariado euro-mediterráneo y signo de continuidad con el Proceso de Barcelona.

Para ser realistas, nos vemos obligados a partir de una constatación: este año 2009 no ha sido un buen año para la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Empezamos el año con la crisis de Gaza y la consiguiente paralización de las tareas de la asociación hasta muy avanzada la primavera. El año terminó con la cancelación de la reunión de Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de la UpM, que tendría que haberse producido en Estambul el 24 de noviembre de 2009, pero fue suspendida como consecuencia de la falta de acuerdo entre árabes e israelíes sobre cuestiones relativas en último término a sus diferencias en torno al conflicto.

Si alguien en algún momento pensó que era posible una despolitización de la Unión por el Mediterráneo, del Partenariado Euro-Mediterráneo, es decir, una desvinculación del conflicto árabe-israelí, de la cooperación y de la integración económica y del acercamiento entre los países en torno al Mediterráneo, lo cierto es que esta idea de la despolitización, si alguno la pudo albergar (y desgraciadamente así sucedió), ha demostrado ser una ilusión. De hecho, tenemos ahora más vinculación entre el conflicto de Oriente Medio y la marcha del Partenariado Euro-Mediterráneo de la que había en años anteriores.

De forma sintética, se pueden atribuir las causas a la creciente frustración por parte de los países árabes miembros de la UpM ante el fracaso de la vía que abrió, hace no tanto tiempo, el Proceso de negociación de Anápolis, interrumpido una vez que se producen cambios en el gobierno de Israel,

Si alguien en algún momento pensó que era posible una despolitización de la Unión por el Mediterráneo lo cierto es que esta idea de la despolitización ha demostrado ser una ilusión

Creo que hay más conciencia y más presión internacional hoy en día de la que ha habido nunca a favor de una solución al conflicto árabe-israelí

con una vuelta al punto de partida sin perspectivas inmediatas de continuidad.

Sin embargo, creo que es fundamental no perder de vista el largo plazo. En un periodo relativamente corto, se han experimentado momentos de euforia, como los que se vivieron en torno a la Cumbre de julio de 2008; posteriormente, periodos de depresión, como consecuencia de la paralización de los trabajos a principios de este año; o de frustración.

El convencimiento, por parte de algunos actores fundamentales, de que la oportunidad existe hoy en día y de que, si esta oportunidad se deja pasar, quizás se pierda ya la posibilidad de la solución de los dos Estados. Por lo tanto, creo que hay más conciencia y más presión internacional hoy en día de la que ha habido nunca a favor de una solución a este conflicto.

No olvidemos que, en definitiva, el Proceso de Barcelona nació en su momento vinculado desde el principio a una solución que en aquél momento se veía cercana y, por ende, el Proceso de Barcelona se concibió (y actualmente la Unión por el Mediterráneo), como una iniciativa post-conflicto, que posteriormente tendría que mantener viva la llama de la cooperación a la espera de mejores tiempos en los que la Asociación Euro-Mediterránea pudiera dar sus mejores frutos.

A día de hoy no estamos ahí. Desde un punto de vista realista, tenemos que reconocer que estamos en momentos de dificultad, pero si perdemos de vista el largo plazo y la perspectiva más amplia, creo que tampoco haríamos justicia a los esfuerzos que se están depositando.

En esta línea, me parece de interés tratar de situar cuáles son las nuevas dinámicas regionales (todas ellas interconectadas), las cuales nos ofrecen el contexto para estudiar dónde se sitúa la Unión por el Mediterráneo y cuál es su sentido dentro de estas dinámicas regionales.

En estas dinámicas, encontramos el conflicto árabe-israelí como una de sus dimensiones fundamentales; la cuestión nuclear con Irán; el retorno a la plena soberanía de Iraq, con la progresiva retirada de las tropas norteamericanas; la superación del aislamiento internacional de Siria en este último año; la estabilización del Líbano; y el reposicionamiento diplomático de Turquía, una de las cuestiones más relevantes dentro de las novedades que se han podido producir en los últimos meses dentro de la geopolítica regional.

Si bien no entraré a analizar en profundidad cada una de estas dinámicas, me gustaría señalar que en el conflicto árabe-israelí prevalecen hoy en día los desafíos internos en cada una de las partes de Palestina e Israel a la hora de conseguir que cada parte acepte los sacrificios y las concesiones que necesariamente implican los compromisos que supondrían un acuerdo para el Estatuto final.

En el caso de Israel estamos ante un nuevo gobierno, que parte de posiciones ubicadas más a la derecha que el anterior y que, de alguna manera, está emprendiendo su viaje hacia el centro, como afirmó hace no mucho el Presidente Peres, viaje que supone una opción en favor de la solución de los dos Estados y que influye en la capacidad de maniobra de que goza el gobierno de Israel en estos momentos.

En el caso de Palestina, las divisiones siguen vivas entre Gaza y Cisjordania, entre Fatah y Hamas. El acuerdo de reconciliación tantas veces anunciado no acaba de cerrarse y, por lo tanto, eso sigue siendo un factor abierto a la hora de encontrar una concertación del pueblo palestino a través de sus representantes para negociar un Estatuto final.

En cuanto a Irán se refiere, podemos señalar que el país que ha experimentado un nuevo giro con los acontecimientos protagonizados este verano después de las elecciones del mes de julio y todavía se especula sobre el efecto que la desafección de una parte importante de la población podría tener en las negociaciones para encontrar una solución a la ambición iraní de tener un programa nuclear civil y a las pretensiones de la comunidad internacional de que este programa nuclear civil no sea una amenaza para la seguridad de la región y no genere una carrera por la proliferación, que sería, sin duda, una gravísima amenaza a la seguridad regional.

La evolución iraní en los próximos meses será decisiva puesto que existe un plazo fijo (que es a finales de este año) para decidir si realmente hay una negociación de buena fe por parte de Irán o, si por el contrario, la negociación no conduce a ninguna parte y, en consecuencia, vamos a entrar en una etapa de tensiones que podría perjudicar la estabilidad en su conjunto.

En Iraq, desgraciadamente, los atentados que sufre el país nos indican que la estabilidad en este país aún queda lejana. Se ha empezado un proceso, pero está resultando más difícil de lo pronosticado. En todo caso, es un proceso cuyo próximo hito son las elecciones de enero de 2010, (ya en periodo de presidencia española de la UE) y la retirada de las tropas de combate norteamericanas para agosto de 2010. Estos meses que tenemos por delante van a ser unos meses muy claves para acompañar al gobierno iraquí que salga de las urnas en su proceso de recuperación de la plena soberanía.

En cuanto a la superación del aislamiento de Siria, simbólicamente quedó representada en la cumbre de París de 2008, con la decisión de los gobiernos de Líbano y Siria de establecer plenas relaciones diplomáticas; lo cual se ha cumplido. Además, Siria ha avanzado en su normalización con Estados Unidos. También se han producido avances en la normalización del Líbano y ahí contribuimos los países que tenemos tropas en FPNUL, que forma parte de ese esfuerzo de estabilización; el cual está siendo exitoso, si bien debemos hablar de un éxito frágil, cuya situación podría revertirse en cualquier momento pero que, a día de hoy, sin duda alguna, es mucho mejor que año y medio atrás.

Finalmente, el reposicionamiento de Turquía ha tenido su último episodio en la cancelación de maniobras militares en las que estaba prevista la participación de Israel. Se trata de un acontecimiento novedoso, puesto que si es verdad que las relaciones políticas entre los gobiernos de Israel y Turquía se habían deteriorado en los últimos meses, las relaciones entre las Fuerzas Armadas de ambos países seguían siendo muy fuertes y, sin embargo, esta es la primera vez que ocurre esta no invitación a Israel para participar en unas maniobras en las que estaba previsto con anterioridad su asistencia.

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Nos adentramos así en una situación nueva en las relaciones entre Israel y Turquía en paralelo con numerosas iniciativas turcas para aumentar su peso político en la región, como ha sido la Cumbre con Armenia, como han sido los acuerdos con Rusia para el tránsito del nuevo gaseoducto a través de Turquía, como son las propias relaciones con Siria, un país con el que estuvo al borde de la guerra solamente hace unos años. Esta nueva dimensión política de Turquía en la región representa una de las novedades que hay que tener muy en cuenta.

Asimismo, tenemos un nuevo factor externo, que es la nueva Administración norteamericana, la cual trata de construir un nuevo discurso que no es ya el de la guerra contra el terrorismo. Estamos ante una nueva actitud y relación con el mundo musulmán. Una Administración que se ha comprometido desde el primer momento en ser mediador equilibrado entre Israel y Palestina, que ha emprendido la normalización con Siria, que ha emprendido las negociaciones con Irán.

Es decir, estamos ante una política norteamericana nueva, cuyo objetivo es el relanzamiento de las negociaciones para la resolución del conflicto árabe-israelí y una de las claves de nuestra presidencia española de la UE será una colaboración muy estrecha con la nueva Administración norteamericana para tratar de impulsar esas negociaciones de paz y tratar de adquirir una velocidad de cruce suficiente como para que puedan generarse unas expectativas razonables de que el conflicto puede acabar en solución.

¿Dónde se sitúa el Partenariado Euro-Mediterráneo en estas dinámicas regionales?

Se sitúa como un foro en el que también chocan las rivalidades en el conflicto. También es un foro abierto en el que hay diálogo entre unos y otros. Es un foro que el día de mañana podría ser una baza importante, si realmente hubiera un retorno a las negociaciones, para recuperar un diálogo en la dimensión regional del conflicto, que es una de las dimensiones necesarias y complementarias con la dimensión puramente bilateral de Israel con los palestinos, de Israel con Siria y de Israel con Líbano.

La Unión por el Mediterráneo también tiene una cierta relevancia en cuanto a las relaciones entre Turquía e Israel con el objetivo de retomar las conversaciones con Siria. Ambos son miembros de la UpM y, de alguna forma u otra, constituye un foro donde se encuentran y en el que pueden gestionar las divergencias surgidas.

En definitiva, podría decirse que la Unión por el Mediterráneo es muy vulnerable a la evolución del Proceso de Paz. Para que se recupere un grado suficiente de cooperación es imprescindible que haya un retorno a las negociaciones y, si esto es así, que se abran perspectivas, pues únicamente en un escenario de paz se recuperaría el pleno potencial de este foro.

Pero incluso sin ese escenario de paz, es un foro en el que caben esfuerzos de cooperación, como bien hemos visto en el pasado en ámbitos sectoriales, en ámbitos más técnicos en los que todos ellos, pese a ser parte en el conflicto, encuentran áreas de cooperación en virtud del interés común.

De cara a la presidencia, los grandes desafíos serían precisamente trabajar por parte de la Unión Europea con la Administración norteamericana y con las partes, con la Liga Árabe, con Israel, con los palestinos, para ese retorno a las negociaciones.

En segundo lugar, encontramos los grandes desafíos de la transformación institucional del Partenariado Euro-Mediterráneo. Antes era un Partenariado muy basado en las presidencias de la UE y el motor de cooperación era la propia Comisión Europea. Ahora se va a crear un Secretariado, que va a ser paritario, pero necesitamos que esa transición entre un método y otro se establezca. Nuestra presidencia puede ser la ocasión para que los nuevos métodos de trabajo encuentren su manera de trabajar estable, sobre todo con la inauguración del Secretariado en el Palacio de Pedralbes.

En lo que se refiere a la cooperación euro-mediterránea, la agenda de la presidencia incluye, por una parte, las grandes cuestiones globales que tienen reflejo en el Mediterráneo: la crisis económica y cómo se ve desde ambas orillas del Mediterráneo, ya que no siempre se ve de la misma manera. En Europa nuestra obsesión en estos momentos es la crisis y el paro. Sin embargo, con motivo de la visita del Presidente del Líbano a Madrid y Barcelona en octubre de 2009, la delegación libanesa explicaba cómo el Líbano está creciendo al 6% anual y la economía no está sufriendo con las repercusiones de la crisis. La situación no se ve de la misma manera desde unos países y desde otros y es necesario encontrar una visión común de los desafíos de la crisis económica.

El cambio climático y sus repercusiones en el Mediterráneo también resulta de gran relevancia. En ese contexto, los proyectos de energías renovables, el Plan Solar, la descontaminación del Mediterráneo, así como una gestión del agua adecuada, unas infraestructuras comunes a toda la región, que hoy en día apenas si existen en el plano de los transportes marítimos y terrestres, cobran todo su sentido para una economía sostenible, de la que al final dependen todos los países ribereños.

Grosso modo, estos son los desafíos y limitaciones políticas realistas que afectan al espacio euro-mediterráneo, sin cerrar la visión de largo plazo que es aquella que debemos preservar.

De cara a la presidencia, los grandes desafíos serían precisamente trabajar por parte de la Unión Europea con la Administración norteamericana y con las partes, con la Liga Árabe, con Israel, con los palestinos, para ese retorno a las negociaciones

RELATORÍA
COMPTE-RENDU
SUMMARY

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INTRODUCCIÓN

Este documento sintetiza las ponencias y debates del VIII Seminario Internacional Seguridad y Defensa en el Mediterráneo, celebrado en Barcelona el día 26 de octubre de 2009. Este seminario, organizado anualmente por CIDOB y el Ministerio de Defensa tiene como objetivo aumentar la transparencia y la confianza entre representantes gubernamentales y expertos, civiles y militares, de ambas orillas del Mediterráneo.

En esta edición, celebrada en el Palacio de Pedralbes, se analizaron nuevos escenarios de cooperación en materia de seguridad y defensa. En primer lugar, se planteó una apertura conceptual analizando el desafío de la seguridad humana en el mundo árabe. En segundo lugar, se abordó el papel del Mediterráneo y de Oriente Medio en el diálogo transatlántico analizando si había voluntad de coordinación a ambas orillas del Atlántico y sus repercusiones en la región mediterránea. En tercer lugar, se debatió en el marco de grupos de trabajo, cómo mejorar la coordinación y la implicación de todos los países del espacio euromediterráneo en sectores como la seguridad marítima, la protección civil y las misiones de gestión de crisis. En cuarto y último lugar, el seminario se clausuró con una mirada al futuro inmediato, presentando cómo se está preparando la agenda mediterránea de la Presidencia española de la UE (primer semestre de 2010).

El Seminario fue inaugurado por el presidente de CIDOB, Narcís Serra, quien destacó que estos seminarios son una invitación al análisis, a la reflexión y a la acción. Serra reconoció que los debates en materia de seguridad en el Mediterráneo se ven contaminados por el conflicto árabe-israelí, pero que es importante sentar las bases para una mayor cooperación en este ámbito. A continuación, Luis Cuesta, Secretario General de Política de Defensa, subrayó que este foro se ha ido convirtiendo en una cita ineludible, que en el Mediterráneo se abren oportunidades para la cooperación y que España intentará impulsar esta agenda en los próximos años, convocando, por ejemplo, una reunión de Ministros de Defensa de la UE junto a sus homólogos magrebíes. El Secretario de Estado de Política de Defensa de Suecia, Hakan Jevrell,

señaló que se pueden conseguir avances en los ámbitos sectoriales escogidos para este seminario: seguridad marítima, protección civil y misiones de gestión de crisis y sugirió que algunas experiencias llevadas a cabo en el mar Báltico en el ámbito de la seguridad marítima pueden replicarse en el Mediterráneo.

LA SEGURIDAD HUMANA

Narcís Serra subrayó que CIDOB ha hecho de la seguridad humana un vector decisivo de sus trabajos. Comentó, asimismo, que la doctrina de seguridad humana ha ido incorporándose en la aproximación de la Unión Europea, citando el ejemplo de la inclusión de la responsabilidad de proteger en la reciente revisión de la Estrategia Europea de Seguridad de 2008.

Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid, experto egipcio en cuestiones de desarrollo, impartió una conferencia sobre el reto de la seguridad humana en el mundo árabe. Al Sayyid resumió los orígenes y dimensiones de un concepto que sitúa la persona como el objeto primordial a proteger y que se basa en garantizar la supervivencia y autonomía del individuo. Señaló que el grado y el tipo de inseguridad sufrida por los ciudadanos varían de un país a otro. Mientras que en algunos casos, la amenaza puede ser la ausencia de productos básicos para la supervivencia (fenómeno agravado generalmente por la degradación ambiental), en otros, la violencia puede provenir de una agresión y ocupación externa o de la represión ejercida por regímenes autoritarios. Al-Sayyid subrayó que la manera de hacer compatible la seguridad y el desarrollo debe adaptarse a las realidades concretas y subrayó, en el caso del mundo árabe, las consecuencias negativas que han tenido los intentos de imponer la democracia por la fuerza, así como la necesidad de contar con los actores sociales. Para este experto egipcio, avanzar en el ámbito de la seguridad humana es la mejor garantía de conseguir paz y desarrollo para la región, recordando que sin seguridad humana no hay seguridad para los estados y, que si está en peligro la seguridad del estado, también lo está la de sus ciudadanos.

UNA OPORTUNIDAD DE COOPERACIÓN TRANSATLÁNTICA

Carlos Westendorp, asesor del grupo de reflexión sobre la UE y con una larga trayectoria diplomática (antiguo ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y embajador en Washington), moderó una mesa redonda en la que se presentaron aproximaciones distintas sobre el Mediterráneo y Oriente Medio en el diálogo transatlántico. El conflicto árabe-israelí y el impacto del cambio político en los Estados Unidos centraron buena parte de las intervenciones.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, director del Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad de la Unión Europea, comenzó su intervención con una referencia hacia el pesimismo que existe en algunas visiones europeas y americanas sobre la política exterior, una política siempre guiada por el interés de los más poderosos y en donde ningún elemento parece cambiar. En cambio, según Vasconcelos, el factor Obama demuestra que las cosas pueden cambiar. Con Obama, el planteamiento se acerca al planteamiento euro-

peo, es decir, los desafíos globales son vistos como una vía para acercar a las personas. A partir de este planteamiento, Vasconcelos propuso un multilateralismo efectivo, generando un sistema que no esté basado únicamente en el clásico equilibrio de fuerzas. Vivimos en un mundo en el que la alianza entre dos poderes no es suficiente. Necesitamos al otro y no a través del uso de la fuerza, sino de la diplomacia, del compromiso. En este sentido, Vasconcelos recordó la importancia central que ha acordado Obama a la región del Mediterráneo (extendida a Irán y a Afganistán); hecho que quedó patente cuando Obama decidió realizar su primera llamada al presidente de la Autoridad Palestina, Mahmoud Abbas, o con su discurso pronunciado en el Cairo.

Vasconcelos recalcó que tanto Europa como Estados Unidos se necesitan mutuamente. Para Estados Unidos, Europa es esencial en cuestiones como el desarme o el apoyo en Afganistán. Para Europa, Estados Unidos se revela de gran importancia en asuntos como el cambio climático, la política de vecindad y Oriente Medio. Vasconcelos concluyó su intervención resaltando que la Administración de Obama es una oportunidad pero que su presidencia no será eterna y su actuación no puede ser en solitario. En Oriente Medio, Europa necesita hacer lo que Obama no puede, por ejemplo trabando una coalición con los países árabes para apoyar la política exterior de Obama.

Brian Lisko, capitán de fragata de los Estados Unidos, hizo una intervención más técnica. Explicó durante su intervención el funcionamiento de la guardia costera de Estados Unidos y su papel en el ámbito de la seguridad marítima, de la salvaguarda marítima, de la movilidad marítima, de la protección de los recursos naturales y de la defensa nacional. Resaltó la capacidad camaleónica de estas fuerzas para operar tanto en operaciones militares como civiles. Asimismo, subrayó su capacidad para garantizar que se aplicara la ley, especialmente relevante para la pesca y la seguridad portuaria. Por otro lado, realizó un balance de las operaciones internacionales que habían llevado a cabo en la lucha contra el tráfico de drogas o el tráfico ilegal de inmigrantes.

En cuanto al Mediterráneo, Lisko señaló las iniciativas que habían impulsado, entre las que figuraba el Instituto Internacional de Derecho Marítimo de la Organización Marítima Internacional (IMLI), el Foro de guardacostas del Mediterráneo o la Iniciativa de Seguridad contra la Proliferación. Por último, Lisko recordó que los desafíos regionales y globales requieren colaboración regional y global y que la guardia costera, gracias a su equipamiento y capacidades marítimas, desempeñan un papel importante en dicho intento por mejorar la estabilidad regional.

David Hacham, consejero en asuntos árabes en el Ministerio de Defensa de Israel, ofreció una ponencia destinada a aclarar su política exterior en relación a Palestina. Entre otros aspectos señaló que el Estado de Israel se mostraba partidario a aceptar la solución de dos Estados, a entrar en negociaciones con representantes legales y a hablar sobre los refugiados posteriores a 1968, sobre los asentamientos y sobre Jerusalén y recordó que Israel se había retirado de la franja de Gaza. Sin embargo, subrayó que actualmente el principal obstáculo para la paz no es Israel sino los actores palestinos y sus fracturas internas. Unas facciones con conexiones internacionales como, según él, se evidenciaría con los vínculos entre Hamas e Irán.

En relación al diálogo transatlántico, Hacham comentó que para Israel, las relaciones con la OTAN son de alta importancia, se conciben como una plataforma para ofrecer una respuesta común a las amenazas y los desafíos, en la que se ha venido produciendo una convergencia de intereses entre las dos partes. Sin embargo, Hacham recalcó que a pesar de las décadas de cooperación con la OTAN, todavía no existe la suficiente cooperación para hacer frente tanto a los desafíos estratégicos como a la amenaza que representa Irán, el terrorismo y la proliferación en la región. En último lugar y a colación con lo anterior, el ponente propondría unas pautas para mejorar la relación y la cooperación entre la OTAN e Israel. Para ello, resulta clave la transferencia de conocimientos y que no se pierda de vista la falta de estabilidad política en la región, el fortalecimiento del Islamismo radical, el terrorismo, la amenaza potencial por los recursos petroleros y las amenazas que afectan no sólo a Israel, sino a la Unión Europea y a la OTAN.

Yilmaz Aklar, investigador del *think-tank* turco TEPAV, realizó un repaso hacia cuestiones que suscitan gran interés dentro de la cooperación transatlántica como son los escenarios regionales y globales, las amenazas y riesgos, el triángulo Naciones Unidas, OTAN y Política Europea de Seguridad y Defensa, la percepción de la nueva Administración norteamericana y Europa en la cuenca del Mediterráneo, la importancia y el papel de Turquía en las relaciones transatlánticas y la seguridad en el Mediterráneo. Aklar planteó un ejercicio prospectivo, a diez años vista. De dicho análisis se desprende la importancia de fortalecer la estructura de las relaciones transatlánticas en aras de lograr un mundo de paz y seguridad.

En cuanto a Turquía se refiere, pidió a los líderes europeos que fueran más sinceros y predictivos en cuanto a la inclusión de Turquía en sus estructuras. La elevada experiencia y el posicionamiento clave de Turquía en el Mediterráneo y Oriente Medio no deben obviarse y dejar a Turquía de lado no producirá resultados positivos. De cara a 2020, su percepción fue optimista; visualizando una Turquía que enfatiza y ha consolidado los valores democráticos, las libertades y el Estado de Derecho, una Turquía que ha emprendido el camino hacia la modernidad. En cuanto a las relaciones entre Turquía y Estados Unidos se refiere, aconsejó que se reemplace el actual “dar y tomar” por una relación asentada sobre una cooperación más productiva. Para cerrar su intervención, Aklar señaló como elementos a considerar la configuración de Asia como un nuevo centro de gravedad y el papel estratégico que está adquiriendo la energía, cada vez más relevante.

John Bell, director del programa de Oriente Medio en el Centro Internacional Toledo para la Paz y antiguo diplomático en Naciones Unidas y en Canadá, centró su intervención en Oriente Medio. Comenzó su presentación lanzando la propuesta de una tercera fuerza de estabilización en Oriente Medio, necesaria por el hecho de que existen Estados débiles en la región. En segundo lugar, recordó que actualmente nos encontramos ante nuevas condiciones políticas para las que el margen de error es enorme, como bien lo demuestra la delicada situación en Jerusalén. En último lugar, señaló que Europa deberá ejercer un papel de mayor responsabilidad.

Bell, a diferencia de Hacham, afirmó que la OTAN no debiera ser el paraguas de la protección de las partes sino que ésta debería producirse a

través de un acuerdo entre las partes (condición *sine qua non* en Oriente Medio), en el que incluso se vieran implicados los actores no estatales. En último lugar, haciendo una proyección hacia el futuro, Bell incidió también en la idea de apostar por un multilateralismo efectivo, con una mayor participación estadounidense en los altos del Golán y una mayor participación europea en Gaza. En este escenario, considera que Turquía puede desempeñar un papel clave, que Europa debería intensificar su implicación en la región y que Obama, cuyas intenciones son buenas, debería reexaminar algunos aspectos de su política exterior.

COOPERACIÓN SECTORIAL

Los participantes del seminario se dividieron en tres grupos de trabajo en los que se debatieron las posibilidades de colaboración en ámbitos concretos como la seguridad marítima, la protección civil y las misiones de gestión de crisis. En cada uno de estos grupos pudimos contar con actores que tienen o han tenido responsabilidades importantes en dichos ámbitos, así como con expertos de reconocido prestigio. Las discusiones en cada uno de los grupos de trabajo se llevaron a cabo siguiendo las normas de "Chatham House" y, por consiguiente, a continuación sólo se presentan las conclusiones que los moderadores de los grupos realizaron en plenario.

El grupo de seguridad marítima subrayó la importancia del mar como factor geoestratégico. Este grupo de trabajo mantuvo de forma consensuada la importancia de recurrir a la solución regional y no funcional a la hora de afrontar los desafíos en materia de seguridad marítima. Entre estos problemas, se subrayó, por ejemplo, el riesgo de desarrollo de la piratería y la enorme función que pueden desarrollar las fuerzas navales. Por otro lado, se enfatizó la necesidad de mejorar la cooperación y la capacidad de hacer frente a los problemas y desafíos comunes. Asimismo, se señaló que resultaba indispensable compartir la información y volcarse en los países de la ribera sur del Mediterráneo. En último lugar, si bien se consideró que la Unión para el Mediterráneo podía resultar un espacio para la cooperación en materia de seguridad marítima, también se remarcó que es necesario mirar con atención las acciones que pueda desarrollar la UE, así como la aplicación del tratado de Lisboa.

Por su parte, el grupo de protección civil subrayó la necesidad de reforzar la cooperación tanto por razones objetivas como por razones subjetivas. Como razones objetivas se apuntaron los elementos de vulnerabilidad frente a desastres naturales de todo tipo a los que están expuestos los países de la cuenca mediterránea. Entre las razones subjetivas destacaba la importancia de la cooperación como mecanismo para exportar confianza y estabilidad. Asimismo, se recalcó que los proyectos en protección civil existen y que prestan cada vez más atención a la prevención. No obstante, aún existe la necesidad de fomentar la cooperación con dinámicas de trabajo conjunto. Además, la financiación necesita ser consolidada y se precisa una cierta armonización del concepto de protección civil, vinculado todavía en algunos países al concepto bélico. Por último lugar, se resaltó que las fuerzas armadas desempeñan un papel instrumental en el ámbito de la protección civil, en la prevención y en la rehabilitación del post-conflicto.

En cuanto al grupo de misiones de gestión de crisis, se recordó que en el ámbito Mediterráneo hay experiencias como FINUL que nos permiten extraer lecciones. Asimismo, hay elementos recientes como la convergencia euroatlántica, el lanzamiento de la UpM o el desarrollo de la PESD que influyen en la definición y puesta en marcha de misiones de gestión de crisis. A modo de conclusión se estableció que es demasiado pronto para generar una cooperación amplia en materia de misiones de gestión de crisis. Se destacó la falta de cooperación de los países del Sur en el marco UE-OTAN, el hecho de que ni los países de la ribera sur ni los países de la UE hubieran liderado un proyecto de envergadura y se señaló la necesidad de recuperar el ámbito de la OSCE y la importancia de aprovechar las nuevas puertas para actuar desde un punto de vista pragmático por una solución del conflicto árabe-israelí.

CONCLUSIONES: HORIZONTE 2010

Finalizadas las ponencias y los grupos de trabajo, el Seminario llegó a su clausura con la mesa de conclusiones. En calidad de moderador intervino Ballesteros, director del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. Su intervención señaló la importancia del mediterráneo, espacio con riesgos y amenazas innegables como el crimen organizado o el terrorismo, y cuyas soluciones pasan por integrar el Este con el Oeste y el Norte con el Sur; soluciones que no necesariamente presentan puntos coincidentes. Como ejemplo citó la iniciativa 5+5 o el Diálogo Mediterráneo de la OTAN. Ballesteros apuntó que dichas iniciativas son foros de cooperación complementarios, que facilitan el entendimiento y la colaboración.

Eduard Soler, coordinador del Programa Mediterráneo y Oriente Medio de CIDOB, expuso que a lo largo de este seminario se pudo comprobar la centralidad del conflicto árabe-israelí cuando se intentan plantear nuevos escenarios de cooperación en materia de seguridad en la cuenca mediterránea. Con todo, Soler señaló que de cara al futuro se han abierto oportunidades para una cooperación transatlántica más potente que a su vez tenga en cuenta las visiones y prioridades de nuevas potencias emergentes. Subrayó la existencia de una demanda de más Europa en muchos campos y también en el de la seguridad. Destacó, asimismo, que un aspecto repetido a lo largo de este seminario es el papel creciente de Turquía, tanto en el plano transatlántico como en la evolución de Oriente Medio.

En último lugar, Fidel Sendagorta, Director General para el Mediterráneo, Magreb y Oriente Próximo, del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, cerró el seminario con un análisis de la situación actual y una proyección hacia la presidencia española de la UE. El balance no fue alentador, recordando que empezamos el año con la crisis de Gaza y la consecuente paralización de la UpM hasta muy avanzada la primavera y que, aún ahora, siguen creando graves dificultades.

Sendagorta coincidió en señalar la importancia del conflicto árabe-israelí como factor de desestabilización y apuntó que si alguno creyó alguna vez en una despolitización del partenariado euromediterráneo, ello fue producto de una ilusión. Por ese motivo, existe hoy en día mayor presión y convencimiento de que si se deja pasar hoy una solución al conflicto árabe-israelí, quizás mañana sea demasiado tarde. Con todo, la UpM

podría ser una baza importante para recuperar un diálogo en la dimensión regional. En cuanto a la situación en Oriente Medio, Sendagorta señaló, aparte del ya mencionado conflicto árabe-israelí, la cuestión nuclear en Irán, el retorno a la plena soberanía en Irak, la superación del aislamiento internacional de Siria, la estabilización del Líbano y el reposicionamiento diplomático de Turquía. Asimismo, mencionó el nuevo factor externo, esto es, la Administración Obama y su nueva relación con el mundo árabe. Subrayó que si bien no ha conseguido mucho en sus primeros intentos de negociación, tiene férrea determinación para conseguir avances hacia la paz en la región.

Ante todas estas cuestiones se plantea la Presidencia española de la UE como una contribución a la paz, la estabilidad y el diálogo. España se implicará para que se retomen las conversaciones de paz y para que se consolide la reforma institucional de la UpM. Por último, realizó un recorrido por las prioridades de la agenda global que pueden tener una traducción en el Mediterráneo. Entre otros temas mencionó la crisis económica y el cambio climático, con cuestiones de vital importancia como la descontaminación del mar Mediterráneo, la economía sostenible y la correcta gestión del agua.

COMPTE-RENDU DU 8^{ÈME} SÉMINAIRE INTERNATIONAL SÉCURITÉ ET DÉFENSE EN MÉDITERRANÉE: NOUVEAUX SCÉNARIOS POUR LA COOPÉRATION

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INTRODUCTION

Le but de ce document est de faire la synthèse des exposés et des débats du VIII Séminaire International Sécurité et Défense en Méditerranée qui a eu lieu à Barcelone, le 26 octobre 2009. Ce séminaire, organisé tous les ans depuis 2002 par la Fondation CIDOB et le Ministère de la Défense d'Espagne, vise à renforcer la transparence et la confiance entre représentants gouvernementaux et experts, aussi bien civils que militaires, des deux rives de la Méditerranée.

Cette édition, tenue au Palais de Pedralbes, a analysé les nouveaux contextes de coopération en matière de sécurité et défense. Premièrement, une ouverture conceptuelle a été adressée en analysant le défi de la sécurité humaine dans le monde arabe. Deuxièmement, le rôle de la Méditerranée et du Moyen-Orient dans le dialogue transatlantique a été l'objet de débat en analysant la volonté de coordination aux deux rives de l'Atlantique et les répercussions dans la région méditerranéenne. Troisièmement, les groupes de travail ont débattu comment améliorer la coordination et l'implication de tous les pays de l'espace euro-méditerranéen dans des secteurs tels que la sécurité maritime, la protection civile et les missions de gestion de crises. Quatrièmement, et pour terminer, le séminaire a mis point final en regardant vers le futur immédiat, pour présenter comment la Présidence espagnole de l'UE (premier semestre de 2010) prépare l'agenda méditerranéen.

Le Séminaire a été inauguré par le président de CIDOB, M. Narcís Serra, qui a souligné que ces séminaires sont une invitation à l'analyse, la réflexion et l'action. M. Serra a reconnu que les débats en matière de sécurité en Méditerranée sont contaminés par le conflit israélo-arabe, mais qu'il est important de jeter les bases pour une coopération renforcée dans ce domaine. Ensuite, M. Luis Cuesta, Secrétaire général de politique de la défense, a souligné que ce forum est devenu un rendez-vous incontournable, que de nouvelles opportunités de coopération s'ouvrent en Méditerranée et qu'Espagne s'efforcera à impulser cet agenda dans les prochaines années, en réunissant, par exemple, les Ministres de la défense de l'UE et leurs homologues maghrébins. Le Secrétaire

d'état pour la politique de défense de Suède, M. Hakan Jevrell, a signalé qu'il est possible d'avancer dans les domaines spécifiques choisis pour ce séminaire : sécurité maritime, protection civile et missions de gestion de crises, tout en suggérant que certaines expériences réalisées dans la mer Baltique en matière de sécurité maritime pourraient être reprises dans la Méditerranée.

LA SÉCURITÉ HUMAINE

M. Narcís Serra a souligné que la sécurité humaine est devenue un vecteur décisif des travaux de CIDOB. Il a également exposé que la doctrine de sécurité humaine a été progressivement incorporée à l'approche de l'Union européenne, en citant l'exemple de l'inclusion de la responsabilité de protéger dans la dernière révision de la Stratégie européenne de sécurité de 2008.

M. Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid, expert égyptien en matière de développement, a prononcé une conférence sur le défi de la sécurité humaine dans le monde arabe. M. Al Sayyid a résumé les origines et les dimensions d'un concept plaçant la personne comme l'objectif primordial à protéger et basé sur la garantie de la survie et l'autonomie de l'individu. Il a signalé que le degré et le type d'insécurité subie par les citoyens varient d'un pays à l'autre. Tandis que dans certains cas, la menace peut venir de l'absence de produits essentiels pour la survie (un phénomène qui s'aggrave en général à cause de la dégradation de l'environnement), dans d'autres cas, la violence peut avoir son origine dans l'agression et l'occupation externe ou la répression exercée par des régimes autoritaires. M. Al-Sayyid a souligné que la manière de réconcilier la sécurité et le développement doit s'adapter aux réalités concrètes, tout en soulignant, en ce qui a trait au monde arabe, les conséquences négatives résultant des tentatives d'imposer la démocratie par la force, ainsi que la nécessité de compter sur les acteurs sociaux. Pour cet expert égyptien, avancer dans le domaine de la sécurité humaine constitue la meilleure garantie d'atteindre la paix et le développement pour la région, en rappelant que sans sécurité humaine il n'y a point de sécurité pour les états et que, tant que la sécurité de l'état est menacée, celle de ses citoyens le sera aussi.

UNE OPPORTUNITÉ DE COOPÉRATION TRANSATLANTIQUE

M. Carlos Westendorp, conseiller du Groupe de réflexion sur l'UE et avec une longue trajectoire diplomatique (ancien Ministre des affaires étrangères et ambassadeur à Washington) a modéré la table ronde au cours de laquelle des approches différentes sur la Méditerranée et le Moyen-Orient dans le dialogue transatlantique ont été présentées. Le conflit israélo-arabe et l'impact du changement politique aux Etats-Unis ont été le centre d'une partie importante des interventions.

M. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Directeur de l'Institut d'études de sécurité de l'Union européenne, a ouvert son intervention avec une référence au pessimisme existant dans certaines visions européennes et américaines sur la politique extérieure, une politique toujours guidée par les intérêts

des plus puissants et où aucun élément ne semble être sur le point de changer. En revanche, d'après M. Vasconcelos, le facteur Obama montre que les choses peuvent changer. La perspective d'Obama est plus proche de la vision européenne, c'est-à-dire, les défis mondiaux sont perçus comme une voie pour rapprocher les personnes. À partir de cet exposé, M. Vasconcelos a proposé un multilatéralisme effectif, pour engendrer un système qui ne soit pas basé exclusivement sur l'équilibre classique de forces. Dans le monde dans lequel nous vivons, l'alliance entre deux puissances n'est pas suffisante. Nous avons besoin de l'autre et non pas en utilisant la force, mais plutôt la diplomatie, le compromis. Dans ce sens-là, M. Vasconcelos a rappelé l'importance capitale qu'Obama a accordée à la région méditerranéenne (extensive à Iran et Afghanistan), comme le prouve le fait qu'Obama ait décidé de faire son premier appel au président de l'Autorité Palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas, ou de prononcer son premier discours au Caire.

M. Vasconcelos a souligné qu'aussi bien l'Europe que les États-Unis ont besoin l'une de l'autre. Pour les États-Unis, l'Europe est essentielle dans des questions comme le désarmement ou le soutien en Afghanistan. Pour l'Europe, les États-Unis ont une grande importance dans des matières comme le changement climatique, la politique de voisinage et le Moyen-Orient. M. Vasconcelos a conclu son intervention en soulignant que l'Administration Obama constitue une opportunité ; néanmoins, sa présidence ne sera pas éternelle et il ne peut pas agir tout seul. Au Moyen-Orient, l'Europe doit faire ce qu'Obama ne peut pas faire, par exemple, en établissant une coalition avec les pays arabes pour soutenir la politique étrangère d'Obama.

M. Brian Lisko, capitaine de frégate des États-Unis, a fait un exposé plus technique. Lors de son intervention, il a expliqué le fonctionnement de la garde côtière des États-Unis et son rôle dans le domaine de la sécurité maritime, de la sauvegarde maritime, de la mobilité maritime, de la protection des ressources naturelles et de la défense nationale. Il a souligné la capacité d'adaptation de ces forces pour agir au sein d'opérations aussi bien militaires que civiles. Il a également souligné leur capacité pour garantir l'application de la loi, un élément particulièrement important pour la pêche et la sécurité portuaire. D'autre part, il a fait bilan des opérations internationales menées dans la lutte contre le trafic de drogues ou le trafic illégal d'immigrants.

En ce qui concerne la Méditerranée, M. Lisko a signalé les initiatives lancées, y compris l'Institut de droit maritime international de l'Organisation maritime internationale (IMLI), le Forum de gardes-côtes de la Méditerranée ou l'Initiative de sécurité contre la prolifération. Finalement, M. Lisko a rappelé que les défis régionaux et mondiaux exigent la collaboration régionale et mondiale, et que les gardes-côtes, en raison de leur équipement et leurs capacités maritimes, jouent un rôle important dans cette tentative d'améliorer la stabilité régionale.

M. David Hacham, conseiller aux affaires arabes au Ministère de la défense d'Israël, a présenté un exposé visant à expliquer la politique étrangère de son pays par rapport à la Palestine. Parmi d'autres aspects, il a signalé que l'État d'Israël se montre favorable à l'acceptation de la solution de deux États, à entamer de négociations avec des représentants légaux et à parler sur les réfugiés d'après 1968, sur les implantations et sur Jérusalem

et il a rappelé qu'Israël s'était retiré de la bande de Gaza. Il a cependant souligné qu'à l'heure actuelle le principal obstacle à la paix n'est pas Israël mais les acteurs palestiniens et leurs fractures internes, certaines factions ayant des connexions internationales, tel que le prouveraient, à son avis, les liens entre Hamas et Iran.

En relation avec le dialogue transatlantique, M. Hacham a exposé que, pour Israël, les relations avec l'OTAN sont très importantes, étant conçues comme une plateforme pouvant fournir une réponse commune aux menaces et aux défis, et dans laquelle il s'est produit une convergence d'intérêts entre les deux parties. Cependant, M. Hacham a souligné que, malgré les décennies de coopération avec l'OTAN, il n'existe pas encore une coopération suffisante pour faire face aussi bien aux défis stratégiques qu'aux menaces représentées par Iran, le terrorisme et la prolifération dans la région. Pour terminer, et en relation avec les points précédents, M. Hacham a proposé des mesures pour améliorer la relation et la coopération entre l'OTAN et Israël. Pour ce faire, il est essentiel de procéder au transfert de connaissances et ne pas perdre de vue l'absence de stabilité politique dans la région, le renforcement de l'islamisme radical, le terrorisme, la menace potentielle pour les ressources pétrolières et les menaces qui ont un impact non seulement sur Israël mais aussi sur l'Union Européenne et l'OTAN.

M. Yilmaz Aklar, chercheur du *think-tank* turc TEPAV, a révisé les questions qui suscitent un grand intérêt pour la coopération transatlantique, tels que les scènes régionales et mondiales, les menaces et les risques, le triangle Nations Unies, OTAN et Politique européenne de sécurité et défense, la perception de la nouvelle Administration américaine et de l'Europe au bassin méditerranéen, l'importance et le rôle de la Turquie dans les relations transatlantiques et la sécurité en Méditerranée. M. Aklar a envisagé un exercice prospectif avec une perspective de dix ans. De cette analyse découle l'importance de renforcer la structure des relations transatlantiques afin d'atteindre un monde de paix et de sécurité.

En ce qui concerne la Turquie, il a demandé aux leaders européens d'être plus sincères et prédictifs pour ce qui a trait à l'inclusion de Turquie dans leurs structures. La large expérience et le positionnement clé de la Turquie en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient ne doivent pas être ignorés, et la laisser de côté ne conduira pas à des résultats positifs. À l'horizon 2020, sa perception a été optimiste, en visualisant une Turquie qui met l'accent et a consolidé les valeurs démocratiques, les libertés et l'État de droit, une Turquie qui a entrepris la voie vers la modernité. En ce qui concerne les relations entre la Turquie et les Etats-Unis, il a conseillé de remplacer la relation actuelle de « donner et prendre » par une relation basée sur une coopération plus productive. Pour terminer son intervention, M. Aklar a signalé, comme éléments à considérer, la configuration de l'Asie en tant que nouveau centre de gravité et le rôle stratégique que l'énergie, un facteur de plus en plus important, est en train d'assumer.

M. John Bell, directeur du programme Moyen-Orient du Centre international de Tolède pour la paix et ancien diplomate aux Nations Unies et au Canada, a centré son intervention sur le Moyen-Orient. Il a commencé sa présentation en lançant la proposition d'une troisième force de stabilisation au Moyen-Orient, nécessaire car il existe des États fragiles

dans cette région. Deuxièmement, il a rappelé que nous nous trouvons actuellement face à de nouvelles conditions politiques dans lesquelles la marge d'erreur est énorme, comme le prouve la situation délicate à Jérusalem. Pour terminer, il a signalé que l'Europe devrait exercer un rôle de plus grande responsabilité.

Contrairement à M. Hacham, M. Bell a soutenu que l'OTAN ne devrait pas être le parapluie de la protection des parties, mais que celle-ci devrait se produire à travers un accord entre les parties (condition *sine qua non* au Moyen-Orient), où même les acteurs non étatiques seraient impliqués. Finalement, en faisant une projection vers le futur, M. Bell a également insisté sur l'idée de parier pour un multilatéralisme effectif, avec une plus grande participation des Etats-Unis sur le Golan et une plus grande participation européenne à Gaza. A partir de cette scène, il considère que la Turquie peut jouer un rôle clé, que l'Europe devrait intensifier son implication dans la région et qu'Obama, dont les intentions sont bonnes, devrait réexaminer certains aspects de sa politique extérieure.

COOPÉRATION SECTORIALE

Les participants au séminaire se sont divisés en trois groupes de travail pour discuter sur les possibilités de collaboration dans des domaines spécifiques, tels que la sécurité maritime, la protection civile et les missions de gestion de crises. Dans chacun de ces groupes nous avons pu compter sur des acteurs qui ont ou qui ont eu des responsabilités importantes dans ces domaines, ainsi que sur des experts de prestige. Les discussions au sein de chacun des groupes de travail se sont déroulées en suivant les normes de « Chatham House » et, par conséquent, les conclusions seulement rapportent ce que les modérateurs des groupes ont fait en séance plénière.

Le groupe de sécurité maritime a souligné l'importance de la mer comme facteur stratégique. Ce groupe de travail a soutenu de manière consensuelle l'importance de chercher une solution régionale et non pas fonctionnelle pour faire face aux défis en matière de sécurité maritime. Parmi ces problèmes, le risque de développement de la piraterie et la fonction extrêmement importante que les forces navales peuvent avoir ont été soulignés. D'autre part, l'accent a été mis sur la nécessité d'améliorer la coopération et la capacité de faire face aux problèmes et aux défis communs. Il a également été signalé qu'il est indispensable de partager l'information et de se consacrer pleinement à la rive sud de la Méditerranée. Finalement, tout en considérant que l'Union pour la Méditerranée pourrait représenter un espace pour la coopération en matière de sécurité maritime, il a également été souligné qu'il convient d'observer attentivement les actions que l'UE peut développer, ainsi que l'application du Traité de Lisbonne.

Pour sa part, le groupe de protection civile a souligné la nécessité de renforcer la coopération aussi bien pour des raisons objectives que pour des raisons subjectives. Les éléments de vulnérabilité face aux désastres naturels de tout type auxquels sont exposés les pays du bassin méditerranéen ont été signalés comme raisons objectives. Parmi les raisons subjectives, l'importance de la coopération comme mécanisme

pour exporter la confiance et la stabilité a été mise en relief. Il a aussi été souligné que les projets en matière de protection civile existent et qu'ils prêtent une attention croissante à la prévention. Cependant, il existe encore la nécessité de promouvoir la coopération avec des dynamiques de travail en commun. D'autre part, le financement doit être consolidé et une certaine harmonisation du concept de protection civile, associé encore dans certains pays au concept de guerre, est nécessaire. Finalement, ce groupe a souligné que les forces armées jouent un rôle instrumental dans le domaine de la protection civile, dans la prévention et dans la réhabilitation après le conflit.

En ce qui concerne le groupe de missions de gestion de crises, celui-ci a rappelé que, dans le domaine de la Méditerranée, il y a des expériences comme FINUL qui nous permettent de tirer des conclusions. Des éléments plus récents, également, comme la convergence euro-atlantique, le lancement de l'UpM ou le développement de la PESD ont un impact sur la définition et la mise en marche de missions de gestion de crise. Pour conclure, le groupe a établi qu'il est trop tôt pour générer une coopération vaste en matière de missions de gestion de crises. L'absence de coopération des pays du Sud dans le contexte UE-OTAN, le fait que ni les pays de la rive sud ni les pays de l'UE n'aient pas été à la tête d'aucun projet d'une certaine envergure ont été soulignés, ainsi que la nécessité de récupérer le domaine de l'OSCE et l'importance de profiter des nouvelles portes pour agir à partir d'une perspective pragmatique afin de trouver une solution au conflit israélo-arabe.

CONCLUSIONS : HORIZON 2010

Une fois les exposés et les groupes de travail terminés, le Séminaire a été clôturé avec une table de conclusions. M. Ballesteros, directeur de l'Institut Espagnol d'Études Stratégiques, est intervenu comme modérateur. Son intervention a versé sur l'importance de la Méditerranée, espace présentant des risques et des menaces incontestables, tels que le crime organisé ou le terrorisme, et dont les solutions dépendent de l'intégration Est-Ouest et Nord-Sud ; des solutions qui ne présentent pas nécessairement des points coïncidents. Il a cité à titre d'exemple l'initiative 5+5 ou le Dialogue méditerranéen de l'OTAN. M. Ballesteros a signalé que ces initiatives représentent des forums de coopération complémentaires qui facilitent la compréhension et la collaboration.

M. Eduard Soler, coordinateur du Programme Méditerranée et Moyen-Orient du CIDOB, a exposé que le séminaire a permis de vérifier la centralité du conflit israélo-arabe lorsque de nouvelles scènes de coopération en matière de sécurité dans le bassin méditerranéen sont envisagées. Malgré tout, M. Soler a soutenu que, face au futur, de nouvelles opportunités sont ouvertes pour une coopération transatlantique plus puissante qui tienne compte également des visions et des priorités des nouvelles puissances émergentes. Il a souligné l'existence d'une demande pour une Europe plus présente dans de nombreux domaines, y compris celui de la sécurité. Il a souligné, également, qu'un aspect répété tout au long de ce séminaire est le rôle croissant de la Turquie, aussi bien sur le plan transatlantique qu'en ce qui concerne l'évolution au Moyen-Orient.

Finalement, M. Fidel Sendagorta, Directeur général pour la Méditerranée, le Maghreb et le Prochain Orient, du Ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération, a fermé le séminaire avec une analyse de la situation actuelle et une projection vers la présidence espagnole de l'UE. Le bilan n'a pas été prometteur, en rappelant que nous avons commencé cette année avec la crise de Gaza et la paralysie résultante de l'UpM jusqu'à presque la fin du printemps et que, même maintenant, de graves difficultés persistent.

M. Sendagorta a aussi signalé l'importance du conflit israélo-arabe comme facteur de déstabilisation et il a fait remarquer que si quelqu'un a jamais cru à une dépolitisation du partenariat euro-méditerranéen, cela n'était que le produit d'une illusion. Pour cette raison il existe aujourd'hui une plus grande pression et une plus grande conviction sur le fait que, si nous laissons passer maintenant une solution au conflit israélo-arabe, demain ce sera peut-être trop tard. L'UpM pourrait quand même être un atout important pour récupérer un dialogue dans la dimension régionale. En ce qui concerne la situation au Moyen-Orient, M. Sendagorta a signalé, outre le conflit israélo-arabe déjà mentionné, la question nucléaire en Iran, le retour à la souveraineté pleine en Iraq, la résolution de l'isolement international de la Syrie, la stabilisation du Liban et le repositionnement diplomatique de Turquie. M. Sendagorta a également mentionné le nouveau facteur externe, c'est-à-dire, l'Administration Obama et sa nouvelle relation avec le monde arabe. Il a souligné que, bien qu'il n'ait pas eu de résultat tangible avec ses premières tentatives de négociation, il est fermement déterminé à avancer vers la paix dans la région.

Face à toutes ces questions, la Présidence espagnole de l'UE se présente comme une contribution à la paix, la stabilité et le dialogue. L'Espagne travaillera pour que les conversations de paix soient reprises et pour que la réforme institutionnelle de l'UpM soit consolidée. Finalement, il a parcouru les priorités de l'agenda mondial qui peuvent trouver une traduction en Méditerranée. Parmi d'autres thèmes, il a fait référence à la crise économique et au changement climatique, présentant des questions d'une importance capitale comme la décontamination de la mer Méditerranée, l'économie durable et la correcte gestion de l'eau.

SUMMARY OF THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: NEW SCENARIOS FOR COOPERATION

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INTRODUCTION

This document is a summary of the addresses and debates which took place at the 8th International Seminar on Security and Defence in the Mediterranean, held in Barcelona on 26 October 2002. The aim of the seminar, annually organised by CIDOB and the Ministry of Defence of Spain, is to increase transparency and trust between governmental representatives and experts – both civilians and members of the armed forces – from both shores of the Mediterranean.

In this edition, which was held at the Palace of Pedralbes, the participants analysed new scenarios for cooperation in the area of security and defence. The seminar opened with a conceptual analysis of the challenge of human security in the Arab world. The second topic for debate was the role of the Mediterranean and the Middle East in the transatlantic dialogue, analysing whether there is a desire for coordination on both sides of the Atlantic, and the impact on the Mediterranean region. The third subject for debate (organised in the format of working groups) was the way to improve the coordination and involvement of all the countries in the Euro-Mediterranean region in sectors such as maritime security, civil protection and crisis management missions. Fourthly and lastly, the seminar closed with a look to the immediate future, including an examination of the preparations of the Mediterranean agenda or Spain's EU Presidency in the first half of 2010.

The seminar was inaugurated by Narcís Serra, President of CIDOB, who affirmed that these seminars offer an invitation to analysis, reflection and action. Serra acknowledged that the debates on the issue of security in the Mediterranean are contaminated by the Arab-Israeli conflict, but that it was important to lay the foundations for greater cooperation in this field. The next speaker, Luis Cuesta, Secretary General for Defence Policy, declared that this forum was becoming an unmissable event, that opportunities for cooperation were emerging in the Mediterranean, and that Spain will attempt to push forward this agenda in the coming years, by organising, for instance, meetings between EU Defence Ministers and their Maghrebi counterparts. Hakan Jevrell, the Swedish Secretary

of State for Defence Policy, claimed that progress could be made in the sectorial fields selected for this particular seminar – maritime security, civil protection and crisis management missions – and he suggested that certain experiences implemented in the sphere of maritime security in the Baltic Sea could be reproduced in the Mediterranean.

HUMAN SECURITY

Narcís Serra stressed that CIDOB has made human security a top priority of its agenda. He mentioned, for example, that the doctrine of human security has been gradually incorporated into the European Union approach. As an example of this, he made reference to the inclusion of the responsibility to protect into the recent revision of the European Security Strategy in 2008.

Mustafa Kamel Al-Sayyid, an Egyptian expert on development issues, focused on the challenge of human security in the Arab world. Al-Sayyid summarised the origins and dimensions of the concept of humanisation and explained that this approach is based on guaranteeing individuals' survival and autonomy. He pointed out that the degree and type of insecurity from which citizens suffered varies from one country to the next. While in some cases, the threat might be a lack of basic elements for survival (a phenomenon generally aggravated by environmental degradation), in others, violence may derive from external aggression and occupation, or from repression by authoritarian regimes. Al-Sayyid stressed that all attempts to make security and development compatible must be adapted to specific realities, and he highlighted, in the case of the Arab world, the negative consequences produced by attempts to impose democracy by force, as well as the need to work with social actors. In the opinion of the Egyptian expert, making progress in the area of human security is the best guarantee to achieve peace and development in the region, and he added that if no human security exists, there can be no security for the State, and that if the security of the State is in danger, then the security of its citizens is also at risk.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

Carlos Westendorp, adviser of the European Union Reflection Group and with a long diplomatic career (former Minister of Foreign Affairs and ambassador to Washington), chaired a round table at which different approaches to the Mediterranean and Middle East in Transatlantic dialogue were presented. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the impact of political change in the United States were the subjects of many of the addresses and comments.

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, began his address by referring to the pessimism that is present in certain European and American views on foreign policy, a policy that (they say) is always guided by the interests of the most powerful, and in which none of the elements appear to change. In contrast, Vasconcelos claims that the Obama factor demonstrates that things can change. With Obama, the approach becomes closer to the European approach; that is to say, global challenges are seen as a way

to bring people together. Based on this approach, Vasconcelos proposed an effective multilateralism, to bring about a system that is not solely based on the classic balance of power. We live in a world in which the alliance between two powers is not enough. We need the others, and not through the use of force, but through diplomacy and agreement. In this respect, Vasconcelos highlighted that the Mediterranean region (extended to Iran and Afghanistan) is at the core of Obama concern; this became clear when Obama decided to make his first call to the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and his first speech in Cairo.

Vasconcelos stressed that Europe and the United States have a mutual need for each other. For the US, Europe is essential for issues such as disarmament and support in Afghanistan. For Europe, the United States becomes extremely important for issues such as climate change, the Neighbourhood Policy and the Middle East. Vasconcelos concluded his address pointing that the Obama administration represents an opportunity. Nevertheless, he reminded that his term of office would not go on forever, and that he could not act alone. In the Middle East, Europe needs to do what Obama cannot do, such as working to create a coalition with the Arab countries to support Obama's foreign policy.

Brian Lisko, Captain of a US frigate, gave a more technical address. He explained how the US Coast Guard service operates and its role in the sphere of maritime security, maritime defence, maritime mobility, the protection of natural resources and national defence. He highlighted the chameleon-like ability of these forces to operate seamlessly with both military and civil organisations. He also stressed their blend of law-enforcement capabilities, particularly important for fishing and port security. Furthermore, summarized the international operations that the Coast Guard service had carried out in the fight against drug trafficking and the illegal trafficking of immigrants.

With respect to the Mediterranean, Lisko exposed the initiatives that had been promoted, including the International Maritime Organization's International Maritime Law Institute (IMLI), the Mediterranean Coast Guard Forum and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Finally, Lisko noted that regional and global challenges require regional and global collaboration and that coast guards, thanks to their equipment and maritime capacities, play an important role in this attempt to improve regional stability.

David Hacham, adviser on Arab affairs to the Israeli Ministry of Defence, attempted to clarify his country's foreign policy regarding Palestine. Among the various points he made, he declared that the State of Israel was in favour of accepting the two-state solution, as well as of entering into negotiations with legal representatives, and discussing refugees since 1968, the settlements and Jerusalem. He also pointed out that Israel had withdrawn from the Gaza Strip. However, he stressed that the main obstacle to peace is not Israel, but the Palestinian actors and their internal fractures – factions with international connections (he claimed) as it would be proved afterwards with the links between Hamas and Iran.

With respect to the transatlantic dialogue, Hacham said that Israel considers relations with NATO to be of great importance; they are viewed as a platform for offering a common response to the threats and challenges in which a convergence of interests between the two parties has

taken place. However, Hacham stressed that despite decades of cooperation with NATO, there is still not enough cooperation to deal with the strategic challenges and the threats represented by Iran, terrorism and proliferation in the region. Finally, the speaker proposed a few guidelines for improving relations and cooperation between NATO and Israel. In this respect, he underlined that key issues to be tackled are: the transfer of knowledge, the lack of political stability in the region, the strengthening of radical Islamism, terrorism, the potential threat for oil resources and possible threats which affect not only Israel but also the European Union and NATO.

Yilmaz Aklar, researcher at the Turkish think-tank TEPAV, gave a summary of issues that are of great interest to transatlantic cooperation, such as regional and global scenarios, threats and risks, the triangle of United Nations, NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy, how the new US administration is perceived in the Mediterranean basin, Turkey's importance and role in transatlantic relations, and security in the Mediterranean. Aklar proposed a prospective analysis over the next decade. His analysis revealed the importance of strengthening the structure of transatlantic relations in order to achieve a secure and peaceful world.

As for Turkey, he called on European leaders to be more sincere and predictive with respect to Turkey's inclusion into their structures. Turkey's great experience and key position in the Mediterranean and Middle East should not be ignored, and leaving Turkey aside will not produce positive results. Looking toward 2020, his view was optimistic: he visualised a country that stresses and has consolidated democratic values, freedoms and the Rule of Law, a country that has set out on the path toward modernity. Concerning the relations between Turkey and the United States, he said that the current "give and take" approach should be replaced by a relationship based on more productive cooperation. Finally, Aklar mentioned as elements for consideration the configuration of Asia as a new centre of gravity and the strategic role being played by energy, which is increasingly important.

John Bell, Director of the Middle East programme at the Toledo International Centre for Peace and an ex-diplomat for United Nations and in Canada, based his address on the subject of the Middle East. He began his presentation claiming that a third force is required for stabilisation in the Middle East, due to the fact that there are weak states in the region. Secondly, he commented that we are currently facing new political conditions in which there is a huge margin of error, as the delicate situation in Jerusalem fully demonstrates. Finally he declared that Europe must play a role of greater responsibility.

Unlike Hacham, Bell claimed that NATO should not be the protective umbrella for the different parties, but that this should take place by means of an agreement between the parties (*a sine qua non* condition in the Middle East), in which even non-state actors are involved. Finally, and looking to the future, Bell also stressed the idea of an effective multilateralism with greater US participation in the Golan Heights and more European participation in Gaza. Within this scenario, he considered that Turkey could play a key role, that Europe should intensify its involvement in the region and that Obama, whose intentions are good, should re-examine certain aspects of his foreign policy.

SECTORIAL COOPERATION

The seminar participants divided up into three working groups in which they debated the possibilities of collaboration in the specific areas of maritime security, civil protection and crisis management missions. Each of these groups featured actors who currently have or have had important responsibilities in these areas, in addition to leading experts. The discussions in each of the working groups were carried out in accordance with Chatham House rules, and as a consequence, only the conclusions presented by the group chairmen will be exposed.

The maritime security working group stressed the importance of the sea as a geostrategic factor. The members of this group agreed on the importance of adopting a regional solution and not a functional one when it came to tackling the challenges of maritime security. It was also highlighted the risk of growing piracy and the huge role that naval forces could play. Moreover, participants stressed the need to improve cooperation and the capacity to tackle common problems and challenges. It was also noted that information-sharing was highly important, as well as all support to the countries of the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Finally, even though participants considered that the Union for the Mediterranean could become a space for cooperation in the field of maritime security, it was also mentioned that close attention should be paid to the EU actions and to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.

Meanwhile, the civil protection group stressed the need to strengthen cooperation for both objective and subjective reasons. The objective reasons underlined particular vulnerability to all kind of natural disasters to which the countries of the Mediterranean basin are exposed. The subjective reasons included the importance of cooperation as a mechanism for exporting trust and stability. Furthermore, it was pointed out that civil protection projects exist, and that their focus on prevention is increasing. Nevertheless, there is still the need to foster cooperation and common work to consolidate and harmonise the concept of civil protection; which in some countries is still linked to the concept of war. Finally, it was emphasised that the armed forces should play an instrumental role in the sphere of civil protection, in prevention and in post-conflict rehabilitation.

As for the crisis management missions group, it was noted that there are experiences in the Mediterranean region, such as FINUL, from which we can extract lessons. Likewise, there are recent elements such as the Euro-Atlantic convergence, the launching of the Union for the Mediterranean and the development of the ESDP that influence the defining and setting up of crisis management missions. To conclude, it was said that it is too soon to coordinate broad cooperation in the area of crisis management missions. Participants stressed the lack of cooperation from the southern countries in the EU-NATO framework, and the fact that neither the countries from the southern shores nor EU countries had led any major projects. To conclude, it was stressed was the need to regain the OSCE, and the importance to take advantage of the new opportunities to act from a pragmatic point of view for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING TOWARD 2010

Once the addresses and work groups had ended, the seminar began its closing session with a conclusions table. Miguel Angel Ballesteros, Director of the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies, chaired the discussion. In his address he stressed the importance of the Mediterranean, an area with undeniable risks and threats such as organised crime and terrorism. Ballesteros underlined that integrating the East with the West and the North with the South is large part of the solution— solutions that do not necessarily offer points of convergence. As an example he mentioned the 5+5 initiative and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. Ballesteros noted that these initiatives are forums of complementary cooperation that facilitate understanding and collaboration.

Eduard Soler, Coordinator of CIDOB's Mediterranean and Middle East Programme, underlined the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict when considering, during the course of the seminar, new cooperation scenarios in the issue of security in the Mediterranean basin. Yet, Soler pointed out that looking to the future, opportunities have opened up for stronger transatlantic cooperation which will in turn take into consideration the views and priorities of new emerging powers. He emphasised the existence of a demand for a stronger presence of Europe in many fields, as well as in that of security. Furthermore, he stressed that one aspect that was repeated during the course of the seminar was the growing role of Turkey, both at the transatlantic level and in the evolution of the Middle East.

Finally, Fidel Sendagorta, Director General for the Mediterranean, Maghreb and the Middle East of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, brought the seminar to an end with an analysis of the current situation and a preview of Spain's EU Presidency. The summary was not encouraging, as he reminded participants that we began the year with the crisis in Gaza, the consequent paralysing of the Union for the Mediterranean until well into spring, and that even now serious difficulties persist.

Sendagorta agreed that the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a destabilising factor must be stressed, and noted that if anyone ever believed that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership could be depoliticised, this was the product of an illusion. For this reason, nowadays there is greater pressure and conviction about the idea that if we fail to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict today, it may be too late tomorrow. Yet, the Union for Mediterranean could prove to be a major advantage for restarting dialogue on a regional dimension. As for the situation in the Middle East, Sendagorta mentioned, in addition to the aforementioned Arab-Israeli conflict, the nuclear issue in Iran, Iraq's return to full sovereignty, Syria's overcoming of its international isolation, the stabilisation of Lebanon and the diplomatic repositioning of Turkey. Furthermore, Sendagorta mentioned the new external factor; that is, the Obama Administration and its new relationship with the Arab world. He pointed out that while the US government has not achieved much in its first attempts at negotiation; it has a steely determination to make progress towards peace in the region.

In light of all these issues, Spain's Presidency of the EU is conceived as a contribution to peace, stability and dialogue. Spain will take steps to restart peace discussions and to ensure that the institutional reform of the Union for the Mediterranean is consolidated. Finally, the speaker referred to the different priorities for the global agenda that could be transferred to the Mediterranean. Among the issues mentioned were the economic crisis and climate change, including such issues of key importance as the cleaning up of the Mediterranean Sea, sustainable economy and the correct management of water.

ANEXO

- PROGRAMA DEL SEMINARIO
- PROGRAMME DU SÉMINAIRE
- SEMINAR PROGRAMME

La iniciativa de organizar conjuntamente este seminario internacional se remonta al año 2002. Desde entonces y, con periodicidad anual, el Ministerio de Defensa y la Fundación CIDOB han reunido en Barcelona a los principales expertos, académicos y gubernamentales, civiles y militares, involucrados en el estudio y la práctica de la seguridad y la defensa en el Mediterráneo.

Los principales objetivos de este encuentro son, en primer lugar, aumentar la transparencia y el conocimiento en el desarrollo e implementación de las distintas iniciativas en el campo de la seguridad. En segundo lugar, fomentar espacios de relación y conocimiento mutuo entre personalidades de procedencias y disciplinas diversas. En tercer lugar, contribuir al debate político y académico sobre la seguridad y la defensa en el Mediterráneo.

En esta edición el seminario dedica especial atención a abordar nuevos escenarios de colaboración en el marco del diálogo transatlántico, en la seguridad marítima, en la protección civil y en las misiones de gestión de crisis.

9.30 **INAUGURACIÓN**

Luis M. Cuesta, Secretario General de Política de Defensa, España

Hakan Jevrell, Secretario de Estado, Secretaría General de Política de Defensa, Suecia

Narcís Serra, Presidente, CIDOB

10:15 **SEGURIDAD Y DESARROLLO: LA SEGURIDAD HUMANA EN EL MUNDO ÁRABE**

Mustafa Kamel Al Sayyid, Profesor de Ciencias Políticas y Economía, Universidad de El Cairo

11.00 Pausa café

11.30 **EL MEDITERRÁNEO Y ORIENTE MEDIO EN EL DIÁLOGO TRANSATLÁNTICO**

Preside y modera:

Carlos Westendorp, Asesor del Grupo de Reflexión sobre la Unión Europea y antiguo Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de España

Intervienen:

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director del Instituto de Estudios de Seguridad de la Unión Europea, París

Brian Lisko Capitán de Fragata, Oficial de Enlace del Cuerpo de Guardacostas ante el Mando de Fuerzas Navales para Europa y África, Estados Unidos

David Hacham, Consejero en Asuntos Árabes, Ministerio de Defensa, Israel

Yilmaz Aklar, Analista principal, Fundación para la Investigación sobre las Políticas Económicas en Turquía (TEPAV), Ankara

John Bell, antiguo Diplomático en Naciones y Canadá, Director del Programa Oriente Medio, Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz, España

14.00 Almuerzo

15.30 **GRUPOS DE TRABAJO**

Seguridad Marítima

Preside y modera:

Jean François Coustilière, Director, Horizons Méditerranée, Francia

Panelistas:

Arslan Chikhaoui, Presidente de Nord-Sud ventures, Argel

José Antonio Ruesta Botella, Jefe de la División de Planes del Estado Mayor de la Armada, Ministerio de Defensa, España

Basil Germond, Investigador Universidad de Salford, Manchester

Protección Civil

Preside y modera:

Josep Ramon Mora Villamate, Director General de Protección Civil, Generalitat de Catalunya

Panelistas:

Philippe Nardin, Jefe de Relaciones Internacionales, Dirección de Defensa y Seguridad Civiles, Francia

Carlos Dueñas, Subdirector General de Planificación, Operaciones y Emergencias, Ministerio del Interior, España

Mustafa Tag-Eldeen, Presidente de DIMCO (Disaster and Emergency Management), Estocolmo, Suecia

José Emilio Roldán, Jefe de la Unidad Militar de Emergencias (UME), Ministerio de Defensa, España

Raül Daussà, Responsable del programa ambiental, Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (OSCE)

Misiones de gestión de crisis

Preside y modera

Jose Antonio Lazuen, Director del Departamento de Infraestructuras y Seguimiento para situaciones de crisis (DISSC), Presidencia del Gobierno, España

Panelistas:

Timur Goksel, antiguo Asesor principal de UNIFIL, Beirut

Javier Muñoz Castresana, Subdirector de Cooperación y Defensa Civil, Ministerio de Defensa, España

Salvador Moreno Susanna, División de Operaciones del Estado Mayor Militar Internacional (IMS), OTAN, Bruselas

18.00 Pausa café

18.30 CONCLUSIONES Y CLAUSURA

Preside y modera

Miguel Ángel Ballesteros Martín, Director del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE), Ministerio de Defensa, España

Relatoría de los grupos de trabajo

Conclusiones de la jornada

Conferencia de clausura sobre la Presidencia española de la UE y el Mediterráneo

Fidel Sendagorta, Director general para el Mediterráneo, Magreb y Oriente Próximo, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, España

PROGRAMME DU SÉMINAIRE

L'initiative d'organiser ce séminaire de façon conjointe date de l'année 2002. Depuis, et avec une périodicité annuelle, le Ministère de la Défense et la Fondation CIDOB ont réuni à Barcelone les principaux experts, du domaine académique et gouvernemental, civils et militaires, engagés dans l'étude et la pratique de la sécurité et la défense dans la Méditerranée.

Cette rencontre vise, tout d'abord, à renforcer la transparence et la connaissance en relation avec le développement et la mise en œuvre des différentes initiatives dans le domaine de la sécurité. Deuxièmement, il s'agit d'encourager des espaces de relation et de connaissance mutuelle entre personnalités d'origines et de disciplines différentes. Troisièmement, nous visons à contribuer au débat politique et académique sur la sécurité et la défense dans la Méditerranée.

Dans cette édition, le séminaire mettra en exergue de nouveaux scénarios de coopération : dans le dialogue transatlantique, la sécurité maritime, la protection civile et les missions de gestion de crises.

9.30 **INAUGURATION**

Luis M. Cuesta, Secrétaire Général de Politique de Défense, Espagne
Hakan Jevrell, Secrétaire d'État, Secrétariat Général de Politique de Défense, Suède
Narcís Serra, Président, CIDOB

10:15 **SÉCURITÉ ET DÉVELOPPEMENT : LA SÉCURITÉ HUMAINE AU MONDE ARABE**

Mustafa Kamel Al Sayyid, Professeur, Faculté de Sciences Politiques et Économie, Université du Caire

11.00 Pause café

11.30 **LA MÉDITERRANÉE ET LE MOYEN ORIENT DANS LE DIALOGUE TRANSATLANTIQUE**

Président et modérateur:

Carlos Westendorp, Conseiller du Groupe de Réflexion de l'Union Européenne et ancien Ministre des affaires étrangères d'Espagne

Intervenants:

Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Directeur de l'Institut d'Études de Sécurité de l'Union Européenne (IESUE), Paris

Brian Lisko, Commandant, Garde-côtes États-Unis, Commandant Officier de Liaison des Garde-côtes, Forces Navales Europe-Afrique, États-Unis

David Hacham, Conseiller aux Affaires Arabes, Ministère de la Défense, Israël

Yilmaz Aklar, Analyste Principal, Fondation pour la Recherche sur les Politiques Économiques en Turquie (TEPAV), Ankara

John Bell, ancien Diplomat auprès des Nations Unies et Canada, Directeur du Programme du Moyen-Orient, Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz, Madrid

14.00 Déjeuner

15.30 **GROUPES DE TRAVAIL SIMULTANÉS**

Sécurité maritime

Président et modérateur:

Jean François Coustillière, Directeur d'Horizons Méditerranée, France

Panélistes:

Arslan Chikhaoui, Consultant et Directeur de Nord-Sud Ventures, Alger

José Antonio Ruesta Botella, Chef de Division des Plans de l'Etat Major des Forces Navales, Ministère de la Défense, Espagne

Basil Germond, Chercheur Principal, Université de Salford, Manchester

Protection Civile

Président et modérateur:

Josep Ramon Mora Villamate, Directeur Général de la Protection Civile, Gouvernement de la Catalogne

Panélistes:

Philippe Nardin, Chef de missions de Relations Internationales, Direction de la Défense et de la Sécurité Civiles, France

Carlos Dueñas, Sous-Directeur Général, Planification, Opérations et Urgences, Ministère de l'Intérieur, Espagne

Mustafa Tag-Eldeen, Président de DIMCO (Disaster and Emergency Management), Stockholm, Suède

José Emilio Roldán, Chef de l'Unité Militaire d'Emergences, Ministère de la Défense, Espagne

Raül Daussà, Officier du Programme Environnemental, Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (OSCE)

Missions de gestion de crises

Président et modérateur

José Antonio Lazuen, Directeur du Département des Infrastructures et Suivi des Situations de Crise (DISSC), Présidence du Gouvernement Espagnol

Panélistes:

Timur Goksel, ancien Conseiller Principal de l'UNIFIL, Beyrouth

Javier Muñoz Castresana, Sous-Directeur de Coopération et Défense Civile, Ministère de la Défense, Espagne

Salvador Moreno Susanna, Division des Opérations de l'Etat Major Militaire International (IMS), OTAN, Bruxelles

18.00 Pause café

18.30 CONCLUSIONS ET CLÔTURE

Président et modérateur:

Miguel Ángel Ballesteros Martín, Directeur, Institute Espagnol d'Études Stratégiques (IEEE), Ministère de la Défense, Espagne

Compte rendu des groupes de travail

Conclusions de la journée

Conférence de clôture sur la Présidence espagnole de l'UE

Fidel Sendagorta, Directeur Général pour la Méditerranée, le Maghreb et le Proche Orient, Ministère Espagnol des Affaires Étrangères, Espagne

The initiative of jointly organising this international seminar goes back to the year 2002. Since then, and on a yearly basis, the Ministry of Defence and the CIDOB Foundation have brought together, in Barcelona, the principal experts, both academic and governmental and both civil and military, who are involved in the study and practice of security and defence in the Mediterranean.

The main objectives of this encounter are, in the first place, to increase transparency and knowledge in the development and implementation of the different initiatives in the field of security; secondly, to promote spaces of relationship and mutual knowledge among figures from different backgrounds and disciplines; and thirdly, to contribute to the political and academic debate on security and defence in the Mediterranean.

In this edition, the seminar puts a special emphasis on exploring new scenarios for cooperation: in the transatlantic dialogue, in maritime security, in civil protection and in crisis management operations

9.30 **INAUGURATION**

Luis M. Cuesta, Secretary General for Defence Policy, Spain
Hakan Jevrell, State Secretary, Secretariat General for Defence Policy, Sweden
Narcís Serra, President CIDOB

10:15 **SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ARAB WORLD**

Mustafa Kamel Al Sayyid, Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Economy, Cairo University

11.00 Coffee Break

11.30 **THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE**

Chairman and moderator:
Carlos Westendorp, Advisor of the European Union Reflection Group and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain

Speakers:
Álvaro de Vasconcelos, Director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris
Brian Lisko, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Liaison Officer. Commander, Naval Forces Europe – Africa, United States
David Hacham, Adviser for Arab Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Israel
Yilmaz Aklar, Senior Analyst, Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara
John Bell, Former Canadian and United Nations diplomat, Director, Middle East and Mediterranean, Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz, Madrid

14.00 Lunch

15.30 **SIMULTANEOUS WORKING GROUPS**

Maritime Security

Chairman and moderator:
Jean François Coustillière, Director of Horizons Méditerranée, France

Panellists:
Arslan Chikhaoui, President of Nord-Sud ventures, Algiers
José Antonio Ruesta Botella, Head of Plans Division, General Staff of the Navy, Spain
Basil Germond, Research Fellow, University of Salford, Manchester

Civil Protection

Chairman and moderator:

Josep Ramon Mora Villamate, Director-General, Civil Protection, Government of Catalonia

Panellists:

Philippe Nardin, Chief of International Relations, Direction for Defence and Civil Security, France

Carlos Dueñas, Deputy Director-General, Planification, Operations and Emergencies, Ministry of Home Affairs, Spain

Mustafa Tag-Eldeen, Chairman Swedish DIMCO (Disaster and Emergency Management) Stockholm, Sweden

José Emilio Roldán, Head Military Emergency Unit (UME), Ministry of Defence, Spain

Raül Daussà, Environmental Programme Officer, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

Crisis Management Missions

Chairman and moderator

José Antonio Lazuen, Director of the Department of Infrastructure and Monitoring of Crisis Situations (DISSC), Presidency of the Spanish Government

Panellists:

Timur Goksel, former Senior Advisor of UNIFIL, Beirut

José Javier Muñoz Castresana, Deputy Director of Cooperation and Civil Defence, Ministry of Defence, Spain

Salvador Moreno Susanna, Deputy Assistant Director, Operations Division International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters, Brussels

18.00 Coffee break

18.30 CONCLUSIONS AND CLOSING

Chairman and moderator:

Miguel Ángel Ballesteros Martín, Director, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE), Ministry of Defence, Spain

Reports on working groups

Conclusions of the discussions

Closing conference on the Spanish Presidency of the EU

Fidel Sendagorta, General Director for the Mediterranean, the Maghreb and the Near East, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Spain

